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with Limited Information
Mohammed-Amine Allouah
Information availability plays a fundemantal role in decision-making for business
operations. The present dissertation aims to develop frameworks and algorithms in
order to guide a decision-maker in environments with limited information. In particu-
lar, in the first part, we study the fundemantal problem of designing optimal auctions
while relaxing the widely used assumption of common prior. We are able to char-
acterize (near-)optimal mechanisms and associated performance. In the second part
of the dissertation, we focus on data-driven pricing in the low sample regime. More
precisely, we study the fundemantal problem of a seller pricing a product based on
historical information consisting of one sample of the willingness-to-pay distribution.
By drawing connection with the statistical theory of reliability, we propose a novel ap-
proach, using dynamic programming, to characterize near-optimal data-driven pricing
algorithms and their performance. In the last part of the dissertation, we delve into
the detailed practical operations of the online display advertising marketplace from
an information structure perspective. In particular, we analyze the tactical role of
intermediaries within this marketplace and their impact on the value chain. In turn,
we make the case that under some market conditions, there is a potential for Pareto
improvement by adjusting the role of these intermediaries.
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Introduction
Decision-making is embedded at all strategic and operational levels of organizations.
With the widespread emergence of technology during the last decades, there is an un-
precedented need for theory and frameworks to guide real-time decisions in a scalable
fashion.
One key building block of any decision-making task is the information available to
the decision-maker. Depending on the availability and the structure of the informa-
tion at hand, the approach might differ significantly. For example, in the e-commerce
industry, if a seller has tailored information about the preferences of her customers,
then she might be able to segment these customers and make the decision to present
personalized offers to each segment. More broadly, given the information gathered,
a decision-maker needs to be armed with suitable algorithms, tools and models that
would guide her toward the “best” decision. Such a need was at the inception of many
streams of literature across different research communities. In particular, some main
streams of literature across Operations Research, Economics, Computer Science have
led different approaches to tackle this need. For instance, some streams develop differ-
ent stochastic models and optimization frameworks in order to guide a decision maker.
Some other key streams study models in order to analyze the market equilibrium and
strategic behavior of agents that a decision maker might face. Also, some important
streams analyze and design algorithms and study approximation solutions in order
to help a decision maker approach the best decision. Moreover, within the machine
learning community, there has been recently significant developments of algorithms
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in order to train models from existing data to learn to guide decision-making.
Despite the difference in approaches and interests, at the heart of these commu-
nities lays some fundemantal questions: How to model the information available to
the decision-maker? Given this model of available information, how to find the best
decision? As a result, what insights or recommendations the decision maker needs to
follow? What is the impact of such decisions on the other agents?
There has been a massive body of research trying to address these questions across
different communities with important questions still open. This present dissertation
aims to contribute to this stream, focusing on the design of selling mechanisms under
various information structure: a decision maker, aka a seller, with limited informa-
tion, aims to design a selling mechanism to sell goods to buyers. In the first two
chapters, we analyze the case when the seller has limited information about the pro-
cess generating the buyers’ values for the goods. Especially, in the first, chapter, we
focus on characterizing the optimal selling mechanism in the presence of competi-
tion under limited information. In the second chapter, we study a complementary
direction, where there is no competition and the seller has some available data to
design the optimal selling mechanism. In the last chapter, we analyze a model where
the information structure is impacted by the market structure rather than the lack
of knowledge of buyers’ characteristics. More precisely, we study the impact of the
presence of intermediaries between the seller and buyers on the information structure
and ultimately on the welfare of each agents involved.
Chapter 1. We will be analyzing the questions raised under the lens of auctions.
In other words, the central question of the first chapter is what is the optimal auction
or optimal decision of an auctioneer, when she has limited information about the
preferences of potential buyers.
The motivation of this question is rooted around different practical and theoretical
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reasons. Indeed, auctions have been a central tool in selling goods and services across
history. Nowadays, auctions are used in many of industries. Governments for instance
use auction to sell public goods such as spectrum licenses. Auctions are also used to
sell unique and historical art pieces. Given the rise of technology and new industries,
auctions have gained even more prevalence. In online advertisement, there are millions
of auctions taking place daily.
This importance of auctions has led different communities such as Operations
Research, Economics and Computer Science to elaborate and analyze models, algo-
rithms and tools in order to support decision making in auctions. Although there
has been extensive work on designing auctions under different settings, a large body
of the literature is anchored around a crucial informational assumption: that of a
common prior. In more details, this assumption means that the seller as wells as the
buyers share some common prior on the process generating the values for the object.
Since the seminal works of Vickrey (1961) and Myerson (1981), this assumption
has allowed many subsequent works to derive tractable models and solutions for
the optimal auctions. However, at the same time, this assumption might create a
potential disconnect between practice and theory. Indeed, there are many settings
in which this assumption can be clearly violated. For instance, in the case of a
brand new product, it is not clear how a decision maker can determine the exact
process generating the values of buyers. Another setting is motivated by emerging
privacy policies. In particular, even though an auctioneer can have access to large
data-sets, then due to regulation constraints, she might be constrained not to use
the full data when fine tuning the auction. More generally, the buyers themselves
might not know apriori their own value and might need to go through some complex
process to determine the value of the auctioned good, and in turn it is not clear how
an auctioneer might make assumptions on such a complex process. Hence, practice
motivates the need to relax this assumption.
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This need to relax this assumption to have more “realistic” models is typically
referred as the “Wilson doctrine” (Wilson, 1987). Motivated by this doctrine, a recent
stream of literature at the frontier of Operations Research, Economics and Computer
Science has emerged to close this gap. This first chapter contributes to this growing
stream.
In particular, we study the design of optimal prior-independent selling mecha-
nisms: buyers do not have any information about their competitors and the seller
does not know the distribution of values, but only knows a general class it belongs
to. Anchored on the canonical model of two buyers with independent and identically
distributed values, we analyze a competitive ratio objective, in which the seller at-
tempts to optimize the worst-case fraction of revenues garnered compared to those
of an oracle with knowledge of the distribution. We characterize properties of op-
timal mechanisms, and in turn establish fundamental impossibility results through
upper bounds on the maximin ratio. By also deriving lower bounds on the maximin
ratio, we are able to crisply characterize the optimal performance for a spectrum of
families of distributions. In particular, our results imply that a second price auction
is an optimal mechanism when the seller only knows that the distribution of buyers
has a monotone non-decreasing hazard rate, and guarantees at least 71.53% of oracle
revenues against any distribution within this class. Furthermore, a second price auc-
tion is near-optimal when the class of admissible distributions is that of those with
non-decreasing virtual value function (aka regular). Under this class, it guarantees a
fraction of 50% of oracle revenues and no mechanism can guarantee more than 55.6%.
Finally, we extend our results to the case of an unknown and adversarially selected
number of buyers and show that the same bounds above hold.
Chapter 2. In the first chapter, we have focused on the case in which the decision
maker does not use any side or historical information. In the second chapter, we
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study a complementary setting. Especially, under limited information, we assume
that the decision maker has access to some side information or historical data and
facing only one buyer, meaning there is no competition among buyers. In other
words, we study the canonical model of one seller selling one indivisible good based
on existing data. This falls under the data-driven pricing. The main problem we
are interested by is how to design the optimal algorithm that maps available data to
the pricing decision. This stream has also received attention from different angles.
Some streams have studied the sample complexity in order to achieve a near-optimal
revenue compared to the oracle monopoly revenue under full information. The online
learning community has studied this problem in a dynamic fashion. The focus of
that stream is to minimize the regret by optimally trading-off between exploration
and exploitation. In both of the last streams, the mode of analysis is asymptotic,
meaning either the seller has a large amount of data or has a long time horizon to
learn. In the recent years, there has been an interest on developing models in finite
sample regimes.
Chapter 2 focuses on the regime where the seller has only access to one obser-
vation. In more details, we analyze the following fundamental problem: how should
a decision-maker optimally price based on a single sample of the willingness-to-pay
(WTP) of customers. The decision-maker’s objective is to select a general pricing
policy with maximum competitive ratio when the WTP distribution is only known to
belong to some broad set. We characterize optimal performance across a spectrum of
non-parametric families of distributions, α-strongly regular distributions, two notable
special cases being regular and monotone hazard rate distributions. We develop a
general approach to obtain structural lower and upper bounds on the maximin ratio
characterized by novel dynamic programming value functions. In turn, we develop
a tractable procedure to obtain near-optimal mechanisms and near-worst-case distri-
butions, allowing to characterize the maximin ratio for all values of α in [0, 1].
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Chapter 3. In the last two chapters, we have analyzed how the optimal auctions
and pricing are impacted by the available information to the seller. Sometimes, the
information availability is also impacted by the structure of the market. In particular,
the presence of intermediaries between a seller and potential buyers might distort
the information flow. In this third chapter, we study how does the structure of a
marketplace, especially the presence of intermediaries, impact the information and
the performance of different agents within this market? This is particularly motivated
by the marketplace of Online Display Advertising.
Online Advertising is becoming one of the most prominent channels for companies
and brands to reach their customers. In particular, with the advance of the technol-
ogy, online advertising allows these companies to target in real time their customers.
This selling mechanism is typically referred as Real-time Bidding. In more details,
while a user is loading a page with an advertisement banner, advertisers can now
participate in auctions and send in real time their bids based on the available infor-
mation about this user. This high flexibility of targeting has attracted over the last
decades lot of interest in industry and has created a value chain of different actors.
Especially, there has been the emergence of intermediaries between the advertisers
and publishers across the value chain. In other words, advertisers can go through
some intermediaries that will manage the bidding process on their behalf.
In practice, these intermediaries allow to reduce the cost of participating in this
real-time bidding process for advertisers because of the economy of scale and the
need of technical expertise. But at the same time, these intermediaries impact the
information structure within this marketplace given the fact that they may manage
couple of advertisers simultaneously. In turn, intermediaries, when bidding on behalf
of their customers, strategize to maximize some internal objective and may only
submit a single bid to limit competition on a given item. In this chapter, we propose
a framework to analyze the implications of such a campaign coordination role by
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intermediaries, taking as a benchmark the case in which each intermediary would
manage the bidding process of each advertiser it represents independently of other
buyers, a case we refer to as multi-bidding. We show that the adoption of multi-
bidding by all intermediaries would lead to an increase in both the social welfare and
the seller’s revenues. Furthermore, we analyze the impact on buyers in two regimes:
i.) without competition among intermediaries and ii.) with competition, with a large
number of intermediaries and buyers in an appropriate asymptotic regime. Quite
remarkably, we establish that multi-bidding would also lead to an increase in the
buyers’ side surplus under a very broad set of market characteristics. In particular,
as long as the average number of buyers interested in an item is moderate and the
coefficient of variation of buyers’ values is not too small, moving from coordinated
campaigns to multi-bidding leads to a Pareto improvement in the value chain.
In each chapter, we discuss in more details, the contributions and the positioning





Auctions have been run for many centuries and play today a prominent role in ap-
plications as diverse as e-commerce, spectrum allocation, antique sales, online adver-
tising and procurement. In turn, auction design has been a central topic of research
at the intersection of Operations Research, Computer Science and Economics. The
monograph of Krishna (2009) provides an overview of auction theory and Talluri and
Van Ryzin (2006) details many revenue management applications. While there is an
elegant theory of auction design dating back to the seminal works of, e.g., Vickrey
(1961) and Myerson (1981), the classical theory of auctions is anchored around a fun-
damental assumption: that of a common prior. This assumption stipulates that the
seller as well as the buyers share the same common prior on the process generating
the values for the object. In turn, this assumption leads naturally to the buyers using
this common prior to play equilibrium bidding strategies, forming a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium; and the seller, anticipating such equilibrium behavior, can optimize the
selling mechanism based on this prior. This poses a challenge in practice as such a
prior is not available and it is not clear how the seller’s belief and the buyers’ beliefs
about values should coincide, or how they would be formed correctly. In turn, a
fundamental question from practical and theoretical perspectives pertains to how to
relax such an assumption and what performance can one expect in its absence. This
fundamental need to move beyond mechanisms that rely on priors is often referred
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to as the “Wilson doctrine” (Wilson, 1987). Relaxing the assumption on common
priors leads to a trade-off between information about the distribution of values and
performance which motivate the following questions. What is the maximum fraction
of revenues that one can guarantee compared to an oracle that would have access to
the underlying distribution of values? How does this fraction vary as a function of
the information available about the underlying distribution? These are the central
questions that this chapter aims to address.
In the present chapter, we aim to address the above in the canonical private value
model of a seller trying to sell a good to two bidders with independent and identi-
cally distributed values1. While mechanism design is very well understood for this
classical model under the common prior assumption, it remains challenging in prior-
independent environments. (We review shortly in detail related work.) As soon as
one relaxes the common prior assumption, a first question is how to formulate the
problem. On the one hand, the common prior affected bidding behavior of buyers.
On the other hand, it also affects the seller’s mechanism optimization problem. We
maintain the fact that values are drawn from an underlying distribution (the true
distribution of values), as in the classical framework, but we do not assume knowl-
edge of this distribution by the buyers or the seller. In turn, one needs to specify
the information available to the buyers and the resulting equilibrium, as well as the
seller’s knowledge and feasible mechanisms, and these two are tightly interconnected.
For the buyers’ side, we will adopt a detail-free approach and assume that buyers’
optimal decisions are independent of any information about the other buyers’ val-
ues. For that, we will restrict attention to mechanisms for which truth-telling is a
dominant strategy, so-called Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) mech-
anisms. Against such a mechanism, buyers bidding their values represent a dominant
1We extend the results to the case in which the number of buyers can be more than two, and is
picked adversarially by nature.
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strategy Nash Equilibrium. On the seller’s side, we will assume that the seller is
free to select among such mechanisms. Given that the seller does not know the true
distribution of values, we will adopt a maximin ratio approach. We model our prob-
lem as a game between nature and the seller. The seller first selects a mechanism in
the class of DSIC mechanisms. Then, nature may counter such a mechanism with
any distribution for buyers’ values from a given class of admissible distributions. In
particular, the resulting equilibrium induced by the mechanism is dominant strat-
egy incentive compatible and the only knowledge the seller is endowed with is the
class of admissible distributions. For any distribution and mechanism, we measure
the performance of the seller through the ratio of the revenue she garners using this
mechanism over the optimal revenue she would have obtained with access to the exact
knowledge of the distribution. We refer to the latter as the oracle revenues. The ratio
is always between 0 and 1 and the higher the ratio, the better the performance. We
focus on a maximin setting in which the seller attempts to maximize the worst-case
performance ratio (or competitive ratio) over the class of admissible distributions.
Our results provide a characterization of the maximin ratio across a spectrum of
distribution classes. In particular, we consider three main classes of distributions. It
is possible to show that against the general class of distributions, no DSIC mechanism
can guarantee a positive fraction of oracle revenues and hence there is a need to study
how different structures of the underlying distributions affect the type of performance
that can be achieved. Beyond the general class of distributions, we will consider a
class which is central to mechanism design (including under the common prior as-
sumption), that of so-called regular distributions. These are distributions that admit
increasing virtual value function. In addition to the class of regular distributions,
we will also analyze the subclass of monotone increasing hazard rate distributions
(MHR) (also often referred to as increasing failure rate distributions), which contains
many distributions often assumed in practice and in the literature (e.g., uniform,
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exponential, . . . ).
Summary of contributions. Before laying out our main results, it is important
to highlight the nature of the problem we study. On the one hand, given a particu-
lar mechanism, nature selects the worst possible distributions in the non-parametric
classes above. So nature when minimizing the ratio of revenues compared to ora-
cle performance, is solving a non-convex infinite dimensional optimization problem.
In turn, fully understanding the worst-case performance of a specific mechanism is
highly non-trivial and not necessarily tractable. On the other hand, the seller, when
optimizing over DSIC mechanisms, is also solving an infinite dimensional problem
(over allocation and payment mappings). An important contribution of the present
chapter is to propose an approach to tackle this class of problems and characterize
optimal or near-optimal performance.
For regular distributions, it is known that a second price auction2 guarantees, in
the worst case scenario, 50% of the oracle revenues, as articulated in Dhangwatno-
tai et al. (2015) through a reinterpretation of the results in Bulow and Klemperer
(1996). Notably, Fu et al. (2015) recently establish that a second price auction is not
prior-independent optimal. In particular, they exhibit a mechanism that randomizes
between a second price auction and an auction that inflates the second value and
establish that it ensures a competitive ratio of at least 51.2%. Table 1.1 below sum-
marizes the best known lower bounds on the maximin ratios as well as implications of
our results. While there is a lower bound on the maximin ratio against regular distri-
butions, there is no notion of what performance one should aim at, and how good are
the prior-independent auctions previously proposed. In the popular subclass of MHR
distributions, to the best of our knowledge, no lower or upper bounds were available
in the literature.
2Here and throughout the chapter, whenever we refer to a second price auction, unless otherwise
noted, it is implicitly assumed that there is no reserve price.
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A first significant layer of contribution pertains to the methodological domain and
allows to obtain the first impossibility results for any mechanism in a broad class of
DSIC mechanisms. We mainly focus on the case with two buyers, which intuitively
is the case with most tension while relaxing the common prior assumption, and then
establish that the bounds obtained for the case of two buyers also apply to the case
when the number of buyers is adversarially selected (Section 1.7.1).
We first develop families of tractable upper bounds on the maximin ratio. These
are obtained through successive dimensionality reductions on the space of mechanisms
and the space of distributions. We show that, under some mild regularity assumption
on the mechanisms, an optimal mechanism is scale-free (see Theorem 3.2). In other
words, it is sufficient to focus on mechanisms that only rely on the ratio of values of
buyers. In turn, leveraging properties of the allocations, we are able to “discretize”
the mechanisms without loss of optimality, and reduce the description of mechanisms
to a countable set (Proposition 1.1).
Given the result above, we then introduce general subsets of distributions. These
abstract subsets are developed in order to, on the one hand, being “hard” for any
mechanism, and on the other hand allow to further reduce the complexity of the set
of mechanisms under consideration, leading to a new generic upper bound (Theo-
rem 1.2). By customizing this bound through appropriate concrete classes and lever-
aging additional properties of the classes, we obtain parametric upper bounds for the
maximin ratio against regular distributions (Theorem 1.3) and MHR distributions
(Theorem 1.4). In turn, these upper bounds lead to the first impossibility results for
general randomized mechanisms against these two central classes of distributions. No
DSIC mechanism considered can guarantee more than 55.6% of oracle performance
against all regular distributions, and no DSIC mechanism considered can guarantee
more than 71.53% of oracle performance against all regular distributions.
These results have a significant implication for regular distributions. They imply
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that the mechanisms proposed to date in the literature are in fact near-optimal. A
second price auction is within 5.6% of optimal and the mechanism proposed in (Fu
et al., 2015) is within 4.4% of optimal. These impossibility results allow to quantify
the quality of any mechanism compared to optimal performance in the class of DSIC
mechanisms.
As a second layer of contribution, we also develop lower bounds on the max-
imin ratio. We develop a series of generic parametric lower bounds (Proposition 1.4,
Proposition 1.5) and in turn obtain lower bounds on the worst-case performance of
specific mechanisms. For the case of regular distributions, we establish that there
exists a mechanism that guarantees at least 51.9%, improving the best known lower
bound and further closing the gap with the upper bound we have developed. For the
case of MHR distributions, we establish that a particular mechanism, a second price
auction, guarantees at least 71.53% of oracle performance.
While we improve the lower bound on regular distributions, the significant impli-
cation of the lower bounds is for the MHR class. The first implication stems from
comparing it to the novel upper bound we derive for regular distributions. In particu-
lar, our results show how refined class information (from regular to MHR) translates
into improved performance. Against MHR distributions, even with only two buyers,
a seller is guaranteed 71.53% of oracle performance. The second implication is even
more notable. The conjunction of our upper and lower bounds imply that a second
price auction is actually optimal against MHR distributions and that we have exactly
characterized the maximin ratio for that class. Overall, the results above provide a
crisp characterization of the maximin ratio as information regarding distributions is
refined.
In addition, the results shed light on the trade-off that an auctioneer might face
between running an auction with limited information and the cost of collecting addi-
tional information to approach the oracle optimal revenue. Our results highlight how
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this trade-off might be affected by the nature of distributions that a decision-maker
might face, e.g., if distributions are more “concentrated” (as is the case for MHR).
From a different angle, in practice, there is also often a trade-off between revenue
maximization and social efficiency. In the canonical class studied, our results highlight
that, in a prior-independent environment, a second price auction is near optimal for
the wide class of regular distributions and optimal for the large subclass of MHR
distributions. As such, when limited information about the underlying distribution
of values is available, a simple, practical and socially efficient mechanism appears
“sufficient” from a revenue maximization perspective. Hence, there is a weak trade-off
between revenue maximization and social efficiency when facing regular distributions
and no trade-off when facing MHR distributions.
Maximin ratio
Lower Bounds Upper Bounds
Distributions class best known this chapter this chapter best known
Regular 51.2% 51.9% 55.6% n/a
MHR n/a 71.53% 71.53% n/a
Table 1.1: Maximin Performance. The table contrasts known results in the exist-
ing literature with the bounds derived obtained through the analysis in the present
chapter.
The remainder of the chapter. After relating our chapter to the existing litera-
ture, we formulate our problem and set up our framework for two buyers. In Section
1.3, we establish that one may restrict attention to scale-free mechanisms and charac-
terize the maximin ratio for general distributions. In Section 1.4, we derive a family
of upper bounds on the maximin ratio against subsets of regular distributions. In
Section 1.5, we investigate the case of regular distributions while the subset of MHR
distributions is the focus of Section 1.6. Then, in Section 1.7, we extend our results
to the case in which the number of buyers is arbitrary and adversarially selected, and
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discuss future directions. All proofs are presented in the appendix in the electronic
companion.
1.1.1 Literature review
Our work relates to a rich literature on auction design. Since the seminal work
Myerson (1981) that characterized the structure of an optimal revenue maximizing
mechanism when the seller has access to the exact distributions of values of buyers,
the research community has raised early on the need of designing auctions that do not
rely on such informational assumptions, often referred to as the “Wilson doctrine”
(Wilson, 1987). Our work belongs to the stream that aims to relax such assumptions.
There are different layers of informational assumptions that have been analyzed in
the literature. Some layers relate to the seller’s knowledge about the distributions
of values of buyers or the number of participating buyers. Other layers relate to
the knowledge of buyers about their own values as well as the values or number of
competitors.
When relaxing informational assumptions in auction design, there are two im-
plications. On the one hand, the information affects the type of mechanisms that
the seller can adopt. On the other hand, the information also affects the type of
equilibrium played by the competing buyers.
In terms of the assumption that each buyer makes on the value generating pro-
cess of his competitors, various alternatives have been analyzed. One extreme is to
assume that the buyers’ know their competitors distributions of values. In this case,
Caillaud and Robert (2005) show that the seller could exploit this and recover the
optimal oracle revenue even if she does not have access to the distributions of values
through a dynamic mechanism. A first relaxation is to assume that the buyers know
some ambiguity sets characterizing the distributions, see Bose et al. (2006), Chiesa
et al. (2015) and Koc¸yig˘it et al. (2017). A further relaxation is to assume that buyers
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do not have access to any information about values of other buyers, this is typically
done by assuming Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) mechanisms. We
refer the reader to Chung and Ely (2007) that gives a formal foundation of such an
assumption by showing that a dominant strategy mechanism always dominates in
terms of revenue any other mechanisms when the buyers’ beliefs about the distribu-
tion of their competitor is selected adversarially. Our work aims to make minimum
assumptions on both the seller and the buyer’s side, and in turn we focus on DSIC
mechanisms. Furthermore, we do not make any assumption on the buyers knowledge
on the number of competitors.
Another line of work relaxes the knowledge of the buyers regarding her true value,
by assuming that the buyer observes some signal related to the true value. We
refer the reader to, e.g., Bergemann et al. (2016) that aims to characterize optimal
auctions when there is uncertainty on the information structure of the buyers. See
also Bergemann and Morris (2013) for a broader overview. We would like to note that
in this line of work, it is typically assumed that the seller knows the distribution of
values of buyers. Compared to our work, we assume that the seller does not know the
distribution of values of buyers but knows the information structure of the buyers.
Furthermore, the DSIC assumption also implies that the equilibrium of buyers does
not depend on the underlying distributions of values. The buyers’ strategies also
does not depend on the number of buyers. In that regard, we also note that another
dimension of information on the side of buyers pertains to the number of buyers.
Harstad et al. (1990) and Levin and Ozdenoren (2004) relax this, while maintaining
knowledge of the distribution of values.
Once information on the buyers’ side is formulated, the next dimension relates to
the layer of information that the seller has. In that regard, there are at a high level
three main classes of information structures assumed on the knowledge of distribu-
tions of values of buyers: non-parametric canonical classes of distributions (Dhang-
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watnotai et al., 2015), statistics of the distributions (Azar et al., 2013), uncertainty
sets on the distributions (Koc¸yig˘it et al., 2017) or the values (Bandi and Bertsimas,
2014).
Finally, a fundamental other dimension pertains to how performance of a mech-
anism is measured in such an environment. One approach, typically referred to as
“robust” is to use the absolute worst-case performance based on the information
available, see, e.g., Carrasco et al. (2015), Bandi and Bertsimas (2014) and Koc¸yig˘it
et al. (2017). Another approach is to measure worst-case performance relative to
a full information benchmark, see, e.g., Neeman (2003) and Dhangwatnotai et al.
(2015). A more detailed discussion on various candidate objectives can be found in
Borodin and El-Yaniv (1998). Our work relates to the last branch of literature since
we characterize the optimal competitive ratio when the seller has only access to the
class of distributions of buyers. The ratio we analyze is unitless and has a physical
interpretation in terms of the fraction of oracle performance one can obtain compared
to an oracle.3
In this stream, an important set of results pertain to “existence” of mechanisms
with good guarantees. Looking at different classes of distributions Neeman (2003)
derive an early result and establishes a guarantee for the English auction, compared
to the social optimum. In particular, the author characterizes tight lower bounds as a
function of some summary statistics, on the performance of an English auction with
or without reserve price. The setting we focus on is the independently and identi-
cally distributed values case. In this setting, if the seller knows that the distribution
of values of buyers belongs to the regular class of distributions, then an implication
of classical results of Bulow and Klemperer (1996), based on the interpretation of
3It is worthwhile noting here that against the classes we consider (regular and mhr), a worst-
case absolute performance analysis would lead to a value of zero and all feasible mechanisms would
be optimal. The relative benchmark approach allows to control for the environment and derive
guarantees on broader sets of distributions.
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Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015), is that there exists a particular mechanism, namely a
second price auction, that extracts 50% of the oracle revenue had one known the
true distribution, against any regular distribution. Recently, Fu et al. (2015) show
that a second price auction is suboptimal against regular distributions by exhibiting
a randomized mechanism that has a higher guarantee than a second price auction. In
the present work, we focus on optimizing over a very broad class of DSIC mechanisms
and in turn establish fundamental impossibility results for any such mechanism. The
results complement the literature by not only characterizing what is achievable by
a particular mechanism but also characterizing optimal performance through upper
bounds on the maximin ratio. Furthermore, by focusing on the widely considered
subclass of mhr distributions, we establish that a second price auction is actually the
exact optimal mechanism in that case. This also sheds light on the role of random-
ization and its relationship to the class of distributions one faces.
In the case of multiple goods, Goldberg et al. (2006) introduce and analyze the
competitive ratio, where the worst case is taken with respect to any possible inputs;
and then establish that some auctions are competitive compared to a fixed pricing
benchmark. In more general environments Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) leverages the
connection to Bulow and Klemperer (1996) to propose a mechanism that has a non-
trivial performance even in general allocation environments. Relatedly, Sivan and
Syrgkanis (2013) extend a result of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) to the case in which
the distributions of values of buyers are a convex combination of regular distributions.
A related stream of literature focuses on alternative information about the distri-
bution. For instance, Azar and Micali (2012) and Azar et al. (2013) propose mech-
anisms in cases in which the seller has access to some summary statistics of the
distributions of values of buyers (mean or median). They exhibit mechanisms that
have performance guarantees compared to an oracle using these. In the present chap-
ter, we do not assume that the seller has access to some summary statistics and we
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focus on the optimal mechanism among a broad set of randomized mechanisms.
In our chapter, we focus on a static model with limited information. Other ex-
amples of directions analyzed pertain to the amount information available or the
dynamics. Cole and Roughgarden (2014) analyze the size of the sample that the
seller needs to observe from past data in order to design a near optimal mechanism.
Dynamic models have also been considered in the literature; see, e.g., Bose and Daripa
(2009) for a dynamic model under ambiguity. We refer the reader to review chap-
ters of Hartline and Roughgarden (2009), Hartline (2013), and Carroll (2018) for a
broader overview.
Another information assumption from seller’s perspective that the literature has
tried to relax is the knowledge of the exact number of buyers. For instance, while
maintaining the common prior assumption, McAfee and McMillan (1987) characterize
the optimal auctions when the seller has some prior on the number of buyers and Levin
and Ozdenoren (2004) study the seller’s best response when the number of buyers is
picked adversarially from some ambiguity set.
Our work also relates to pricing under limited information. Monopoly pricing with
unknown demand information was analyzed with various considerations in Bergemann
and Schlag (2008) for a minimax regret objective and in Eren and Maglaras (2010)
for the competitive ratio. Caldentey et al. (2016) extends this line of work to account
for the presence of strategic customers. Cohen et al. (2016) derive performance guar-
antees for pricing heuristics when the firm has some knowledge about the demand
shut-down price. More recently, Chen et al. (2017) study robust single item and bun-
dle pricing based on summary statistics of buyers’ values distribution. Leveraging
existing data, Huang et al. (2015) focus on pricing based on a finite sample of values.
There is also an extensive body of work on joint learning and pricing with various in-
formational structures. We refer the reader to Kleinberg and Leighton (2003), Keskin
and Zeevi (2014) and Besbes and Zeevi (2015) for various informational structures,
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as well as to Besbes and Zeevi (2009), Araman and Caldentey (2009) Farias and
Van Roy (2010), and Wang et al. (2014) for inventory considerations in such pricing
problems. den Boer (2015a) provides a survey of this line of work.
1.2 Problem formulation
We consider a seller offering an indivisible object for sale to two buyers. For now,
we focus on the two buyers case since it is the case with minimum competition,
and isolates the impact of relaxing the common prior assumption. We return to the
case of more than two buyers in Section 1.7. The two buyers have values identically
and independently distributed according to a distribution F with support SF in
[0,∞). We will denote by F (·) := 1−F (·) the complementary cumulative distribution
function (ccdf) of values.
We assume that the seller does not know exactly the distribution of values of
buyers, however she knows that it belongs to a particular class. The goal of the seller
is to design a mechanism that maximizes her revenue given the limited information
about the underlying distribution of values of buyers.
Seller’s problem. We model our problem as a game between the seller and nature,
in which the seller selects a prior-independent selling mechanism and then nature may
counter such a mechanism with any distribution of buyers’ values from an admissible
class.
A selling mechanism m = (x, t) is characterized by an allocation mapping x and
a payment mapping t, where x : R2 → [0, 1]2 and t : R2 → R. In particular, given
reports b1, b2 by buyers 1 and 2, a mechanism would allocate the good to buyer i with
probability xi(bi, b−i) and the expected payment of buyer i is ti(bi, b−i). Here, and in
all that follows, the notation (vi, v−i) is the vector that has value vi at position i and
v−i at the other position.
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We do not make any assumption on the buyer’s knowledge of the distribution.
Given this, we will restrict attention to dominant strategy incentive compatible
(DSIC) mechanisms. For such mechanisms, buyers need not make any assumptions
about the underlying distribution of values and will find it optimal to report their
true value, independently of the realization of value of the other buyers.4
More formally, we focus on the class of mechanisms m = (x, t) that satisfy the
following constraints
vi xi(vi, v−i)− ti(vi, v−i) ≥ 0, for all i and vi, v−i in R2+ (IR)
vi xi(vi, v−i)− ti(vi, v−i) ≥ vi xi(vˆi, v−i)− ti(vˆi, v−i), for all i and vi, v−i, vˆi in R3+,
(IC)∑
i=1,2
xi(vi, v−i) ≤ 1, for all v in R2+. (AC)
The first constraint (IR) captures ex-post individual rationality and states that
buyer i should be willing to participate compared to his outside option, normalized to
zero. The second constraint (IC) captures ex-post incentive compatibility and imposes
that a buyer should always find it optimal to report his true value, independently
of the value of the other buyer. Finally, (AC) is a constraint on the allocation
probabilities that captures that the seller can allocate at most one good. Note here
that we allow for randomized mechanisms by the seller. In addition, we will introduce
a regularity assumption on mechanisms. We denote by TV (xi, [a, b] × [c, d]) the
Arzela` total variation of the allocations on the set [a, b]× [c, d].5 We assume that the
allocations around zero have finite Arzela` total variation. In particular, we will be
focusing on the following set of mechanisms.
M =
{
(x, t) : (IR), (IC), (AC) and max
i=1,2
{TV (xi, [0, ε]2)} <∞ for some ε > 0
}
.(1.1)
4We also refer the reader to Chung and Ely (2007) for an in-depth discussion of DSIC mecha-
nisms.
5We recall the definition of Arzela` total variation in Section 1.8.
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This class of mechanisms is a rich one, containing for example the second price auction
with a deterministic reserve price and most mechanisms typically considered in the
literature. The assumption on the boundedness of the total variation of allocations
around zero is technical in nature6 but could also be seen as a way to avoid potentially
overly complex mechanisms that might be hard to implement in practice, given the
high burden this would put on the buyers.7
The revenue of the seller using a feasible mechanism m inM, if nature is selecting








We will use the subscript F to emphasize that the expectation is taken with respect
to that distribution.
The challenge in the present chapter is that the seller does not know the distri-
bution F and as a result cannot evaluate the objective above to select a “good” or
optimal mechanism. We next introduce a performance benchmark and pose a proper
objective for the seller for this environment with unknown distribution of values.
Oracle benchmark. The benchmark we will use, opt(F ), is the maximal perfor-
mance one could achieve with knowledge of the exact distribution of buyers’ values
when selecting mechanisms in M. More formally,









Seller’s objective. For an arbitrary mechanism in M, we define its performance








6While it is needed for the proofs, we conjecture that it does not imply a loss of optimality.
7In recent years, there has been growing literature advocating for simple mechanisms (see for
example Hartline and Roughgarden (2009), Daskalakis and Pierrakos (2011)). In that sense, the
mechanisms inM could be thought as a formalization of some broad class of “simple” mechanisms.
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In other words, R(m,F ) represents the fraction of the oracle benchmark performance
the mechanism is able to achieve. The ratio R(m,F ) always lies in [0, 1] and the
closest the ratio is to 1 the better the performance of the mechanism.
Let G denote the set of distributions with support included in [0,∞) with finite
and non-zero expectation, i.e.,
G = {F : [0,∞)→ [0, 1] : F is a cdf and 0 < EF [v] <∞} . (1.3)
Note that EF [v] > 0 if only if opt(F ) > 0. Hence the ratio R(m,F ) is well defined
for any element of the class G.
The objective of the present chapter is to characterize for classes F ⊆ G the
maximin ratio





In other words, we are interested in designing mechanisms that admit “good” perfor-
mance independently of the underlying distribution of values. In particular, the value
R(M,F ) represents the maximal fraction of oracle revenues (obtained with knowl-
edge of the distribution of values) that can be recovered when nature may select any
distribution in F .
Definition 1.1. A cdf F is said to be regular on its support SF if it admits a density
f and if the corresponding virtual value function φF : v 7→ v−(1−F (v))/f(v) is non-
decreasing over SF . We will further say that the distribution has monotone hazard
rate (MHR) if v 7→ f(v)/(1− F (v)) is non-decreasing over SF .
The class of regular distributions is very widely used and plays a central role in
mechanism design (with knowledge of the distribution of buyers) and the class of
monotone hazard rate distributions is a wide subclass of the set of regular distri-
bution that encompasses all distributions with log-concave densities (e.g., uniform,
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exponential, . . . ). In particular, beyond G, we will analyze the two subclasses of
distributions
Freg = {F ∈ G : F is regular}
Fmhr = {F ∈ G : F has monotone non-decreasing hazard rate}
It is clear that we have Fmhr ⊂ Freg ⊂ G and hence
R(M,G) ≤ R(M,Freg) ≤ R(M,Fmhr).
In the coming sections, we will be interested in quantifying the three quantities above
and characterizing optimal or near-optimal mechanisms.
Review of some known results. While, to the best of our knowledge, the prob-
lem above has not been addressed in the literature, some mechanisms m have been
exhibited and their performance characterized. A classical mechanism in M is the
second price auction mspa defined by
xi(vi, v−i) = 1{vi > v−i}+ .5 1{vi = v−i}
and
ti(vi, v−i) = v−i 1{vi > v−i}+ .5 v−i 1{vi = v−i}.
The results of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) and their reinterpretation for the per-




R(mspa, F ) = 50%,
Recently, Fu et al. (2015) exhibited a mechanism m that randomizes between the
identity and a mapping that inflates the second highest value and established that
inf
F∈Freg
R(m,F ) ≥ 51.2%.
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The results above imply a lower bound on R(M,Freg) through specific mechanisms
but leave open the question of optimal performance. In the present chapter, we aim
at characterizing the maximin ratio (2.2) and corresponding near-optimal solutions
for Freg, but also for G and Fmhr.
1.3 Optimality of Scale-Free Mechanisms
The goal of this section is to establish that one may reduce the space of mechanisms
to a simpler class, without loss of optimality. In particular, we will establish that one
may restrict attention to scale-free mechanisms (as defined later in Eq.(1.5)).
We first state a classical result from the mechanism design literature (see Myerson
(1981)) that links payments and allocations for any incentive compatible mechanism.
Lemma 1.1. A mechanism (x, t) verifies (IC) if and only if xi(·, v−i) is non-decreasing
for any v−i ≥ 0 and the payment mapping satisfies
ti(vi, v−i) = vi xi(vi, v−i)−
∫ vi
0
xi(l, v−i)dl + ti(0, v−i), for all vi, v−i ≥ 0.
Note that by the constraint (IR), ti(0, v−i) ≤ 0. Hence, we can restrict attention
to mechanisms that set ti(0, v−i) = 0 without loss of optimality. With some abuse
of notation, we impose this additional constraint in the class of mechanisms M. In
other words, given (IC), we can restrict attention to allocations that are monotone
in own values and payments are fully determined by the allocations.
Before stating the main result of this section, let us now introduce some definitions
pertaining to scaled distributions as well as a scale invariant classes of distributions.
Scaled distributions. For any distribution F in G, and θ > 0, we define Fθ(·) :=
F (θ ·) to be the θ-scaled distribution.
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Definition 1.2 (scale invariance). A class of distributions F ⊆ G is said to be
invariant under scaling if for any element F in F , the distribution Fθ also belongs to
F for any θ > 0.
Note that G, Freg and Fmhr are all scale invariant. The scale invariance of G
follows from the fact that EFθ [v] = θ−1 EF [v]. For Fmhr and Freg, note that for any
F , we have for all v in its support,
fθ(v)
1− Fθ(v) = θ
f(θv)











Hence, the MHR and regularity properties of any distributions Fθ are inherited from
the original distribution F .
Scale-free mechanisms. Recall the class of mechanisms M introduced in (1.1).
We next introduce the subclass of scale-free mechanismsMsf ⊂M defined as follows
Msf = {m ∈M : xi(θvi, θv−i) = xi(vi, v−i) for all v1, v2 ≥ 0, θ > 0, i = 1, 2} .(1.5)
This subclass of mechanisms have the property that the allocations do not depend
on the scale of values. With these definitions in place, we may now state the main
result of this section.
Theorem 1.1. For any class F ⊆ G that is invariant under scaling, when solving
(2.2), it is sufficient to consider scale-free mechanisms. Namely, we have
R(Msf ,F ) = R(M,F ).
This result establishes that we can restrict attention to the scale-free mecha-
nisms without loss of optimality. Intuitively, an optimal prior independent mecha-
nism should not depend on the scale of buyers’ values. If that were the case, then
nature could leverage it to significantly affect the performance of the seller. The proof
builds on this idea by evaluating a mechanism inM against a particular distribution
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and noting that the performance of this mechanism against any scaled version of the
distribution serves as an upper bound on the worst-case performance of this mech-
anism. (For this step, we leverage the boundedness of the total variation of feasible
mechanisms around zero.) In turn, by “swapping” the scale from the distribution to
the mechanism, we establish that the limiting performance of the mechanism against
a scaled version of the distribution as the scale goes to ∞ can be reinterpreted as
the performance of a scale-free mechanism against the original distribution. In other
words, we obtain that there exists a scale-free mechanism that performs at least as
well (in the worst-case) as the original mechanism.
The reduction to scale-free mechanisms significantly simplifies the set of mecha-
nisms under consideration and we will leverage this property to further reduce the
space of mechanisms in upcoming sections when we consider regular distributions
and its subsets. Before that, we directly leverage Theorem 3.2 to characterize the
maximin ratio under arbitrary distributions G, defined in (1.3).
In the previous literature, it was alluded to that without restrictions the seller can-
not have any guarantee, Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015). For completeness, we formalize
this here in our specific context.
Lemma 1.2. No mechanism in M can achieve a positive max-min ratio against the
general class G, namely,
R(M,G) = 0.
Lemma 1.2 shows that it is impossible for the seller to design a mechanism that
achieves positive worst-case performance against arbitrary distributions. The proof
relies on two main ideas. Given Theorem 3.2, one may restrict attention to scale-free
mechanisms. In turn, we establish that if the value of a buyer is zero then necessarily,
a scale-free mechanism charges zero to the other buyer, independently of its value.
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Given this, we establish that the performance of any scale-free mechanism when facing
the family of Bernoulli distribution of values can be arbitrarily small.
In the rest of the chapter, we focus on characterizing the maximin ratio for the
set of regular distributions Freg and the set of monotone hazard rate distributions
Fmhr.
1.4 Maximin Ratio for Subsets of Regular
Distributions
In this section, we focus on the development of a family of upper bounds onR(M,F )
for any F that is a subset of the class of regular distributions Freg. In particular,
the analysis of this section applies to both Freg and Fmhr and we will leverage these
results in Sections 1.5 and 1.6, when we specialize the analysis to those classes.
In Section 1.4.1, we establish that one may, without loss of optimality restrict
attention to a simpler set of mechanisms that are characterized by a sequence of
thresholds. In Section 1.4.2, we focus on a simplification of the set of distributions
against which one competes, which leads to a further simplification of the set of
mechanisms one needs to consider. The conjunction of results leads to a generic
family of upper bounds on R(M,F ) presented in Theorem 1.2.
Oracle Performance for regular distributions. Note that when the distribution
of values F is known and is regular, it is a standard result (cf. Myerson (1981)) that
an optimal mechanism is given by a second price auction with reserve price given by
rF := φ
−1
F (0), and in turn
opt(F ) = EF [φF (max{v1, v2})1{max{v1, v2} ≥ rF}] .
In particular, the optimal oracle mechanism depends on the knowledge of the distri-
bution through the reserve price. In what follows, we denote by qF = 1− F (rF ) the
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quantile associated with rF .
1.4.1 From general mechanisms to discrete threshold
mechanisms
Our first result consists of a reduction of the set of mechanisms that one needs to
focus on when the seller faces a subset of regular distributions. To that end, we
introduce the subset of mechanisms M′sf defined by






1{vi > γn v−i}1{vi 6= v−i}+ c 1{vi = v−i},
for some N ≥ 1, γ ∈ RN and c ∈ [0, 1/2] }.
Note first that this set M′sf is nonempty. For example, the second price auction
(without reserve price) belongs to this set. (To see that, one can take N = 1, γ1 = 1
and c = 1/2.). This set represents, a subset of the scale-free mechanisms Msf that
consists of mechanisms that are constructed using a randomization over prices to be
paid by the buyer that is a linear transformation of the value of the competitor.8 The
next result characterizes the performance of mechanisms in M′sf .
Proposition 1.1. For any subclass F of the set of regular distributions Freg, it is
sufficient to focus on mechanisms in M′sf , i.e.,
R(M′sf ,F ) = R(Msf ,F ).
Proposition 1.1 shows that without loss of optimality we can focus on mechanisms
that belong to M′sf . Furthermore, note that this result allows one to move from a
8Note also that this set captures explicitly the probability of allocation to a buyer when the
value of buyers are equal. While seemingly unimportant in the class Freg since ties happen with
probability zero, this explicit inclusion of the case of ties will play an important role when we
will be dealing with the limiting performance of a mechanism against an appropriate sequence of
distributions which converges weakly to a point outside of Freg (see Proposition 1.3).
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(potentially intractable) functional space of mechanisms, Msf , to the union of finite
dimensional vector spaces, M′sf .
The result relies on three key ingredients. We first leverage the monotonicity of
the allocations (cf. Lemma 1.1) to establish that one may approximate those from
below by a combination of step functions, where the steps are chosen so that the
new allocation stays appropriately close to the original allocation. This leads to a
new mechanism in M′sf . Then, leveraging the scale-free property of mechanisms
and the fact that the distributions are regular, we can establish that necessarily the
performance (in terms of the ratio of revenues achieved compared the optimal oracle
revenues) of the new mechanism is necessarily appropriately close to that of the
original mechanism.
1.4.2 Family of Upper Bounds on R(M,F )
Having reduced the strategies of the seller to a more tractable space by discretizing
the allocation function, we next reduce the complexity of the space of distribution




F ∈ G : vF <∞, F admits a density on [vF , vF ) and sup
v∈[vF ,vF )
φF (v) ≤ 0
}
,
where for any distribution F ∈ G, we denote by vF = inf{x : x ∈ SF} and vF =
sup{x : x ∈ SF}. In particular, W denotes the class of distributions with bounded
support, that have non-positive virtual value function on the interior of the support
and a potential mass at the upper limit of the support. Note that this set is clearly
non-empty and we will consider explicit examples in Sections 1.5 and 1.6. Moreover,
note also that for each element of W , the expectation of the virtual value function is
not necessarily equal to the expected revenue. The expected revenue is given by
EF [ti(vi, v−i)] =
∫ v¯
0












xi(vi, u)f(u) du is the interim allocation to buyer i. In addition to
the “classical” first term on the RHS, a second term, driven by the mass at v¯, is also
present.







γk v−i 1{vi > γk v−i}1{vi 6= v−i}+ c′ v−i 1{vi = v−i},
for some appropriate c′. In particular, when evaluating the expected revenues of
a mechanism in M′sf , one needs to consider terms of the form EF [v21{v1 > αv2}].
The next result establish that one may characterize the performance of terms of
EF [v21{v1 > αv2}], not only for elements of Freg, but also for limits of such elements.
Lemma 1.3. Suppose that a sequence {Fn : n ≥ 1} in Freg, with supn≥1{v¯Fn} <∞,
converges weakly to a distribution F where the latter has at most a discontinuity at
vF <∞. Then, for any α ≥ 0,
lim
n↑∞
EFn [v21{v1 > αv2}] =

EF [v21{v1 > αv2}] , if α 6= 1,
1
2
EF [min(v1, v2)] if α = 1,
(1.6)
This result is established by leveraging the weak convergence in conjunction with
the regularity of the distributions Fn’s. This result is a key step in linking the
performance against elements of W to that against F .
Proposition 1.2. Fix a non-empty subset F of Freg and a non-empty subset W ′ of
W . Suppose that for any element of W ′, there exists a sequence of distributions in
F that weakly converges to that element. Then we have
R(M′sf ,F ) ≤ R(M′sf ,W ′).
In other words, whileW ′ is not a subset of Freg, the result states that the maximin
ratio against the class of distributions W ′ upper bounds the maximin ratio against
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the class Freg. The proof of this result leverages the fact that we are working under
the tractable space of mechanisms M′sf in conjunction with the limits established
Lemma 1.3. Indeed, the worst-case performance of any mechanism in M′sf against
F is upper bounded by that against any element of a sequence Fn that converges
weakly to an element F of W ′. In the proof, we characterize an asymptotic upper
bound on the performance of any mechanism inM′sf against Fn. Then, we establish
that the asymptotic upper bound may be expressed as the performance of a new
mechanism in M′sf when facing the distribution corresponding to the weak limit F .
Subclass of optimal mechanisms against W . Next, we exploit the structure of
the distributions in W to further simplify the maximin ratio against subclasses W ′
of W , R(M′sf ,W ′). Let us introduce the following subset of mechanisms of Msf :






1{vi > γn v−i}1{vi 6= v−i}+ c 1{vi = v−i},
for some N ≥ 1, γ ∈ ([1,∞))N and c ∈ [0, 1/2] }.
Note thatMmaxsf is a subset ofM′sf and is the set of mechanisms inM′sf that never
allocate to the minimum value of buyers (when both values are different).
Proposition 1.3. For any subset of distributions W ′ of W ,
R(M′sf ,W ′) = R(Mmaxsf ,W ′).
This proposition shows that without loss of optimality, when facing distributions
inW , one can focus on mechanisms that never allocate to the minimum value (if the
latter is different from the maximum value). The intuition behind the result is that
under the class of distributionsW , the seller would like to set a reserve price equal to
the upper bound of the support if she would know the distribution (cf. Lemma A.2-4).
In addition, allocating to a buyer with value strictly below this reserve price yields
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a negative contribution to the revenue of the seller (cf. Myerson (1981)). When the
seller sees two values, while she does not know the distribution, she knows that it
belongs toW , and hence she still knows that both values are weakly below the optimal
oracle reserve price. In turn, the seller never wants to allocate to the minimum value
(if it is different from the maximum value).
We are now ready to put together all earlier results and state the main result of
this section.
Theorem 1.2. Fix a non-empty scale invariant subset F of Freg and a non-empty
subset W ′ of W . Suppose that for any element of W ′, there exists a sequence of
distributions in F that weakly converges to that element. Then we have
R(M,F ) ≤ R(Mmaxsf ,W ′).
This result provides a family of upper bounds on the maximin ratio associated
with any subset of the set of regular distributions, and in particular applies to Fmhr
and Freg. In Section 1.5, we apply this upper bound to F = Freg and in Section 1.6,
we apply it to F = Fmhr, where for each we select a suitable set W ′.
1.5 Maximin Ratio for Regular Distributions
In this section, we develop upper and lower bounds on R(M,Freg), leading to a
narrow interval to which R(M,Freg) belongs.
1.5.1 Upper Bound
Theorem 1.3 (Upper bound for regular distributions). The maximin ratioR(M,Freg)



















ψ (γk, q) ,
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where I+ = {k ∈ [1, N ] : γk > 1} and









1− q + γkq −
1
γk − 1 ln
(
γk
1− q + γkq
)]
.
Theorem 1.3 provides a fundamental limit on the performance of any mechanism
in M. At a high level, the upper bound captures the complexity of the space of
mechanisms through a vector γ ∈ [1,+∞)N and the space of distributions has been
distilled down to a scalar q ∈ [0, 1]. This is in stark contrast with the initial space of
mechanisms M and the space of regular distributions. The sharpness of this upper
bound will be apparent in the coming subsections, when we evaluate it and compare
it to a lower bound.
The upper bound in Theorem 1.3 also explicitly highlights the tension associated
with the design of a prior-free mechanism. On the one hand, one may want to put
weight on values γk = 1 to guarantee performance in line with a second price auction,
which hedges against deterministic values. This corresponds to the first term in the
upper bound, i.e. 1/(2− q). On the other hand, putting weight on terms γk > 1 may
yield higher performance if nature selects a distribution with a heavy tail.
Key ideas underlying the proof of Theorem 1.3. The first step in the proof
is to derive an upper bound on R(M,Freg) through Theorem 1.2. Given the latter,
the key then is to identify an appropriate subset of distributionWreg that verifies the
conditions of Theorem 1.2 and the rest of the proof is organized around identifying
such a subset and explicitly deriving an upper bound on the worst-case performance
of any mechanism in Mmaxsf against Wreg.
The family of distributions for which the revenue curve in the quantile space is a





, if v < a,
1 , if v ≥ a,
(1.7)
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for some a ≥ 0 and has received attention in the literature in various contexts. If we
introduce the following class of distribution Wreg := {Fa : a > 0}, then one can show
that each element in this class of distribution Wreg can be approached by a sequence
of elements of Freg (cf. Lemma B.6-2). As a result, R(Mmaxsf ,Wreg) is a valid upper
bound for R(M,Freg). The proof then relies on deriving an analytical expression for
R(Mmaxsf ,Wreg).
1.5.2 Lower Bound
We have just established an upper bound on R(M,Freg). We next focus on deriving
a lower bound.
Proposition 1.4 (Lower bound for regular distributions). Consider any mechanism
m = (x, t) in Mmaxsf and the corresponding parameters N ≥ 1, γ ∈ [1,∞)N and
c ∈ [0, 1/2]. Let I+ = {k ∈ [1, N ] : γk > 1}. If |I+|/N ≤ 1/3, then the performance
of such a mechanism in the presence of two buyers against a distribution F with
optimal quantile qF is lower bounded as follows















1− q − 1
γ − 1 ln
[
γ





1 + (γ − 1) q
1
2− q .
The proposition above gives an explicit lower bound for any mechanism inMmaxsf
which satisfies |I+|/N ≤ 1/3, i.e., which does not inflate the second price more than
a third of the time. In particular, the lower bound admits the same structure as the
function characterizing the upper bound up to a correction factor. In particular, it is
possible to see that the difference between the upper and lower bounds goes to zero
as q approaches zero.
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Comparison to the lower bound obtained in Fu et al. (2015). The authors
study a mechanism that randomizes between a second price auction and an inflation
factor of γ which can be viewed as a special instance of the mechanisms in Mmaxsf .
For γ = 2, and using the second price auction with probability 1−p and inflation γ
with probability p, one may establish that the lower bound obtained in Proposition 1.4
is tighter and higher by a factor of
p
2 q2F (1− qF )
(1 + qF ) (2− qF ) .
The key drivers of the improvement are dual. A first improvement stems from bound-
ing in a dependent fashion the contributions of the second price auction (γk = 1) and
that of the inflation mechanisms (γk > 1). A second improvement stems from ob-
taining a tighter bound on the contributions of high γk terms.
1.5.3 Characterization of R(M,Freg)
We next evaluate numerically values for upper and lower bounds on R(M,Freg).
Using Theorem 1.3, we derive an upper bound on the maximin ratio. To that end,
we fix q = 0.17 For such a value, we have 1/(2 − q) = 54.64%. Furthermore, the
function ζ : (1,+∞)→ R defined by









1− q + γq −
1
(γ − 1)2 ln
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γ





reaches its maximum around γ = 1.5 and its maximal value is 55.59%. From the
above, we deduce that maximin ratio is upper bounded by 55.59%.
Applying Proposition 1.4, we evaluate numerically the lower bound by taking
γ = (1, 1, 1, 1, 2), and a vector q of values from 0 to 1 with a step 0.001. We find that
the lower bound is 51.9%. We conclude that
51.9% ≤ R(M,Freg) ≤ 55.59%.
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In other words, we have characterized the maximin ratio up to less than 4%. There
is an important implication of the results above. In the face of regular distributions,
while randomization is helpful compared to a second price auction (that guarantees
50% of oracle revenues), the extent to which one may improve performance is limited
to at most 5.59%. An interpretation of our results is that the second price auction is
near-optimal in environments with unknown regular distributions.
1.6 Maximin Ratio for MHR Distributions
In this section, we focus on the maximin ratio when nature can only select distri-
butions in Fmhr, which is a subset of the regular class of distributions Freg. In
other words, the seller now has more information about the distribution of buyers,
compared to the setting analyzed in Section 1.5.
1.6.1 Upper Bound
Theorem 1.4 (Upper bound for MHR distributions). The maximin ratioR(M,Fmhr)




2 q (2− q) ln(1/q) .
Theorem 1.4 provides a fundamental limit on the performance of any mechanism
against distributions in Fmhr. Quite notably, this upper bound comes in quasi-closed
form and takes a significantly much simpler form than for the broader class of regular
distributions. We next highlight the main ideas in the proof and highlight the role of
the MHR knowledge in the derivation of this upper bound.
The proof of this result follows initially the same structure as that of of Theo-
rem 1.3. As earlier, we leverage Theorem 1.2 but now, we use a different familyWmhr,
suited to the increasing hazard rate family of distributions Fmhr. In particular, we
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define Wmhr to be the set of distribution F parametrized by a ≥ b > 0 such that
Fa,b(v) =

1− exp (− v
a
)
, if v < b,
1 , if v ≥ b.
This family is constructed by truncating the exponential family distribution. This
family is rich enough to cover the range of all possible optimal oracle quantiles (qF )
of MHR distributions. We establish that any such element can be “approached” by a
sequence in Fmhr and in turn, R(Mmaxsf ,Wmhr) is an upper bound on R(M,Fmhr).
The role of the MHR assumption comes into play when we evaluate the performance of
any mechanism inMmaxsf againstWmhr. In this context, we are able to establish that
the optimal performance against Wmhr is given by that of a second price auction. In
particular, it is suboptimal to randomize the allocation when facing the familyWmhr.
1.6.2 Lower Bound
We next establish a lower bound on R(M,Fmhr) by lower bounding the performance
of a second price auction.
It is worthwhile to note that a first coarse lower bound may be readily obtained
from existing results by simply noting that the oracle optimal quantile qF cannot be
less than e−1 for MHR distributions; see, e.g., Hartline et al. (2008). Combining this
with the lower bound on the performance of a second price auction of 1/(2 − qF )
obtained in Fu et al. (2015) for regular distributions, one readily obtains that
R(mspa, F ) ≥ 1
2− e−1 ≈ 61.2%.
One can already see that a significantly higher performance is possible with the
additional knowledge that the distributions belong to the MHR class. Next, we
establish a sharp lower bound on R(mspa, F ).
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Proposition 1.5 (Lower bound for MHR distributions). For any F in Fmhr, the
performance of the second price auction in the presence of two buyers is bounded
below as follows
R(mspa, F ) ≥ 1
2
1− q2F
qF (2− qF )(− ln(qF )) ,
where qF = 1− F (rF ) is the oracle optimal quantile.
The key idea underlying this result is to leverage the structural properties that
the MHR distribution imposes on the the structure of the revenue curve in the quan-
tile space. In particular, leveraging a single crossing property between the ccdf of
any MHR distribution and any exponential tail developed in the reliability theory
literature (Barlow and Proschan, 1975), we establish a lower bound on the ccdf of
the distribution of any MHR distribution through that of a particular exponential
distribution. This leads to a lower bound on the revenue curve in the quantile space,
ultimately leading to the bound above.
We discuss the implications of this result next.
1.6.3 Optimality of Second Price Auction and
Characterization of R(M,Fmhr)
We are now ready to state the main result of Section 1.6, which follows from the two
earlier results.
Theorem 1.5 (Optimality of second price auction). The second price auction is
optimal in M when facing two buyers with MHR distributions. Namely,
inf
F∈Fmhr





2 q (2− q) ln(1/q) ≈ 71.53%.
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We conclude that the second price auction and an element in Wmhr represent a
(quasi) saddle point for the maximin ratio R(M,Fmhr).9 Theorem 1.5 provides an
exact characterization of the maximin ratio and the corresponding optimal prior-free
auction.
Interestingly, while randomization of the allocation helped the seller counter na-
ture when facing regular distributions, such randomization does not help anymore
when facing the subclass of monotone hazard rate distributions. It is quite notable
that this simple mechanism, a second price auction, which is also efficient, is actually
optimal in this environment.
The result above also quantifies the value of additional knowledge about the dis-
tributions. If a seller knows that the distribution is MHR, then she gains at least
71.53% − 55.59% = 15.94% in guaranteed performance (compared to an oracle).
Indeed, MHR distributions have limited variability as measured, e.g., through the
coefficient of variation. The latter is bounded by 1 (Barlow and Proschan, 1975)
whereas it is unbounded for regular distributions. With such limited variability, a
second price auction appears “sufficient.”
1.7 Extensions and Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed the problem of optimally selling one indivisible good to two sym-
metric and independent buyers when one relaxes the common prior assumption. For
that, we look at the model where the buyers are not assumed to know any informa-
tion about the other buyers and the seller does not know the exact distribution. We
characterize the maximin ratio for a broad subclass of DSIC mechanisms against the
classes of regular and MHR distributions. We refer back the reader to Table 1.1 in
Section 1.1 for a summary of some implications of our results. While we have done
9Technically speaking, it is not exactly a saddle point given that the elements of Wmhr do not
belong to Fmhr.
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so while focusing on the case of two buyers, we establish next that the bounds we
have derived apply to the case when the number of buyers is selected adversarially.
1.7.1 Extension to the case of an adversarially selected
number of buyers
In this section, we will show that our bounds apply to the case in which the number
of buyers is arbitrary but adversarially selected.
We assume as earlier that the seller does not know exactly the distribution of
values of buyers but knows it belongs to some class of distribution F in the general
class of distributions G. Moreover, we assume also that the seller does not know the
exact the number of buyers K ≥ 2. We model the seller’s problem as a game between
the seller and nature, where the seller will first pick a collection of prior-independent
mechanisms contingent on the number of bids K, and then nature picks both the
number of buyers and their distribution of values from some class.
A seller’s mechanism is now a set of allocations and payment functions con-
tingent on the number of bids received K ≥ 2. The seller will apply a mecha-
nism characterized by an allocation mapping xK and a payment mapping tK , where
xK : RK → [0, 1]K and tK : RK → RK . We focus on DSIC mechanisms that verify
for any K ≥ 2
vi x
K
i (vi,v−i)− tKi (vi,v−i) ≥ 0, for all i and vi,v−i in RK+ (IR-K)
vi x
K
i (v)− tKi (v) ≥ vi xKi (vˆi,v−i)− tKi (vˆi,v−i), for all i and v, vˆi in RK+2+ , (IC-K)
xK(vi,v−i) belongs to ∆K , for all vi,v−i in RK+ , (AC-K)
where ∆K is the probability simplex of RK . These constraints are similar to those
introduced earlier (see (IR), (IC) and (AC)).











satisfies (IR-K), (IC-K), (AC-K)
and max
i=1,2
{TV (x2i , [0, ε]2)} <∞ for some ε > 0
}
.
Similarly, we define the oracle benchmark as well as the performance of each
mechanism contingent on having K buyers, by

















In the case of an arbitrary but adversarially selected number of buyers, the ob-
jective of the seller is now given by







Next, we state the main result of this section.
Proposition 1.6. 1. The maximin ratio for the regular class of distributions ver-
ifies
51.9% ≤ R˜(M˜,Fref ) ≤ 55.6%.




R2(mspa, F ) ≈ 71.53%.
Note that a priori it is not clear that the case of two buyers is the worst case,
since the oracle benchmark also varies with the number of buyers. In the proof
of Proposition 1.6, we show formally that the smallest maximin ratio is achieved
when only two buyers participate in the auction. The proof of these results rely
fundamentally on the case of two buyers studied earlier in the chapter in conjunction
of some known results in the literature. Hence, when nature can pick adversarially
any number of buyers K ≥ 2, a second price auction is still near-optimal against
regular distributions and is actually optimal against MHR distributions.
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1.7.2 Future directions
A direct and complementary direction would be to characterize the maximin ratio as
a function of the number of buyers, when this number cannot be selected adversarially
by nature.
Also, in our analysis we have mainly focused on the regular and MHR classes,
which are subsets of the α-strongly regular class of distributions; see Ewerhart (2013),
Cole and Roughgarden (2014), Cole and Rao (2015) and Schweizer and Szech (2016)
for more details about this class of distributions. The results developed in Section 1.4
for the upper bounds have the potential to be applied to any subclass of the α-
strongly regular class where α would be a parameter that would capture the degree
of knowledge of the seller. As such, an interesting direction is to characterize the
maximin ratio as a function of the degree of knowledge of the seller.
Another way to incorporate the knowledge of the seller is to assume that she has
access to extra information such as the moments and a potential research question is
how one could leverage such additional information to improve the performance and
what is the structure of optimal mechanisms in such cases. (We refer the reader to,
e.g., Azar et al. (2013) that study deterministic mechanisms that incorporate such
information.)
More generally, our work tries to relax the common prior assumption and we have
focused on the canonical setting of one indivisible good and symmetric buyers with
independent values that are regular. There are various generalizations that naturally
emerge. For example, it would be interesting to see if one can develop results of a
similar nature when the class of distribution is a “structured” irregular class (see, e.g.,
Sivan and Syrgkanis (2013) for an example of such a subclass). Similarly, developing
parallel lower and upper bounds on the maximin ratio for general environments that
would allow, e.g., for correlation among values or asymmetric buyers is a promising
direction.
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1.8 Additional Notes: Auxiliary Definition
Here, we recall the definition of the Arzela` total variation definition for functions of
two variables; see, e.g., Clarkson and Adams (1933).
Definition 1.3. The Arzela` total variation of a mapping h : [a, b] × [c, d] → R is
given by










|h(uj+1, vj+1)− h(uj, vj)| .






Pricing has constituted and continues to be a central decision in a host of indus-
tries, ranging from retail to hospitality. In turn, this practical importance has lead
academic communities in Operations Research, Economics and Computer Science
to develop frameworks and algorithm classes for pricing. At the heart of pricing
lies a fundamental informational dimension regarding the level of knowledge about
customers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP).
At an extreme side of the spectrum, if a seller knows the exact WTP of a customer,
then pricing is “easy”. If the seller wishes to maximize revenues, the seller may
just charge the customer its WTP. Of course, in practice this rarely happens and
alternative informational formulations are needed. A first relaxation of the above
setting would be that the seller only knows the distribution from which the WTP is
drawn. In this case, one may optimize pricing to maximize the expected revenues,
leading to the classical setting, which is a building block to a significant number of
studies across disciplines. However, such a construct of WTP distribution is rarely
available in practice, leading to the basic questions: How should one price without
knowledge of the WTP distribution? How should existing data be used to refine
pricing decisions? In this regard, there are many levels of information that one could
adopt. Ideally, one would like to understand, given a particular amount of data,
what should be an optimal pricing policy. This is an incredibly challenging problem
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from a theoretical perspective. In turn, towards better understanding this question,
a first interesting regime is the large data regime in which one may have access
to a large number of past observations. In this case, one key question pertains to
sample complexity: how many samples would one need to guarantee near-optimal
performance. Another regime of interest is the low-data regime, in which the firm
has access to very limited information. This regime has dual motivations. On the one
hand, in practice, many goods are sold in customer segments with very limited data.
On the other hand, from a theoretical perspective, this regime may allow to build
from the bottom up towards a general theory for an arbitrary and finite number of
samples. The present chapter focuses on this regime.
In more detail, we focus on a seller optimizing her pricing strategy when selling one
good to a buyer. The seller does not know the WTP distribution of the buyer. She
only knows that it belongs to some broad non-parametric class and in addition, has
access to one sample drawn from the same distribution. In particular, the question
the seller faces is: what is the optimal pricing strategy given the data available? We
adopt a maximin ratio formulation in which performance is measured in comparison
to the best the seller could have obtained with complete information on the WTP
distribution. The seller optimizes over a broad set of randomized pricing strategies
and nature may select any distribution in the class of interest to counter a pricing
strategy. We are interested in characterizing the maximin ratio, as well as in deriving
insights on the value of the sample and on the structure of near-optimal strategies.
The fundamental problem above, while simple and elegant to state, is seemingly
intractable. On the one hand, the set of possible pricing strategies is infinite di-
mensional and so is the set of possible underlying WTP distributions. Our main
contributions lie in developing a novel approach to characterize the structure of near-
optimal mechanisms and near-worst case families, and in turn providing crisp upper
and lower bounds on the maximin ratio, leading to a characterization of the maximin
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ratio over a spectrum of distribution classes. In particular, we focus on α-strongly
regular distributions (α-SR) introduced in Cole and Roughgarden (2014). Two spe-
cial cases are regular distributions (α = 0) and non-decreasing monotone hazard rate
(MHR) distributions (α = 1). The latter two classes include a broad set of distri-
butions that are typically assumed in the pricing and mechanism design literature,
including in settings in which the WTP distribution is known.
The present chapter develops a novel and unified approach to characterize jointly
the structure of near optimal pricing mechanisms, as well as the structure near-
worst case distributions. As a result, the chapter also provides a series of tight
upper and lower bounds on the maximin ratio for α-SR distributions. As highlighted
earlier, the seller problem is highly intractable. As a first reduction, we show that
without loss of optimality, the seller can focus on pricing strategies that randomize
over posted prices that are multiplicative of the sample. This reduction enables one to
focus on simpler mechanisms, characterized by a single distribution. Leveraging this
reduction, we focus on jointly deriving lower bounds as well as impossibility results
on the worst-case performance of an optimal mechanism. Note that for a specific
mechanism, characterizing worst-case performance is still a priori intractable since
nature’s problem is over an infinite dimensional and non-convex set of distributions.
One key contribution resides in establishing a lower bound on performance that only
depends on a finite number of local quantiles around the optimal one (as opposed to
the entire distribution). This is enabled by a succession of structural results on “local”
contributions to performance (Proposition 2.2), leading initially to a lower bound
that only depends on a countable number of quantiles of the distribution. In turn, a
fundamental next step is a dimensionality reduction of the lower bound dependence
on the distribution through the development of novel and judiciously constructed
dynamic programming recursions (Proposition 2.3 and Proposition 2.4) that capture
worst-case performance only through a small number of quantiles. In turn, we derive
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an alternative maximin problem that lower bounds the initial problem, and in this
alternative problem, nature’s problem is now tractable (Theorem 2.1, Theorem 2.2).
Interestingly, the derivation of lower bounds also highlights “hard” cases. Next,
by leveraging such families that are meant to counter all mechanisms, we develop
impossibility results in the form of an alternative maximin problem that is tractable
(Proposition 2.5, Proposition 2.6). Ultimately, as an implication of our results, we
obtain for any α ∈ [0, 1], a lower and upper bound on the maximin ratio but also a
near-optimal pricing mechanism and near-worst case distribution. Figure 2.1 depicts
the lower and upper bounds we obtain for various values of α. The figure highlights
the tightness of our approach. In particular, for all values of α tested, the maximin
ratio is characterized up to 1.3%.


















Figure 2.1: Visualization of the results. The figure summarizes the upper and
lower bounds on the maximin ratio R(P ,Fα) for a grid of values of α. We refer the
reader to Table 2.1 for more details.
As a first notable special case for our approach, we develop a new lower bound
for regular distributions (α = 0). The best known lower bound, established in Fu
et al. (2015), is 50% + 5 × 10−9. Our unified approach yields a new lower bound
of 50.1%. In addition to improving on the best known lower bound, we provide the
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first impossibility results for randomized mechanisms against regular distributions.
We establish that no mechanism can achieve a better performance than 51.1%. This
impossibility result shows that there is very little room for improvement against reg-
ular distributions. In particular, a simple mechanism that just posts the sample is
known to achieve a worst-case performance of 50% (Huang et al., 2015). Our impos-
sibility result implies the near-optimality of this simple mechanism against regular
distributions.
As a second notable special case of our approach, we develop a lower bound
for randomized mechanisms when nature picks from the MHR class of distributions.
The best known lower bound for deterministic mechanisms, developed in Huang et al.
(2015), is 58.9%. Our approach yields a lower bound of 63.5% through a deterministic
mechanism. Also, we provide the first impossibility result for randomized mechanisms
against MHR distributions. We show that no mechanism can achieve a higher com-
petitive ratio than 64.8%. The conjunction of the lower and upper bounds show how
tight the results are.
Furthermore, our approach can be applied to any value of α, leading to the first
α-dependent lower bounds and impossibility results for this class of problems. Across
all values of α tested, the lower and upper bounds are within 1.3% of each other.
This highlights the quality of the bounds developed but also allows to guarantee the
near-optimality of the pricing strategies used in the derivation of the lower bounds.
In turn, our results suggest that deterministic mechanisms are near-optimal, with
losses of at most 1.3%, compared to randomized strategies. For many values of α,
the gap is typically smaller than that can can be as small as 0.3%.
We believe that the analysis and results may have implications in other applica-
tions and also lay some foundation to analyze maximin ratio for the case in which
the seller has access to an arbitrary number of samples.
Literature review. While there is a vast literature on pricing across disciplines,
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our work relates to the efforts towards relaxing the knowledge of the seller.
A first way to relax informational assumptions is to assume full lack of knowledge
of the WTP distribution. Two early studies in that regard are Bergemann and Schlag
(2008) and Eren and Maglaras (2010). These study pricing in cases when the seller
does not know the underlying distribution of values but only knows the support. In
the former, the setting is static, whereas in the latter it is dynamic. These characterize
the optimal pricing policy and performance as a function of the support. Building on
the framework above in terms of informational assumptions, Caldentey et al. (2016)
characterize optimal pricing strategies in a dynamic setting where myopic or strategic
customers arrive over time. An intermediary setting is studied in Cohen et al. (2016)
in which the seller knows the maximum willingness to pay of customers but does not
know the exact demand function. In contrast to these, we study a setting in which
the seller has access to some information (a sample), and allow distributions with
arbitrary support.
An alternative regime that has received attention is the “large” sample regime,
with a first focal question pertaining to sample complexity. How many samples are
needed to achieve a particular level of performance compared to an oracle with full
information. Huang et al. (2015) have shown that a polynomial number of samples
is sufficient to achieve near optimal revenue. In a different line of work, a series of
studies look at how to collect and incorporate data on the fly for pricing purposes, in
which case an exploration-exploitation trade-off emerges. See Kleinberg and Leighton
(2003), Besbes and Zeevi (2009) and Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012), as well
as den Boer (2015b) for a review.
In the above, the mode of analysis is asymptotic, understanding performance as
the number of samples or time periods grows large. More closely related to our work
are recent studies that focus on a regime in between the large sample regime and the
no information regime. Huang et al. (2015) and Fu et al. (2015) both analyze the case
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when a seller has access to only one sample. Huang et al. (2015) study the perfor-
mance of deterministic pricing strategies. They establish that post your sample is an
optimal strategy (among deterministic ones) against regular distributions and pro-
vide lower and upper bounds on the performance of deterministic pricing mechanisms
against MHR distributions. In parallel, Fu et al. (2015) have exhibited a randomized
pricing mechanism that “beats” any deterministic mechanisms against the regular
class of distributions, highlighting the need to expand the set of pricing strategies
one focuses on. Building on those chapters, we study the broader class of randomized
pricing mechanisms, and develop a unified general framework for α-strongly regular
distributions, covering as special cases regular and MHR distributions. This general
framework allows to develop novel impossibility results, to significantly improve ex-
isting lower bounds but also to develop new α-dependent lower bounds. Recently,
Babaioff et al. (2018) analyze the setting when the seller has access to two samples.
In such a setting, the authors exhibit a deterministic mapping from the two samples
to prices that guarantees at least 50.9% of oracle performance.
While we do not assume competition among buyers in the present chapter, our
work relates to the growing literature on prior independent auctions in the sense that
a seller does not know the exact distribution of buyers’ values. We refer the reader
to Hartline (2013) and Roughgarden (2015) for a broader overview of this line of
work. In particular, our work relates more closely to Bulow and Klemperer (1996),
Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015), Fu et al. (2015) and Allouah and Besbes (2018). At
high-level, there are many other problem classes being studied in distribution-free
environments; see, e.g., Correa et al. (2019) for a recent contribution in the context
of prophet inequalities.
From a methodological perspective, our work builds on the statistical theory of
reliability (Barlow and Proschan, 1975) as well as the theory of α-strongly regular
distributions introduced in Cole and Roughgarden (2014), and further studied in
51
Cole and Rao (2015) and Schweizer and Szech (2016) (see also the related class of
ρ-concave distributions in Ewerhart (2013)).
2.2 Problem Formulation
We consider a seller trying to sell one indivisible good to one buyer. We assume
that the buyer value v is drawn from some distribution F with support included in
[0,∞). We assume that the seller does not know this distribution but has access to
one sample s from the same distribution.
The problem we are analyzing is how can the seller leverage the observed sample
s to maximize her revenue. More formally, we model the problem as a game between
nature and the seller, in which the seller picks a selling mechanism and nature may
select a distribution F from which the past sample s and the current value of the
buyer v are drawn independently.
The seller selects a randomized posted price mechanism, that is tailored to the
sample s observed. In words, a seller’s strategy can be interpreted as the set of
conditional probability distributions for all possible realizations of s. We denote by
W(X ) the set of real-valued functions from a set X into R. We denote by D the
set of distributions, i.e., the set of non-decreasing functions from R+ into [0, 1] such
that the limit at infinity is one. A pricing mechanism Ψ in W([0,∞)2) is a family
of distributions {Ψ(·|s) in D : s ∈ [0,∞)} that specify the cumulative distribution
function (cdf) of prices the seller posts conditional on observing sample s.
Definition 2.1. We say that a pricing mechanism Ψ(·|·) is “well-behaved” around
zero if for any s, p ≥ 0, the function Ψ(ζp|ζs) admits a limit as ζ ↓ 0.
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The set of feasible pricing mechanisms P is defined as follows
P = {Ψ in W([0,∞)2) : Ψ(·|s) is in D for any s ∈ [0,∞)
and Ψ is well-behaved around zero}.
The “well-behaved” condition is purely technical and it is a sufficient condition for
the optimization problem we will introduce to be well posed. The expected revenue

















where F := 1 − F is the complementary cumulative distribution function. Note
that here, we evaluate the expected performance of mechanism Ψ, where the expec-
tation is taken with respect to the value of the buyer v, the sample s as well as the
randomization of the pricing strategy.
Oracle benchmark. We define opt(F ) as the maximal performance one could
achieve with knowledge of the exact distribution of buyer’s values when selecting
mechanisms in P . More formally,
opt(F ) := sup
p≥0
p F (p). (2.1)
Seller’s objective. For an arbitrary mechanism Ψ in P , we define its performance
against a distribution F such that opt(F ) > 0 as follows





pF (p) dΨ(p|s)] dF (s)
opt(F )
.
Let G denote the set of distributions with support included in [0,∞) with finite
and non-zero expectation, i.e.,
G = {F : [0,∞)→ [0, 1] : F is in D and 0 < EF [v] <∞} .
53
Note that opt(F ) is in (0,∞) for all F in G, and hence the ratio R(Ψ, F ) is well
defined for any element of the class G. The objective of the present chapter is to
characterize for classes F ⊆ G the maximin ratio




R(Ψ, F ). (2.2)
One may easily observe that it is impossible to design any mechanism with a
positive competitive ratio when competing against G (see Cole and Roughgarden
(2014)). In turn, we focus on subclasses of G and we will analyze the maximin ratio
against a spectrum of classes of distributions.
Definition 2.2 (α-strong regularity). Fix α in [0, 1]. A cdf F is said to be α-strongly
regular (α-SR) on its support SF if it admits a density f and if the corresponding
virtual value function φF : v 7→ v−(1−F (v))/f(v) satisfies φF (v′)−φF (v) ≥ α(v′−v)
for all v′ ≥ v in SF .
The notion of α-strong regularity was introduced in Cole and Roughgarden (2014).
We also refer the reader to Ewerhart (2013) and Schweizer and Szech (2016) for
connections to ρ-concavity. Let us introduce the following notation
Fα = {F ∈ G : F is α-SR}.
Two notable special cases are α = 0 and α = 1. Note that F0 is the set of so-
called regular distributions, i.e., distributions that admit a non-increasing virtual
value. The set F1 is the set of monotone increasing hazard rate distributions (also
referred to as increasing failure rate distributions). Regularity and the monotone
increasing hazard rate conditions are very common assumptions across the pricing
literature (including in cases in which the distribution is known to the seller). It
is worth noting that these non-parametric classes of distributions encompass many
widely used and studied parametric classes such as large subsets of Gamma, Beta
and other classes of distributions. (see, e.g., Ewerhart (2013)).
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It is clear that for any 0 ≤ α ≤ α′ ≤ 1, Fα′ ⊆ Fα, and hence R(P ,Fα) is non-
decreasing in α. Furthermore, all the classes Fα are subclasses of the regular class of
distributions. In the coming sections, we will be interested in quantifying R(P ,Fα)
and characterizing near-optimal mechanisms.
For any distribution F in Fα, we define rF := arg maxp≥0 p F (p). The oracle
optimal price rF is well defined by the regularity assumption of the distribution and
the fact that EF [v] <∞. Moreover, the optimal revenue is given by
opt(F ) = rF F (rF ).
Throughout the chapter, whenever a distribution F is defined, we use qw to denote
F (w) to lighten the notation. The latter represents the quantile of the distribution
at the value w. In most of our analysis, we will leverage working with quantiles
(see Bulow and Klemperer (1996) for more detailed economic interpretations of those
quantities). We also use the generalized inverse of a distribution F in D, defined by
F−1(1− q) := inf{v in R+ s.t. F (v) ≥ 1− q} for all q in [0, 1].
2.3 Pricing Mechanisms: Structural Results
2.3.1 Reduction of the Space of Mechanisms
In this section, we show that we can reduce the space of pricing strategies that a
seller needs to consider.
Proposition 2.1. Let M ⊂ P be given by
M =
{




for some ψ in D
}
.
Then for any α in [0, 1], one can restrict attention to mechanisms in M without loss
of optimality, i.e.,
R(P ,Fα) = R(M,Fα),
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In particular, the result states that while initial pricing mechanisms are charac-
terized by an uncountable collection of distributions (conditional distributions on the
sample), it is sufficient to optimize over pricing mechanisms that are characterized by
a single distribution. To elaborate on what this distribution corresponds to, consider
Ψ in M. The performance against a distribution F in Fα is given by




































In other words, a mechanism inM can be thought of as a mechanism that randomizes,
not over the price to post, but over a multiplicative factor to be applied to the observed
sample. We use the mnemonic notation M that refers to the multiplicative nature
of the pricing mechanism. Proposition 2.1 above states that restricting attention to
such mechanisms is without loss of optimality.
For multiplicative mechanisms, the seller would randomize between different levels
of inflation of the sample ( γ > 1) or deflation of the sample (γ ∈ (0, 1)) or simply
posting the sample (γ = 1).
Going forward, for any mechanism inM, with some abuse of notation, we use in-






. Similarly, we write interchangeably R(Ψ, F ) or R(ψ, F ).
2.3.2 Approach to bound R(P ,Fα): Overview
The key challenge in evaluating R(P ,Fα) and designing optimal or near-optimal
sample-based pricing policies resides in the fact both P and Fα are infinite dimen-
sional spaces. While we have shown that one may reduce attention to mechanisms
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in M, even for any such particular mechanism, it is not clear how to evaluate its
worst-case performance. Next, we derive a decomposition of the performance of a
mechanism through two steps. First, we decompose the performance of a mecha-
nism through the contributions of deterministic mechanisms inM. Second, for such
mechanisms, we decompose the performance through local contributions stemming
from different realizations of the sample. This decomposition will be key in deriving
tractable bounds on R(P ,Fα).
For any mechanism ψ in M, based on Eq.(2.3), one can write
R(ψ, F ) =
∫ ∞
0
R(δγ, F )dψ(γ), with δγ(v) := 1{v ≤ γ}, for all v ≥ 0, (2.4)
where δγ is a dirac-delta function at γ, in other words, a “deterministic” mechanism
that posts the price γs. Furthermore, we have for any γ > 0,
R(δγ, F ) =
∫∞
0
γsF (γs) dF (s)
opt(F )
.
Let, for any 0 ≤ w ≤ w′,
C (γ, w, w′;F ) :=
∫ w′
w
γsF (γs) dF (s). (2.5)
The term C (γ, w, w′;F ) corresponds to the contribution to the performance stem-
ming from realizations of the sample that are in the interval [w,w′] for a deterministic
mechanism inM characterized by the parameter γ. Fix a given non-negative mono-




γsF (γs) dF (s) may be decomposed into an infinite sum of “local” terms
of the form C (γ, wj, wj+1;F ), i.e.,





C (γ, wi, wi+1;F ). (2.6)
In what follows, we will derive lower bounds onR(P ,Fα) by establishing paramet-
ric lower bounds on the worst-case performance of dirac-delta mechanisms R(δγ, F ).
The key to our approach will be a reduction of the complexity of nature’s optimization
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problem from an infinite dimensional problem to a finite dimensional problem. This
reduction will be enabled by two key steps. On the one-hand a “local” reduction of
dimensionality is established in Section 2.4 by focusing on local contributions of the
form C (γ, w, w′;F ). On the other hand, these local results are leveraged to obtain
a global dimensionality reduction through an appropriate decomposition of the form
of (2.6) in conjunction with the development of a set of novel judiciously constructed
dynamic programs in Section 2.5.
To derive an upper bound on R(P ,Fα) in Section 2.6, we extensively rely on the
reduction of mechanisms inM as well as the intuition gleaned from the lower bound
arguments to construct a sufficiently rich family of “hard cases” that yield tractable
upper bounds.
2.4 Parametric Lower Bounds on Local
Contributions
This section is dedicated to derive lower bounds on local contributions C (γ, w, w′;F )
as defined in (2.5), that depend on the distribution F only through a “small” num-
ber of local quantile values. To do so, we first establish how local bounds on the
tails of distributions translate into bounds on the local performance, and then estab-
lish α-dependent local bounds on the tails of distributions in the class Fα. Finally,
combining these two results, we obtain lower bounds on the local contributions.
2.4.1 From tail bounds to lower bounds on local
contributions
The next result establishes how one may leverage local bounds on the tails to obtain
a lower bound on local performance.
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Lemma 2.1. Fix α ∈ [0, 1] and F in Fα. Fix γ > 0 and w,w′ such that 0 ≤ w < w′.
Suppose that there exists a non-increasing function Hl : R+ → [0, 1] such that F (v) ≥
Hl(v) on [γw, γw
′].
i.) If the revenue function vF (v) is non-decreasing on [γw, γw′] and there exists a
non-increasing function H˜l : R+ → [0, 1] such that F (v) ≥ H˜l(v) on [w,w′] and
H˜l(w) = F (w) and H˜l(w
′) = F (w′), then








ii.) If the function vHl(v) is non-increasing on [γw, γw
′] and there exists a non-
increasing function Hu : R+ → [0, 1] such that F (v) ≤ Hu(v) on [w,w′] and
Hu(w) = F (w), then














Part i.) of the result establishes that as long as the revenue curve is non-decreasing
on the interval [γw, γw′] (which, by unimodality, would hold if w′ ≤ rF/γ), then it
is sufficient to obtain lower bounds on the tail of the distribution F on the intervals
[w,w′] and [γw, γw′] to obtain a lower bound on the local expected performance.
Part ii.) of the result applies to regions where the revenue curve can be lower
bounded by a non-increasing function, and intuitively applies to the right of w ≥
rF/γ. As in the first part, we establish how bounds on the tails translate to bounds
on the local expected performance. However, now that the revenue curve can be
lower bounded by a non-increasing function, one needs a lower bound on the tail on
[γw, γw′] and an upper bound on the tail on [w,w′].
2.4.2 Local lower and upper bounds on the tail
In the previous section, we have established how lower bounds on local contributions
to performance can be derived through suitable local lower and upper bounds on the
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tails. In this section we establish a systematic way through which such bounds may
be derived.
Lemma 2.2. Fix α ∈ [0, 1], F in Fα and a pair of values (w,w′) such that 0 ≤ w <
w′. Then










if w ≤ v ≤ w′,










if v ≥ w′,
where for any v ≥ 0,
Γα(v) =

(1 + (1− α) v)−1/(1−α) if α ∈ [0, 1),
e−v if α = 1.
In addition, Γ−1α is the inverse of Γα and we set Γ
−1
α (0) := +∞ and Γα(+∞) := 0.
Lemma 2.2 provides a systematic way to obtain local lower and upper bounds
on the complementary cumulative distribution function of any distribution in Fα as
a function of Γα(·). The bound coincides with the original function at the extreme
points of the interval [w,w′], and provides a lower bound on the interval [w,w′] and
an upper bound on [w′,+∞) that coincides with the function at w′. Furthermore,
the bounds are only parameterized by α and the quantiles at the interval extremes.
The function Γα is the complementary cumulative distribution function of a par-
ticular Generalized Pareto distribution. The function φF (v)−αv of this distribution
is non-decreasing and hence it belongs to Fα. As a matter of fact, φF (v) − αv is
constant, and hence the complementary cumulative distribution function represents
in some sense an “extreme” element of the class. In turn, note that these bounds are
tight in the sense that there exists an element in Fα for which all the inequalities are
actually equalities.
This result is related to a “single crossing property” studied in the statistical the-
ory of reliability, that is satisfied by the monotone hazard rate class of distributions,
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F1. More precisely, (Barlow and Proschan, 1975, Chapter 4, Theorem 2.18) show
that for any monotone hazard rate distribution F , if the complementary cumulative
distribution function F crosses the complementary cumulative distribution function
of any exponential distribution then both curves must cross only once. Moreover, if
the cross occurs then the exponential tail is always below the tail of F before the
cross and above after the cross.
The proof of Lemma 2.2 relies on two steps. The first step of our proof generalizes
this result to the α-SR class of distributions by establishing that the family Γα plays a
similar role for α-SR distributions as the exponential tails do for MHR distributions.
In a second step, we apply the single crossing property to a truncated version of the
original distribution to the domain v ≥ w.1
Figure 2.2 provides a visual illustration of the main implication of Lemma 2.2.
Using the same distribution F in Fα, consider the interval [w,w′] such that w cor-
responds to the quantile F (w) = 0.7, and w′ to the quantile F (w′) = 0.4. An
application of Lemma 2.2 with w,w′ yields the blue curve and offers a lower bound
on [w,w′] and an upper bound on [w′,+∞) (dashed line). Furthermore, an appli-
cation of Lemma 2.2 on [0, w] leads to the red curve and in particular to an upper
bound on [w,w′] (dashed line).
2.4.3 Parametric lower bounds on local contributions
We are now in a position to develop lower bounds on local contribution C (γ, w, w′;F ).
Proposition 2.2. Fix α ∈ [0, 1], F in Fα and γ > 0. We have

























, if rF/γ ≤ w < w′,
1An implication of Lemma 2.2 is that once the function F in Fα is strictly below Γα then it
stays always below. This implication was already noted by Cole and Rao (2015) using a different
approach.
61













Figure 2.2: Example of local tail bounds. The figure depicts some distribution
belonging to Fα with α = 1/2, together with local lower (full lines) and upper bounds
(dashed lines) obtained through Lemma 2.2.
where γˆ = w
w′ and for σ > 0
βLσ (η1, η2) := (η1, 1, η1, σ, 1, η2, 1, η1, σ, 1, σ, σ) , η ∈ R2+




uα (η2, η3, η4, η5q)Γα
(
Γ−1α (η6) η7
uα (η2, η8, η9, η10q)− η11
1− η12
)
dq, η ∈ R12+









, η ∈ R4+.
An important implication of Proposition 2.2 is that the lower bounds developed
on the local contributions C (γ, w, w′;F ) in both cases only depend on the distribu-
tion F through a “small” number of quantiles. Through the lower bound, we have
moved from a local contribution that depends on an infinite dimensional object F
to a lower bound that only depends on α, as well as the quantiles at the following
values w,w′, γw, γw′ and γˆw. The function Aα coming into play in the lower bound
is a tractable function and represents in some sense the “normalized” worst-case
contribution driven by the bounds derived in Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2.
We also remark that Proposition 2.2 distinguishes between two cases. Either the
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observed sample belongs to a segment which is below rF/γ or belongs to a segment
which is above rF/γ. Technically, this separation is due to the fact that the revenue
curve is non-decreasing on [γw, γw′] in case i) whereas it is non-increasing in the other
case. Intuitively, this separation can be understood as follows: for a deterministic
mechanism inM characterized by a coefficient γ, the value rF/γ represents the ideal
sample that a seller could observe. Hence, if she observed a sample less than rF/γ
then she would be charging a final price under the optimal oracle price. Whereas
in the other case if a seller observes a sample higher than rF/γ then she would be
charging over the optimal oracle price. In other words, rF/γ represents a threshold
sample value that separates the types of “errors” the mechanism will, eventually,
make. In turn, these two regions require different bounds.
The proof is deferred to Appendix B.3 and leverages the previous results developed
in the current section. Concretely, for the first point i.), we use the fact that the
revenue curve is non-decreasing within the considered interval. Given that, we lower
bound the complementary cumulative distribution function F using Lemma 2.2 on
[w,w′] and [γw, γw′]. In turn, Lemma 2.1 i.) leads to the result. The bound given in
the latter depends on the inverse of the lower bound on the complementary cumulative
distribution function H−1l . This is exactly what is driving the expression of uα(·)
whereas ALα is driven by the final bound given in Lemma 2.1. The proof of ii.) relies
on a similar line of arguments. However, we now apply Lemma 2.1 ii.) in conjunction
with Lemma 2.2.
2.5 Parametric Lower Bounds on R(P ,Fα)
Recalling the decomposition for an arbitrary non-negative monotone increasing se-
quence {wi : i ∈ Z}, such that limi↓−∞wi = 0 and limi↑∞wi = +∞ given in (2.6), the
performance of any deterministic mechanism characterized by a multiplicative factor
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γ > 0 is given by





C (γ, wi, wi+1;F ),
Given the lower bound in Proposition 2.2, we see that if one starts with consecutive
elements of the sequence {rF/γ˜i : i ∈ Z} where γ˜ = min(γ, 1/γ), then all the relevant
quantities in the lower bound are always quantiles of elements of the sequence. More
formally, we have

























































where in the last inequality, we have used Proposition 2.2. Under such a decomposi-
tion, we now obtain a lower bound on the performance of a deterministic mechanism
R(δγ, F ) that only depends on a countable number of quantiles associated with the
underlying distribution F . Next, we develop an approach to obtain a low dimensional
lower bound that is based on the construction of judicious dynamic programming re-
cursions and corresponding value functions. We first analyze contributions stemming
from “low” realizations of samples, below rF/γ (Section 2.5.1) and then those stem-
ming from high realizations, above rF/γ (Section 2.5.2), and then present our main
lower bound in Section 2.5.3.
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2.5.1 Lower bound for contributions from samples lower
than rF/γ
In this section, we develop a bound that exploits local relationships between a se-
quence of quantiles associated with values in [0, rF/γ]. The key intuition underlying
our approach is to “propagate” the local bounds developed in Proposition 2.2, and
construct a functional operator such that if one starts from a functional that lower
bounds the contribution from samples between 0 and rF/γ, i.e., C (γ, 0, rF/γ;F ), the
application of the operator maintains the lower bound structure. In particular, if
γ < 1 (a parallel argument applies if γ > 1), we assume that we have already devel-
oped a lower bound J(·) on the performance on any segment [0, rF/γj] with j ≤ 1.
Then we propagate by dividing the interval into a segment [rF/γ
j−1, rF/γj] and the
remainder [0, rF/γ
j−1]. For the segment [rF/γj−1, rF/γj), we use the bound devel-
oped in Proposition 2.2 whereas for the remainder, we use the bound obtained in the
previous iteration, i.e., J(·). Then, taking the worst case quantiles around rF/γj−1
leads a new lower bound defined through a dynamic programming operator.
More formally, let us introduce the following operator T Lα,γ :W([0, 1]2)→W([0, 1]2),
that maps bounded functions into bounded functions such that for any (q, ρ+) in
[0, 1]2,




























and ρ−q− = q
}
,
Intuitively, we operate in the quantile space. The above is a dynamic program-
ming operator that given a reference quantile q and a ratio of quantiles ρ+ to the
left of q, yields a worst-case possible local contribution between the quantile q and 1.
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This worst-case possible contribution is obtained from a local contribution between
quantile q and a neighboring higher quantile q− (this contribution is driven by Propo-
sition 2.2 i.)) and a contribution from q− to 1, which is driven by our initial input to
the operator J .
It is important to note that as worst-case normalized contributions are con-
structed, the quantiles at play are constrained, and these constraints depend on both
γ and the class of distributions that the seller faces through α. We are now in a
position to state our result.
Proposition 2.3 (Left normalized contribution). Fix α in [0, 1], F ∈ Fα and γ > 0
such that γ 6= 1.
i.) The functional equation, T Lα,γJ = J admits a unique bounded solution Lα,γ.
Furthermore, for any bounded function J in W([0, 1]2), (T Lα,γ)k J converges to
Lα,γ as k grows to ∞.
ii.) Furtheremore








F (rF ) , F (rF/γ)/F (rF )
)





F (rF/γ) , F (rF )/F (rF/γ)
)
, if γ > 1.
The first point shows that the dynamic program considered admits a fixed point
Lα,γ and the latter can be obtained through value iteration. The second point estab-
lishes that this limit offers a low dimensional functional lower bound on the normal-
ized local contribution C (γ, 0, rF/γ;F )/opt(F ). In particular, quite notably, while
the previous object depends on the distribution F , the lower bound depends on F
only through two local quantiles, that at the optimal oracle price rF and that at rF/γ.
2
2Note that the last proposition provides a lower bound C (γ, 0, rF /γ;F ). Given Proposi-
tion 2.2 i.), another lower bound may be obtained by taking w = 0 and w′ = rF /γ. However,
this matches the distribution F only at 0 and rF /γ, whereas through the local contribution, we are
matching the distribution on the sequence r/γi, for i ≤ 1. Hence intuitively, by focusing on the local
contributions, the dynamic programming approach is expected to yield a tighter lower bound.
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2.5.2 Lower bound for contributions from samples higher
than rF/γ
Focusing on the right side of rF/γ, to propagate the local lower bound from an
interval to [rF/γ,∞), we apply a similar approach. We assume that we have already
developed a lower bound J(·) on the performance on any segment [rF/γj,∞) with
j ≥ 1 then we propagate by dividing the interval into a segment [rF/γj, rF/γj+1)
and the remainder [rF/γ
j+1,∞) (assuming γ < 1). For the segment [rF/γj, rF/γj+1),
we use the bound developed in Proposition 2.2 whereas for the remainder, we use
the bound obtained in the previous iteration, i.e., J(·). Then, taking the worst case
quantile at rF/γ
j+1 leads a new lower bound that is defined through the iteration of
a dynamic program.
More formally, let us introduce the following operator T Hα,γ :W([0, 1])→W([0, 1]),
such that for any ρ− in [0, 1],


















BHα,γ(ρ−) := {ρ+ ∈ [0, 1] : ρ+ ≤ γ and ρ+ ρ− ≤ γ2}.
This dynamic program is well defined since the functionARα is bounded by 1/γ and
ρ+ρ− ≤ γ2. This dynamic program formulation captures the intuition outlined above.
More precisely, the quantity ρ+ plays the role of the ratio of quantiles at rF/γ
j+1 and
rF/γ
j and ρ− plays the role of the ratio of quantiles at rF/γj and rF/γj−1. Moreover,
the first term in the operator T Hα,γ stems from the interval analysis developed in
Proposition 2.2 whereas the second stems from the bound of the previous iteration.3
Leveraging this intuition and formulation, we can show the following,
3Note that the operator here is specialized for γ < 1. For γ > 1, value iteration converges to zero
by construction of the dynamic program. It is possible to construct a recursion tailored to γ > 1
through a two dimensional dynamic program and such an approach would lead to a lower bound of
zero. For exposition purposes, we do not present this here.
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Proposition 2.4 (High samples normalized contribution). Fix α in [0, 1], F ∈ Fα
and γ > 0 such that γ 6= 1.
i.) The functional equation, T Hα,γJ = J admits a unique bounded solution Hα,γ and(T Hα,γ)k J converges to Hα,γ as k grows to ∞ for any bounded J in W([0, 1]).
ii.) We have,
C (γ, rF/γ,∞;F )
opt(F )
≥ F (rF/γ) Hα,γ
(
F (rF/γ) /F (rF )
)
.
Iterations of the dynamic program considered converge to some well defined limit
Hα,γ. Moreover, as in the case of low samples, we are able to derive a lower bound on
the worst-case contribution for high values of the sample. Notably, this lower bound
captures the dependency of F only through the quantiles at rF and rF/γ.
We note here that a related propagation idea appeared in (Huang et al., 2015,
Lemma 5.8) where a lower bound is developed for MHR distributions. The propaga-
tion there is conducted on constants and the bound derived is not tailored to MHR
distributions as the bound applies to any regular distribution. In contrast, the bound
we derive propagates functionals on a suitable state-space, and the bound adapts to
the value of α under consideration. As we will see, this leads to significantly tighter
bounds.
2.5.3 Main lower bound on R(P ,Fα)
We now present the main result for the lower bound. Let us define ∆N , the simplex
of RN for a given N ≥ 1.
Theorem 2.1 (Parametric lower bound). Fix α in [0, 1], then

























where the functions Lα,γ and Hα,γ are respectively the unique bounded solutions of
the functional equations Eq.(2.7) and Eq.(2.8) and




{q∗} × BHα,γ(0), if γ < 1,
BLα,γ(q∗, 0), if γ > 1.
This result has a fundamental implication: the maximin problemR(P ,Fα) can be
lower bounded by a sequence of alternative maximin problems parameterized byN . In
an alternative maximin problem, the seller selects among multiplicative mechanisms
that puts mass on at most N parameters. And nature, rather than selecting from
an infinite dimensional space of distributions, now selects from a space with N + 1
dimensions. Nature’s problem is now one of selecting the quantile at the optimal
oracle price rF as well as N mechanism-specific quantiles.
The bound above is obtained by combining the results of Proposition 2.3 and
Proposition 2.4, while also imposing further constraints on the parameters of the
functionals in these two results. Such constraints are captured through the sets Q∗α
and Q∗α,γ.
2.6 Parametric Upper Bounds on R(P ,Fα)
In this section, we introduce a general class of distributions motivated by the lower
bound analysis. In particular, the bounds derived on the tails of any α-SR distribu-
tion, see Lemma 2.2, implied that the lower bounds derived were near tight for such
piece-wise generalized Pareto distributions.
For fixed 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, let us introduce the family of parametric distributions
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Fα(·|q0, q1, v¯) given by














, if 1 ≤ v < v¯,
0, if v ≥ v¯.
(2.9)
with 0 ≤ q0 ≤ q1 ≤ 1 and v¯ > 1. This family is characterized by two pieces, one
from 0 to 1 and one from 1 to v¯ and may allow for a mass at v¯. Such piece-wise Γα
distributions have the shape of the lower bound in solid lines depicted in Figure 2.2.
At an intuitive level, the first piece from 0 to 1 counters mechanisms that put too much
weight on deflation, while the second piece from 1 to v¯, in conjunction potentially
with a mass at v¯ counters mechanisms that put too much mass on inflation.
Since such families (and generalizations of such families) were indirectly one of the
key building blocks of lower bounding the performance of deterministic mechanism
against any α-SR distributions, one would expect that the exact performance of any
mechanism against this family would lead to performance that has significant common
structure with the lower bounds derived.
Let us introduce two quantities L α,γ and H α,γ that play similar roles as Lα,γ
and Hα,γ in the lower bound. We define
L α,γ(q, ρ) :=






, 0+, ρ, 1
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, 1, q, 2γ, ρ, 1
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, 1, 0, 0
)
, if γ ≤ 1,
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q
Aα (q˜1(q, ρ, γ), 0+, q, 0, 1, q, γ, q, 0, 1, 0, 0) , if γ > 1,
with











, if γ ≤ 1.
The quantity L α,γ is driven by the same object that was central to the derivation
of Lα,γ in the lower bound, namely Aα. In particular, when γ < 1, the expression
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above is characterized by two terms, driven by the contribution from 0 to the optimal
oracle price rF and a second term stemming from the local contribution from rF to
rF/γ. These two contributions would correspond exactly to the lower bound of the
local contribution against any distribution on [0, rF ] and [rF , rF/γ]. In contrast to
the lower bound analysis, we do not divide further [0, rF ] into small contributions.
Similarly, we define a functional for the contribution of high values of the sample.
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, if γ > 1.
Proposition 2.5. The maximin ratio is upper bounded as follows



















and ρ ≤ Γα(1)
}
.
This result implies that one may upper bound the maximin ratio R(P ,Fα) by an
alternative maximin ratio and the latter has a very similar structure as the maximin
ratio that lower bounded R(P ,Fα) (presented in Theorem 2.1). In particular, in the
new maximin problem, nature’s problem is now two-dimensional.
The proof of this result consists of three steps. First, we consider a subset of family
of distributions at hand where we set the upper support v¯ to∞ and show that under




the distribution is α-SR. In the second step,
leveraging α-SR, we show that under the second condition ρ ≤ Γα(1), the reserve
price is necessarily at v = 1. In the last step, we compute the lower bound based on
the explicit expressions of the distributions considered. Finally, the constraint on q∗
stems from the fact that F is in Fα.
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We note here that Cole and Roughgarden (2014) leverage a special case of the
family introduced in this section to quantify the worst case in a large sample regime
analysis. In the present case, the richer piece-wise structure emerges naturally from
our lower bound analysis.
2.7 Maximin ratio characterization: impossibility
results and near-optimal mechanisms
2.7.1 Tractable characterization of bounds
As mentioned earlier, the maximin ratio optimization problem is highly intractable.
The goal of the previous sections was to reduce the complexity of the problem by
bounding the maximin ratio through optimization problems over finite dimensional
spaces. Despite the notable complexity reduction, the optimization problems defined
are still intractable, involving dynamic programs over continuous spaces. A first
goal of the next sections is to develop tractable and provable bounds through a
judiciously chosen discretization of the space of quantiles and/or mechanisms. Given
these tractable bounds, we are then in a position to derive jointly values for upper
and lower bounds on the maximin ratio, as well as near-optimal mechanisms and
near-worst case families of distributions.
2.7.1.1 Upper bounds
In this section, we derive readily computable upper bounds based on the family
introduced in Section 2.6. For that, we need to ensure a valid upper bound for all
mechanisms. For fixed ε ≥ 0 and M > 0, we define a grid
GMε =

[0,M ] if ε = 0,{
k ε : 1 ≤ k ≤ bM/εc} ⋃ {M} if ε > 0.
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Proposition 2.6. Fix α in [0, 1]. For any ε > 0 and M > 1, for any distribution F
in the set
{
F (·|q0, q1, v¯) s.t. v¯ > 1 and (q0, q1/q0) ∈ Q¯α
}
, we have









γv F ((γ − ε) v)]) , (1− F (1/M)) +R(δM , F )] .
Proposition 2.6 enables one to compute a family of tractable upper bounds. For
that, one just needs to select ε, M and a distribution in the parametric family, and
evaluate the right-hand-side above. There are three key steps behind this result.
First, we leverage the reduction shown in Proposition 2.1. Second, we show that if
we take an element from the family F (·|q0, q1, v¯) introduced in Section 2.6, one can
show that it is approachable by a sequence of distributions in Fα. Third, leveraging
the discretization in the space of multiplicative factors using the grid, we bound the
performance of any deterministic mechanism by a tractable function.
2.7.1.2 Lower bounds
While the lower bound presented in Theorem 2.1 provides a theoretical lower bound,
it is not a priori possible to evaluate it exactly as it requires computing the value
function over a continuous state-space. To obtain computationally tractable lower
bounds, we generalize here the bound of Theorem 2.1 in order to obtain a family of
tractable lower bounds that only require operating in a finite space. The key idea is
to discretize the quantile space while maintaining the lower bound structure, which
leads to dynamic programs over a finite state-space.




[0, 1] if ε = 0,{
k ε : 1 ≤ k ≤ b1/εc} ⋃ {1} if ε > 0.
First, we define counterparts of T Lα,γ and T Hα,γ in a discretized finite state-space.
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Normalized contributions of low samples. Let γ ∈ R++\{1}. We first define
a “generalized version” of βL to account for values of ε > 0. In particular we define
βˆLγ,ε : R2 → R12 as
βˆLγ,ε (η1, η2) :=

(η1, γ, η1 − ε, γ, 1, η2 − ε, 1, η1, γ, 1, γ, γ) , if γ ∈ (0, 1)
(η2, γ˜, η2 − ε, γ˜, 1, η1 − ε, 1, η2, γ˜, 1, γ˜, γ˜) , if γ > 1,
where γ˜ = min{γ, γ−1}.
Let us introduce the following operator T Lα,γ,ε : W(G 2ε ) → W(G 2ε ), such that for
any (q, ρ+) in G 2ε ,
T Lα,γ,εJ(q, ρ+) = inf
(q−,ρ−)∈BLα,γ,ε(q,ρ+)
{
(q − ε) (q− − ε)Aα (βˆLγ,ε (ρ+, ρ−))+ γ˜J (q−, ρ−)} ,(2.10)




) ∈ G 2ε :








+ − ε)(ρ− − ε))
)}
and (ρ− − ε)(q− − ε) ≤ q ≤ ρ−q−
}
.
We note here that when α = 0, the fact that the optimal quantile can be arbitrarily
close to zero leads to a challenge in the evaluation of the lower bound. In particular,
the discretized dynamic program for low values of the sample always leads to a value
of zero for T Lα,γ,εJ for the lowest quantile in the grid if one starts with an initial value
of zero. To counter this, we will develop an alternative computationally tractable
lower bound that does not rely on the operator T Lα,γ,ε. To that end, we define for all


























dq, if γ > 1
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For γ < 1, the latter function is obtained by loosely bounding the local contributions
of the segment [0, rF ] and [rF , rF/γ]. For α very close to 0, especially for the regular
family, the bound L˜α,γ,ε leads to a tractable and non-trivial bound.
Normalized contributions of high samples. Define a form of generalization of
βRγ by βˆ
R
γ,ε : R2 → R12 as βˆRγ,ε (η1, η2) := (η1, γ, η2 − ε, γ, η2, η2 − ε, γ, η2, γ, η2 − ε, 1, γ) .
We now introduce the following operator T Hα,γ,ε : W(Gε) → W(Gε), such that for
any ρ− in Gε,













ρ+ − ε) (ρ− − ε) J (ρ+)},(2.11)
where BHα,γ,ε(ρ−) := {ρ+ ∈ Gε : ρ+ ≤ γ + ε and (ρ+ − ε) (ρ− − ε) ≤ γ2}.
Computationally tractable lower bounds. We are now in a position to state
our result.
Theorem 2.2. Fix α ∈ [0, 1]. For any ε ∈ [0, 1) and integer k > 0. Let J1 be
the zero function in W(Gε) and J2 be the zero function in W(G 2ε ). Then, for any
multiplicative mechanism defined by N ≥ 1, γ ∈ RN++ and ζ in the simplex of RN ,












(T Lα,γi,εJ2)k (q∗, ρ) , L˜α,γi,ε(q∗, ρ)
}








{q∗} × BHα,γ,ε(ε), if γ < 1,
BLα,γ,ε(q∗, ε), if γ > 1.
In other words, the above result provides, for any given α, a family of lower
bounds on R(P ,Fα) parametrized by k and ε and a mechanism in M. To obtain a
computable and valid lower bound on R(P ,Fα), it suffices to select a mechanism in
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M, apply the operators T Lα,γ,ε and T Hα,γ,ε k times starting from the null functions and
then take the minimum over the values of q∗ and ρi in Q∗α,ε.
We note that Theorem 2.2 provides a generalization of Theorem 2.1. While the
bound for ε = 0 is tighter, the result provides a family of tractable bounds through
positive values of ε.
2.7.2 Impossibility Results and Near-Optimal Mechanisms
Now we are in position to derive provable lower and upper bounds on the maximin
ratio for any value of α in (0, 1]. To get the tightest possible bounds as well as the
structure of near-optimal mechanisms and near-worst case families, we will jointly
evaluate the upper and lower bounds. In particular, we use the following procedure.
1) Using Proposition 2.6, for each value of α, by using a grid of the parameters char-
acterizing the set introduced in the proposition, we find the regions of the parameters
that gives the lowest upper bound. This provides an upper bound on R(P ,Fα). 2)
Against this worst case family using Proposition 2.6 we find the best multiplicative
factor(s) γ. 3) Using these best multiplicative factors, we evaluate the worst case
performance using Theorem 2.2, leading to a lower bound on R(P ,Fα).4
In Table 2.1, we report the provable bounds obtained by following the approach
described above as well as the structure of the near-optimal pricing strategies and
the near-worst case distributions. For the upper bound, we select M = 30 and a
discretization parameter ε = 5×10−4 and for the lower bound, we use a discretization
parameter ε = 2.5×10−4 and a number of iterations of k such that the value iteration
errors are in absolute value less than 10−4.
There are multiple insightful remarks that emerge from Table 2.1. First, quite
4Note that for α = 0, our impossibility results will imply that a near-optimal randomized strategy
is the deterministic strategy of posting the sample that yields 50%. However, we will also explore
randomized strategies that put some weight on inflation (in Appendix B.1, we prove that this is
necessary against regular distributions) to improve upon the best known randomized performance.
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Pricing Lower bound Upper bound Distribution parameters
α mechanism on R(P ,Fα) on R(P ,Fα) v¯ q0 q1
1 δ0.76 63.5% 64.8% ∞ 0.450 0.077
0.9 δ0.78 62.9% 63.9% ∞ 0.440 0.076
0.8 δ0.80 62.3% 62.9% ∞ 0.425 0.074
0.7 δ0.81 61.5% 62.0% ∞ 0.405 0.070
0.6 δ0.82 60.6% 61.1% ∞ 0.385 0.066
0.5 δ0.84 59.7% 60.2% ∞ 0.360 0.061
0.4 δ0.86 58.7% 59.1% ∞ 0.330 0.055
0.3 δ0.88 57.5% 57.9% ∞ 0.290 0.047
0.2 δ0.91 56.0% 56.4% ∞ 0.235 0.036
0.1 δ0.94 54.0% 54.3% ∞ 0.165 0.022
0 0.99 δ0.99 + 0.01 δ3 50.1% 51.1% 1.75 0.110 0.009
Table 2.1: Lower and Upper Bounds on the maximin ratio R(P ,Fα) for different
values of α. We also report the parameters of the mechanisms used for the lower
bounds and the distributions used in the upper bounds.
strikingly, our joint approach yields a very tight characterization of the maximin ratio
with the difference between the upper and lower bounds ranging from 0.3% up to at
most 1.3% across different values of α. In particular, the results demonstrate that the
family of distributions that we have constructed yield a near-worst case performance
against all mechanisms. As mentioned earlier, these “hard” cases emerged naturally
in our analysis of the lower bound. To the best of our knowledge, this class of “hard”
distributions were not introduced in previous literature.
It is worth noting that, to date, to the best of our knowledge, only upper bounds on
deterministic mechanisms were known in the literature. In particular, for regular dis-
tributions, it is known that no deterministic mechanism can have better competitive
ratio than 50% and for MHR distributions, it has been shown that no deterministic
mechanism can have a better competitive ratio than 68% (Huang et al., 2015). The
results in the present chapter are the first upper bounds on the more general class of
randomized mechanisms. For the regular class, our bound establishes that while no
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deterministic mechanism can do better than 50%, no randomized mechanism can do
better than 51.1%. The value of randomization cannot be too large against regular
distributions. Against MHR distributions, we show that no randomized mechanism
can do better than 64.8%.
It is also worth noting that the best lower bound to date for the case of MHR
distributions (α = 1) was 58.9% as presented in Huang et al. (2015). Our approach
leads to a significantly improved lower bound of 63.5% for MHR distributions. Fur-
thermore, our approach is not tailored to MHR distributions but also leads to a lower
bound for an arbitrary value of α in [0, 1]. In particular, our bound for the regular case
(α = 0), is 50.1%, whereas the best lower bound in the literature was 50% + 5× 10−9
given by Fu et al. (2015).
On the value of randomization. At a higher level, our results also have impli-
cations on the value of randomization against α-SR distributions. The conjunction of
the lower and upper bounds developed (together with the structure of near-optimal
mechanisms) implies that the value of randomization is limited. For all the values of
α considered, there always exists a deterministic mechanism in P that is within 1.3%
of the optimal randomized mechanism.
On the value of one sample. Our uniform analysis across different values of α
allows to understand the value of a sample as a function of the class of distribution.
In particular, our results imply that there is a gain of at least 12.4% from the regular
case (α = 0) to the MHR case (α = 1).
On the structure of near-optimal mechanisms. Furthermore, we are able
to characterize the structure of near-optimal mechanisms. As we observe, for all
values of α > 0, a near-optimal mechanism is one that deflates the sample, and
the amount of deflation appears to increase as α increases. This is in line with
the fact that the family of distributions contains distribution with lighter tails as
α increases. Finally, it is apparent that the structure of near-optimal mechanisms
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varies a lot as a function of α. While the approach above leads to sharp results
in a constructive fashion, it is possible to derive structural results that prove that
fundamentally different mechanisms are needed for the various classes considered. In
particular, it is possible to show that against regular distributions, any mechanism
that does not put weight on inflation (γ > 1) is necessarily suboptimal. In other
words, inflation is necessary against regular distribution. In stark contrast, against
MHR distributions, it is possible to show that one may restrict attention without loss
of optimality to mechanisms that do not put any weight on inflation. We provide a
formal statement of this result in Proposition B.1-1, along with a discussion on the
interplay of inflation and deflation in Appendix B.1.
2.8 Conclusion
In the present chapter, we analyze the fundamental problem of optimal pricing when
the seller does not know the exact distribution of values of the buyer but has access to
one sample from that unknown distribution. We follow a competitive ratio approach
where the seller picks a pricing mechanism, potentially randomized, to maximize the
worst case fraction of revenue generated compared to the oracle optimal revenue,
when the distribution of values is α-strongly regular. For this problem, we provide a
unified tractable approach to analyze the maximin ratio for any value of α in [0, 1].
Through this novel approach, we are able to characterize the structure of near-optimal
mechanisms as well as near-worst case families of distributions. In turn, we are able
to characterize the maximin ratio across different values of α up to 1.3%.
There are different natural avenues of future research. One potential direction
is to try to completely close the gap between the lower and upper bounds. While
the case of one sample is fundamental, another important direction is to analyze the
problem when the seller has access to more samples. The latter direction is very
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promising since it will allow to connect the low sample and asymptotic regimes.
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Chapter 3
Auctions in the Online Display Advertising Chain:
Coordinated vs Independent Campaign Management
3.1 Introduction
The online display advertising market has grown rapidly over the last ten years, from
less than $4.3 billion in 2005 to more than $23 billion in 2015 (Internet Advertising
Bureau, 2015). This growth has seen the emergence of a significant new channel
through which publishers can sell impressions to advertisers, in addition to the tra-
ditional guaranteed contracts. Publishers now auction off in real time impressions
allowing advertisers to have increased targeting abilities. This real time market is
known as the Real Time Bidding (RTB) market. In the RTB market, while a user is
loading a webpage with an advertising slot, the publisher may send information about
the user and the characteristics of the slot (e.g., position, length, width, etc.) to an
ad exchange (through Supplier Side Platforms). The ad exchange runs an auction in
which advertisers bid for the impression through intermediaries called Demand Side
Platforms (DSPs).12
DSPs play an important role for advertisers in providing technology to access the
RTB market, with important economies of scale. This role is well recognized and
1Figure C.5-1 in Appendix C.5 provides a high level illustration of the structure of the different
agents and links constituting the value chain in the RTB market.
2The DSPs in RTB have often grown naturally from being intermediaries referred to as Ad
Networks in the traditional guaranteed contracts market in which size enabled them to negotiate
better deals on behalf of buyers.
81
understood. The focus of the present chapter is on the tactical role that DSPs play
in practice and their impact on the online display advertising value chain. Indeed,
a DSP typically manages in parallel campaigns of multiple advertisers and accesses
the values that the advertisers he represents have for a particular impression, leading
to some form of collusion. Depending on the auction mechanism in place, a DSP
will potentially have an incentive not to transmit multiple bids to the ad exchange,
even if many of the advertisers he represents would value the impression. The DSP
would want to limit the competition for the item being auctioned off. Consider the
following basic motivating example to illustrate some of the incentives at play given
the structure described above. A publisher sends an impression to an ad exchange
that runs a second price auction with reserve price set to be 3. Assume there is only
one DSP who is bidding on behalf of two advertisers. The first advertiser values the
impression at 5 whereas the second one values it at 4. How should the DSP bid?
Assuming that the DSP maximizes the surplus of his advertisers and coordinates
campaigns, he would try to limit competition and it is clear that the best strategy
of the DSP is to only submit one bid, the highest one, 5 on behalf of the first ad-
vertiser. In turn, the DSP would be allocated the item and the buyers’s side (DSP
plus advertisers) would make a surplus of 2 while the group of sellers (publisher plus
ad exchange) would generate revenues of 3. Let us compare this case to what would
have happened had the DSP managed the campaigns of the advertisers he represents
independently of each other. With such a constraint, he would have submitted a bid
on behalf of each advertiser equal to the advertiser’s value for the impression and the
resulting allocation would have been identical. However, the buyers’ surplus would
have been equal to 1 and the seller’s revenues would have amounted to 4. This simple
example already brings to the foreground fundamental questions on the DSPs impact
on the online display advertising value chain. How does the collusion induced by the
tactical role of intermediaries impact the participants in the value chain?
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3.1.1 Main questions and contributions
In the absence of collusion through intermediaries, i.e., when DSPs manage cam-
paigns of their advertisers independently of each other, it is well known that under
proper regularity assumptions, a second price auction with reserve price is an op-
timal mechanism for selling a single object (Myerson, 1981). We take this setting
as a benchmark, which we refer to as the “multi-bidding” case or the independent
campaign management case. With this baseline, we focus on the implications of co-
ordinated campaign management by DSPs in the bidding process on the value chain
when the seller uses a second price auction. The joint optimization creates a form of
collusion among buyers. The early work of McAfee and McMillan (1992) studied how
buyers could collude efficiently under an (first price) auction, and when analyzing the
seller’s response, illustrated through a numerical example with uniform valuations
that collusion could hurt not only the seller but also the buyers. In the present chap-
ter, we aim to understand and analyze if there exist systematic directional impacts
of collusion on the performance of the players in the value chain in a general market
with many intermediaries, and isolate the drivers of said impacts. In doing so, we also
aim to inform the debate about multi-bidding taking place in the online advertising
industry.
To shed light on the questions above, we develop a framework anchored around a
model with symmetric intermediaries and buyers for which the multi-bidding bench-
mark case is well understood. In particular, the main contributions of the present
chapter can be summarized as follows.
We analyze the impact of coordinated campaign management by DSPs on three
performance measures: the seller’s profit, the buyers’ side surplus (buyers and in-
termediaries) and the social welfare. We show that the presence of intermediaries
leads to an increase in the reserve price, and, as one would expect, always affects
negatively the seller’s profit. In addition, coordinated campaign management always
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negatively affects social welfare. While it is not possible to obtain a systematic direc-
tional conclusion for the impact on buyers across all market scenarios, we are able to
characterize the impact in two regimes with and without competition among inter-
mediaries. In those, we establish that the buyers (together with the intermediaries)
are also worse off when intermediaries coordinate campaigns for a broad set of market
characteristics. As result, a fundamental inefficiency is induced by the coordinating
role of the intermediaries and there is a potential for a Pareto improvement through
multi-bidding in the value chain.
In more detail, to characterize the impact on buyers, we consider two regimes that
we establish to be analytically tractable. We first analyze the impact on buyers for
the special case in which there is no competition among intermediaries: with a single
intermediary representing two buyers. We establish analytically that for the class
of Generalized Pareto distributions (that includes uniform and exponential distribu-
tions), the buyers (together with the intermediaries) are worse off when intermediaries
coordinate campaigns, as long as the coefficient of variation is not too small. Hence,
there is a potential for a pareto improvement through multi-bidding.
In the presence of competition among intermediaries, it is not clear if the ineffi-
ciency persists as the buyers’ surplus is affected by the response of the seller but also
by the competitive landscape. To gain tractability in a competitive environment, we
analyze the impact on buyers in a large market. In particular, we focus on an ap-
propriate asymptotic regime in which both the number of intermediaries and buyers
grow large while maintaining the competition level in the auction constant. In such
a regime, we derive an asymptotic upper bound on the impact on the buyers’ side
surplus for general distributions of values. Leveraging this upper bound, we then
establish that for the class of Generalized Pareto distributions, the buyers are again
negatively impacted by coordinated campaign management in a very broad range of
scenarios. In particular, this holds as long as the average number of advertisers that
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participate in the auction is moderate and the coefficient of variation of values is not
too small.
We also conduct a robustness analysis through numerical experiments for the
family of Beta and Gamma distributions for the buyers’ values and find a similar
insight to hold.
Implications. The present chapter highlights the two main forces at play for buy-
ers using intermediaries that leverage their tactical role in the bidding process and
coordinate bidding strategies as opposed to running all campaigns independently. On
the one hand, coordinated campaign management leads to a “myopic benefit of col-
lusion” by decreasing the competitiveness of the auction the buyer participates in.
On the other hand, coordinated campaign management leads the seller to react and
adjust its selling mechanism. The fundamental insight is that the impact of the latter
reaction of the seller, which leads to an increase in the reserve price, dominates, in a
very broad set of scenarios, the myopic benefit of collusion. In turn, buyers (together
with intermediaries) are worse off in a market with intermediaries that coordinate
campaigns. In other words, both the seller and the buyers’ side in the RTB value
chain suffer due to coordinated campaign management by DSPs. While DSPs play a
key technological role in reducing frictions and enabling access to the RTB market for
advertisers while providing economies of scale, the present research establishes that
coordinated campaign management taken in the bidding process may be detrimental
to the online display advertising value chain. Furthermore, the results above estab-
lish that independent campaign management and truthful submission of all bids by
DSPs, commonly referred to as “multi-bidding”, i.e., independent campaign manage-
ment, in the online advertising industry, leads to a Pareto improvement in the value
chain for a very broad range of environments. Sellers have been concerned about the
lack of transparency and visibility of all bids for some time (see, e.g., Mansour et al.
(2012), Kaplan (2012)), and the lack of thickness in the market, and have advocated
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for multi-bidding. Despite the appearance that multi-bidding might hurt advertisers
(as it would increase competition), the present chapter makes a case that, in fact,
advertisers may benefit from multi-bidding as an industry norm. More broadly, this
chapter exhibits a fundamental inefficiency in the online display advertising value
chain. Furthermore, the present chapter indicates that one may not be able to ad-
dress this inefficiency at the interface between the seller and the intermediaries under
a second price auction. One may need to tackle it at the interface between the ad-
vertisers and the DSPs and advertisers may want to require as an industry norm to
have their campaign managed independently of other buyers. While DSPs should
continue to play an important technological role, this chapter provides a rigorous
framework for a debate about multi-bidding and the role DSPs should play in the
bidding process.
Organization of the chapter. We next discuss the related literature. In Sec-
tion 3.2, we present the problem formulation. We quantify the impact of coordinated
campaign management on the seller’s profit and the social welfare in Section 3.3.
Sections 3.4-3.6 focus on the impact of this coordinated campaign management on
buyers. We conclude in Section 3.7. All proofs are presented in Appendix A and the
online appendix accompanying this chapter.
3.1.2 Literature review
Online advertising. Our chapter relates to the growing online advertising literature.
Muthukrishnan (2009) and Korula et al. (2016) review some of the research challenges
associated with the industry, such as the optimization of campaign delivery, (Roels
and Fridgeirsdottir, 2009; Ciocan and Farias, 2012; Balseiro et al., 2014; Hojjat et al.,
2016), the design of bidding strategies while learning valuations (Iyer et al., 2014) or
the study of contracting in the value chain. The latter has been studied under various
angles. For example, Balseiro and Candogan (2016) study the optimal contracting
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between intermediaries and budget constrained buyers. Feldman et al. (2010) focus
on the relation between the intermediaries and their buyers. Assuming that the
seller is running a second price auction with an eventual random reserve price, they
characterize the optimal contract between the intermediary and advertisers, given
that the intermediary is maximizing the difference between the payment received
from the buyers and the payment made to the seller. Balseiro et al. (2015b) study
the optimal contract when a network of intermediaries is present and analyze the
relation between the position in the network of an intermediary and the profit that
can be achieved as a function of the distribution of buyers. An analysis that relates
to the present work is the analysis of horizontal mergers of intermediaries. However,
the incentives at play are different as intermediaries maximize their own surplus and
we focus on a different question, the role that DSPs should play and the impact of
multi-bidding on the value chain. Also related in spirit is Hummel et al. (2016) who
study, under the assumption that the seller is running a second price auction, if the
seller could incentivize the intermediary to reveal his second value. Specifically, they
have shown that if the seller shares its revenue with the intermediaries then they
might reveal the second highest value in their book if they value the shared revenue
from the seller more than the utility of their advertisers. In the present chapter, the
intermediaries are assumed to act in order to maximize the surplus of the buyers they
represent and we abstract away from how the surplus is shared between buyers and
intermediaries. The latter ensures that the findings we obtain are not driven by any
misalignment of incentives between the intermediaries and the buyers. Especially, we
argue that the fundamental inefficiency, due to the lack of visibility of the second
value in the book of intermediaries may be tackled at the interface between the
intermediaries and the buyers in the form of an industry norm.
Collusion in auctions. Our work may be seen as studying the implication
of collusion when the seller is running a second price auction . In that sense, it
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relates to Graham and Marshall (1987) who study how the buyers could collude
efficiently when the seller is setting a second price auction. McAfee and McMillan
(1992) have also studied how the buyers could collude efficiently under the assumption
that the seller is using a first price auction. They have studied different types of
cartels: weak and strong; our model is more related to the weak cartels since no side
payment is possible, because the assignment set by the seller in our model cannot
be changed or manipulated by the intermediary. They considered only the presence
of one cartel while in our work we allow for competition among intermediaries. As
mentioned earlier, McAfee and McMillan (1992) provide a numerical example for
a specific distribution of values (standard uniform) in which collusion through one
cartel, under the first price auction, negatively affects its own buyers by the reaction
of the seller. In our chapter, we prove analytically, under a second price auction, that
such inefficiencies will be systematic in the case of more than one cartel and for a
general class of distributions. Furthermore, we elucidate a driver for the presence of
these inefficiencies through the coefficient of variation of values of buyers. For more
broad analysis of collusion, we also refer the reader to Pavlov (2008) and Che and Kim
(2009) who investigate what types of mechanisms could be used to counter collusion
when there is asymmetric information between the members of the same cartel (in
our model, motivated by online advertising, we do not assume any asymmetry among
the members of the same cartel.)
In our model each intermediary might represent many advertisers. In general,
since each intermediary could be seen as an agent with a multidimensional vector of
private values, a more general version of our problem in which one does not restrict
attention to second price auctions falls in the class of multidimensional mechanism
design. In particular, the seller’s problem would be, e.g., a special case of the model
analyzed in Belloni et al. (2010), albeit in a different context. It is well known that
in this class of problems, randomization could dominate take it or leave it prices
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(Thanassoulis (2004)) and the work of Haghpanah and Hartline (2014) provides suf-
ficient conditions for a posted price to be optimal. The practical appeal and the
adoption within the industry (Mansour et al. (2012)) of second price auctions to-
gether with the lack of clear understanding of the structure of an optimal solution
to the multi-dimensional mechanism design problem, lead to us to limit attention to
second price auctions in the present chapter.
Intermediation and efficiency in supply chains. Finally, there has been
significant research in supply chain structures and their implications on the chain
profits. From that perspective, our work also relates at a high level to this broad
stream. A study related in spirit to our study is Hu et al. (2013) that analyzes the
impact of pooling purchases on the the buyers’s profits and the strategic reaction this
induces on the seller side. See also, e.g., Adida et al. (2016), Yang and Babich (2014),
Belavina and Girotra (2012), Wu (2004) for recent studies of the role of intermediaries
in supply chains.
3.2 Problem Formulation
We consider one seller (ad exchange) with a single unit to sell (an impression), and
J intermediaries (DSPs). Each intermediary is representing K buyers (advertisers),
so in total there are J ×K buyers. The kth advertiser of intermediary j has a value
vkj for the unit. We assume that {vkj : j = 1, . . . , J, k = 1, . . . , K} are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.).
Each intermediary j is characterized by the vector of values vj = (v
1
j , . . . ,v
K
j )
of the buyers he represents. We assume that the buyers provide truthfully their
values to the intermediary that represents them.3 Each intermediary is assumed to
maximize the surplus of the group of advertisers he represents. This is in line with
3The DSPs are often computing the value their advertisers have for impressions and hence have
access to those.
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intermediaries having a surplus sharing contract with advertisers. This objective is
also in line with the long term objective of DSPs in the marketplace as those aim
to retain their customers. Furthermore, with such an objective, the incentives of the
DSPs are fully aligned with the group of advertisers they represent. In other words,
the results we obtain are not driven by a misalignment of incentives between DSPs
and advertisers.
We assume a quasi-linear utility for the buyers, i.e., an advertiser’s utility is his
value for the impression (if he receives it) minus his payment. The vector vj is the
private information of intermediary j. We assume that the intermediaries do not
communicate between themselves.
Model of valuations. With many intermediaries and advertisers per interme-
diaries, the auctions could “degenerate” given the extreme competition that arises
when J × K is large. To avoid this degeneracy and to be able to analyze a mean-
ingful model with large values of J and K (which occurs, e.g., in the online display
advertising RTB market), we focus on a two step private value model in which each
buyer “matches” with the item with probability α ∈ (0, 1]. If a buyer matches, then
his valuation is drawn from a distribution F (·), otherwise his valuation for the item
is zero. As a result, the underlying new cumulative distribution of an advertiser’s
value is given by
Gα(x) = 1− α + α F (x). (3.1)
Intermediaries are ex-ante symmetric. However, an intermediary might represent,
ex-post, strictly less than K advertisers in the auction. One could consider K as
the total number of clients that an intermediary has in its portfolio. However, for a
particular item, only a portion of those clients are interested in bidding for the item.
Related models of valuations have been used recently in studies focusing on differ-
ent questions in the context of online advertising (Balseiro et al., 2015a; Mirrokni and
Nazerzadeh, 2015). These models are meant to capture a key feature of these mar-
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kets: there tends to be a large number of advertisers contracting with intermediaries
and the latter bids on their behalf; however, when a particular auction takes place,
there is only a moderate number of bids submitted. Mathematically, the matching
parameter α allows to control how much competition is present for a typical auction.
In the present chapter, we will be looking at two main regimes. First, we analyze
a setting without competition among intermediaries, in Section 3.4, where α = 1,
J = 1 and K = 2, to highlight the main intuition at play. Then we analyze a general
model, with competition among intermediaries in Section 3.5, in a large market. We
will take J and K large, α shrinking to zero, while ensuring that αJK is constant.
In the latter, there is a large number of players in the market but the number of
interested buyers per auction is constant and independent of the scale of the market.
The seller’s optimization problem. The seller can only contract with the
intermediaries and does not know the book values list vj behind each intermediary.
However, the number of advertisers K per intermediary, and the number of inter-
mediaries J and the distribution F are assumed to be common knowledge. Finally,
the seller has no value for the item and uses a second price auction4 to maximize its
expected revenue.
Assumptions. We will assume throughout that the support of the values S
is convex, contained in [0,∞), and that the values admit a density denoted by f ,
which is twice continuously differentiable and has increasing failure rate (IFR). These
are common assumptions in the auction literature and are satisfied for example for
Gamma, Beta and Generalized Pareto families for a wide range of parameters. We
will denote the complementary cumulative distribution function by F .
Notation. In what follows, we denote by v
[i]
1:J the i
th highest value of the collection
of values {vkj : 1 ≤ j ≤ J ; 1 ≤ k ≤ K}. For each intermediary j, we denote the
4A second price auction or variations of it is one of the adopted norms in the online display
advertising industry Muthukrishnan (2009) and Mansour et al. (2012).
91
order statistic of vj = (v
1
j , . . . ,v
K
j ) by v
[1]
j , . . . ,v
[K]
j , where v
[k]





j are the first and second highest values of intermediary j. Furthermore,
for v in S , we let
φ(v) = v − 1− F (v)
f(v)
(3.2)
denote the virtual value function. In the following sections, we use buyers (respec-
tively, intermediaries) and advertisers (respectively, DSPs) interchangeably given the
central application of the chapter.
3.2.1 Performance Metrics and Impact of Active Role of
Intermediaries
We track the following performance metrics when intermediaries are coordinating
campaigns of their buyers under an optimal second price auction: the revenue of the
seller Π∗co, the social welfare S
∗
co and the surplus of the buyers (along with the inter-
mediaries) U∗co, where the subscript co is mnemonic for the fact that these metrics
are evaluated when the intermediaries are coordinating the campaigns of the buy-
ers they represent (we introduce in a moment the multi-bidding/independent cam-





J ). In particular, w
[1] is the highest value of the maximum that each in-
termediary has and w[2] is the second highest maximum among the maximum values
that each intermediary has. Note that w[1] = v
[1]
1:J , i.e., the maximum value among
the maximum values that each intermediary represents coincides exactly with the
maximum value of all advertisers. If there is only one intermediary, we define w[2]=0.
Note that given that the seller is using a second price auction with a reserve price r,
it is clear that the best response of an intermediary is to submit only one bid to rep-
resent the buyer with the highest value, i.e., intermediary j will only submit one bid
equal to v
[1]
j . Hence, the problem reduces to one in which the seller can be thought
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as facing J intermediaries, with each one representing only one “virtual buyer.” In
turn, we have
Π∗co = E[max{rco,w[2]} 1{w[1] ≥ rco}],
S∗co = E[w[1] 1{w[1] ≥ rco}],
U∗co = E[(w[1] −max{rco,w[2]})+],
where rco denotes the optimal reserve price set by the seller when the intermediaries
are coordinating the campaigns of the buyers they represent. In Section 3.3, we will
characterize explicitly rco.
Multi-bidding benchmark. To understand the impact of tactical campaign
coordination, we will consider the benchmark case in which intermediaries manage
the campaign of each buyer independently of the other buyers they represent (more
formally, the bid that they submit on behalf of a particular buyer cannot depend on
the actual values of other buyers). We refer to this benchmark as the multi-bidding
or independent campaign management case (we will use both terms interchangeably).
In this case, the problem of the seller reduces to a case akin to one in which
she is dealing directly with the buyers (and intermediaries are simply providing the
technology to potentially compute and submit the bids). Then, the problem reduces
to selling a single unit to J × K buyers with i.i.d values drawn according to F .
Under the IFR assumption we made on F , it is well known (Myerson, 1981) that an
optimal selling mechanism is given by a second price auction with reserve price rin,
where rin is the unique solution of φ(v) = 0 with φ(·) being the virtual value function
defined in (3.2). The subscript in is mnemonic for the fact the intermediaries are
managing campaigns independently. In particular, the good is allocated if and only
if at least one buyer has a bid above rin, in which case the buyer with the highest
bid is allocated the item and pays the maximum of the reserve price and the second
highest bid. Only a buyer who is allocated the item pays anything to the seller. We
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recall that the second price auction is a truthful direct mechanism, i.e., it is optimal
for each buyer to submit its true value. In turn, the expected revenue of the seller,





















The objective of the chapter is to characterize the impact of coordinated campaign
management in the bidding process on the value chain. In particular, we will analyze
the three key quantities
Π∗co − Π∗in impact of coordinated campaign management on seller revenues,
S∗co − S∗in impact of coordinated campaign management on social welfare,
U∗co − U∗in impact of coordinated campaign management on buyers’ surplus.
3.3 Impact of Intermediaries Coordinating
Campaigns of their Buyers
3.3.1 Adjusted reserve price
We first characterize the impact of coordinated campaign management on the reserve
price set by the seller.
Lemma 3.1 (Adjusted Reserve Price). When the intermediaries are coordinating
campaigns of their own buyers, an optimal reserve for a second price auction on all






Furthermore, this price is strictly greater than the one in the independent campaign
management benchmark case, i.e.,
rco > rin.
Hence, when intermediaries are coordinating campaigns of their buyers, the seller
is not oblivious to this role and reacts by becoming more “demanding” towards the
intermediaries and increasing the minimum payment she is willing to accept. We
note that here, we assume that the incentives of intermediaries are perfectly aligned
with those of the buyers they represent, so the increase in reserve price does not stem
from double-marginalization. Rather, it is driven by the change in the distribution of
bids/values that the seller observes due to the coordination of campaigns. Now, the
seller sees only the maximum of the values of the buyers that a particular intermediary
represents.
3.3.2 Impact on the value chain
Seller’s profit and social welfare. The next result formalizes the fact that the
seller is negatively affected when intermediaries coordinate the campaigns of the buy-
ers they represent, and establishes that the latter practice also negatively affects the
social welfare.
Corollary 3.1 (impact on seller and social welfare). The coordinating role of DSPs







The increase of the reserve price only mitigates the revenue losses stemming from
the collusion induced by intermediaries but does not allow her to fully recover the




fact that the seller is hurt by the collusion is in line with intuition. Furthermore,
since the seller increases its reserve price from rin to rco, i.e., rco > rin, there is now
a lower probability that the item is sold hence the social welfare decreases. In turn,
the pie that the seller and buyers (together with the intermediaries) will be sharing
shrinks.
Buyers’ side surplus. Next, we analyze the effect on buyers’s side (buyers
together with intermediaries) and analyze the difference U∗co − U∗in.
To that end, we let Uin(r) denote the expected surplus of the buyers when the











Note that U∗in = Uin(rin).
Similarly, we let Uco(r) denote the expected surplus of the buyers when the seller
uses a second price auction with a reserve price r and when the intermediaries are
coordinating campaigns of their buyers, i.e.,
Uco(r) = E
[
(w[1] −max{w[2], r})1{w[1] ≥ r}] .
Note that U∗co = Uco(rco).
With the notation above, the impact of collusion on buyers may be written as
U∗co − U∗in. In turn, this may decomposed as follows
U∗co − U∗in = MBC +SRI ,
where
MBC = Uco(rin)− Uin(rin),
SRI = Uco(rco)− Uco(rin).
The quantity MBC captures the benefits that the buyers receive stemming from
the intermediaries acting strategically, assuming the seller does not react. We refer
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to MBC as the “myopic benefit of collusion.” Clearly, for any market parameters,
one has MBC ≥ 0, i.e., if the seller does not respond to the coordinating role of
intermediaries and keeps the reserve price at rin, the buyers would benefit from such
coordination since competition is softened.
The quantity SRI represents the impact of the increase in reserve price on the
buyers when the intermediaries are coordinating campaigns of their buyers. We refer
to SRI as the “seller reaction” effect. It is also clear that SRI ≤ 0, i.e., the
buyers are negatively affected by the increase in reserve price from rin to rco.
The following proposition characterizes each quantity as a function of the market
primitives.
Proposition 3.1 (impact on buyers). The myopic benefit of collusion and the seller’s

















−(J − 1)(1− (Gα(x))JK)
]
− [(1− (Gα(x))JK)] dx.
Quantifying the impact of the coordinating role of DSPs on the buyers’ side surplus
is akin to quantifying which of MBC and SRI dominates and drives the sign
of U∗co − U∗in = MBC + SRI . Analyzing U∗co − U∗in based on the expressions in
Proposition 3.1 appears analytically intractable in general. In Section 3.4, we analyze
the case, without competition among intermediaries (one intermediary representing
two advertisers) in detail for a family of distributions, to develop the main intuition
and drivers of U∗co−U∗in. In Section 3.5, we analyze a general model with competition
among intermediaries, and characterize U∗co−U∗in in a “large market” in an appropriate
asymptotic regime.
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3.4 Impact on the Buyers’s Side: No
Competition Among Intermediaries
To highlight the main intuition and the main phenomena at play, we first consider
the case of one intermediary (J = 1) representing two advertisers (K = 2), when
the advertisers are always interested by the object (α = 1). We denote the order
statistic of the values of the two advertisers by v[1] and v[2] with v[1] ≥ v[2]. When
the intermediary is multi-bidding, meaning that the seller receives two bids v[1] and
v[2], the optimal mechanism is a second price auction with reserve price rin defined by
rin = (1 − F (rin))/f(rin). When the intermediary coordinates the bids of its buyers,
the optimal mechanism is a second price auction with reserve price rco defined by
rco = [1 − F 2(rco)]/[2 f(rco) F (rco)] and the seller receives only one bid equal the
highest value v[1].
To quantify the impact of collusion on buyers and the drivers of its sign, we will
be analyzing a family of value distributions that includes among other distributions
the uniform and exponential ones. In particular, we focus on the Generalized Pareto
Distribution parametrized by (σ, ξ) with σ > 0 and ξ ≤ 0 with distribution
Fξ(z) =

1− (1 + ξz
σ
)−1/ξ for ξ < 0
1− e−z/σ for ξ = 0
The support is given by [0,−σ/ξ] for ξ < 0 and [0,∞) for ξ = 0. In particular,
the standard uniform and exponential distributions belong to the family, the former
corresponding to (σ, ξ) = (1,−1) and the latter to (σ, ξ) = (1, 0). Any member of
the family satisfies the IFR property (since ξ ≤ 0). This family allows many possible
shapes and some distributions belonging to the family are depicted in Figure C.6.1 in
Appendix C.6. This family is attractive given its flexibility but also its tractability
in the context of auction design (see, e.g., Balseiro et al. (2015b)).
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Using Proposition 3.1, we can derive an expression for U∗co − U∗in as a function of


















Following Bulow and Roberts (1989), we focus on the quantiles. Let us introduce
q(x) := 1 − F (x), so we get that x = F−1(1 − q) and let us denote qin and qco the
quantiles corresponding to the reserve prices rin and rco respectively.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that the distribution of values is given by a generalized
Pareto distribution with parameters (σ, ξ) with ξ ≤ 0. Then, the impact of campaign
coordination by the intermediary on the buyers’ side surplus is given by




















where qin and qco are solutions to the following equations








Proposition 3.2 provides a closed-form expression of U∗co−U∗in as a function of the
quantiles. The key challenge in analyzing U∗co − U∗in and its sign is associated with
the quantile in the coordinated campaigns case, qco, which does not admit a closed-
form expression. Furthermore, the proposition implies that for the generalized Pareto
family, the sign of U∗co − U∗in does not depend on the value of σ, so the sign depends
only on ξ. Furthermore, note that the coefficient of variation of values (the standard





Hence, CV (ξ) is a one-to-one mapping and is increasing in ξ; as ξ spans (−∞, 0],
CV (ξ) spans (0, 1]. We will next analyze the sign of U∗co−U∗in as a function of CV (ξ),
as the latter is a more “physical” quantity than ξ.
Theorem 3.1. (impact of coordinated campaigns on buyers’s side) Suppose that the
distribution of values is given by a generalized Pareto distribution with parameters
(σ, ξ). Then there exists a threshold ρ in [0, 1/
√
3] such that buyers are worse-off in
a market with coordinated campaigns, i.e., U∗co − U∗in ≤ 0, whenever the coefficient of
variation of values CV (ξ) ≥ ρ.
The result implies that coordinated campaign management has a negative im-
pact on the buyers’s side (buyers together with the intermediaries) as long as the
coefficient of variation of values is not too small. In particular, the uniform and ex-
ponential distributions satisfy CV (ξ) ≥ ρ, (CV (−1) = 1/√3 and CV (0) = 1). The
proof of the previous theorem relies mainly on the fact that when the coefficient of
variation increases the seller becomes more “demanding”. In particular, in the proof,
we establish structural properties of the ratio of the quantiles qco/qin (as depicted in
Figure 3.2(b)) and how it dependens on the coefficient of variation. Leveraging these




Initially, the motivation for coordinated campaigns is to reduce competition from
the advertisers represented by the same intermediary. By hiding the second value (and
lower values), the intermediary decreases the second value present in the marketplace.
This appears appealing to the advertisers given that the myopic benefit of collusion
MBC is always non-negative. However, the seller is not oblivious to this strategic
behavior of intermediaries and adjusts the reserve price given the new distribution of
values she faces. Not only the payment for the winner may increase but by increasing
its reserve price, the seller also allocates less often the item. These last two effects
lead to the negative effect that the seller might have on buyers (SRI ). Theorem 3.1
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establishes that this effect dominates the myopic benefit of collusion in a broad range
of market scenarios. In particular, as long as there is non-trivial value discovery
involved (which corresponds to higher values of CV (ξ)), in which case auctions play
an important role, then the buyers will benefit from operating in a market in which
the intermediary is managing all campaigns independently and is multi-bidding.
Together with Corollary 3.1, Theorem 3.1 implies that coordinated campaigns
can have a negative impact across the value chain. In other words, multi-bidding by
an intermediary can lead to a Pareto improvement in the value chain as long as the
coefficient of variation of values is above a threshold. In the next section, we conduct
a numerical analysis for the different quantities to support our analytical insights
for the Generalized Pareto Distribution. We have also investigated numerically other
general classes of distributions (such as Beta or Gamma) and the same central insight
holds. There exists a threshold such that if the coefficient of variation exceeds that
threshold then both the seller and the buyers are negatively affected by operating in
a market with coordinated campaigns (see Section 3.6).
3.4.1 Numerical illustrations and Discussion
In Figure 3.1, we depict the social welfare, the seller’s profit and the buyers’ surplus
as a function of the coefficient of variation CV (ξ) of the values. We normalize the
mean of values to 1 by setting σ = 1− ξ.
We observe first that when CV (ξ) is close to zero, the role of the intermediary
(campaign coordination vs. multi-bidding) has little influence on the performance
metrics. Indeed, the values of the buyers are close to deterministic and the seller is
able to extract almost all the surplus independently of the nature of the intermediary’s
role. As CV (ξ) increases, the role of the intermediary becomes much more central
and significantly affects the seller and the social welfare. Seller’s revenue losses (Π∗co−
Π∗in)/Π
∗
in and social welfare losses (S
∗
co−S∗in)/S∗in are in the range of 7−8% for CV (ξ) ≥
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Coefficient of Variation CV (ξ)
Figure 3.1: Social welfare, seller’s profit and buyers’ surplus as a function
of the coefficient of variation of values and the intermediary coordinating or inde-
pendently managing campaigns. The distribution of values are generalized Pareto
distributions with parameters (σ = 1 − ξ, ξ), and there is one intermediary and two
advertisers.
0.5.
In Figure 3.2, we zoom on the impact on buyers’s surplus U∗co − U∗in and analyze
in conjunction the optimal reserve prices rco and rin and the corresponding quantiles.
Note that here, once the expectation of values is normalized to 1, we have rin = 1 for
all values of ξ.
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(a) Impact on buyers’ surplus


























(b) Optimal reserve prices and quantiles
Figure 3.2: (a) Impact of campaign coordination on buyers’ side surplus (b) Optimal
reserve prices and quantiles as a function of the coefficient of variation for generalized
Pareto distributions with parameters (σ = 1 − ξ, ξ) with one intermediary and two
buyers.
We observe that U∗co−U∗in is initially positive and negligible (both U∗co and U∗in are
“small” given that the seller extracts almost all the surplus when CV (ξ) is small),
crosses the zero axis at CV (ξ) ≈ 0.22 and then stays negative for all greater values
of CV (ξ). This is a picture proof of Theorem 3.1. In addition, we note that the
losses for the buyers (together with the intermediaries) (U∗co − U∗in)/U∗in amount to
about 7.9% for CV (ξ) = 1/
√
3 ≈ 0.58, which corresponds to the uniform distribution
and about 8.2% for CV (ξ) = 1, which corresponds to the exponential distribution.
The main driver of these losses is the increase in reserve price from rin to rco which
increases by 16% and 21%, respectively, in the latter two cases.
In other words, for the latter two cases of uniform and exponential distributions,
the move from coordinated campaigns in the bidding process to independent campaign
management, in which the campaign of each buyer is managed independently of other
campaigns, would lead to a Pareto improvement in the value chain with both the seller
and the buyers obtaining increases in performance in the range of 7 − 8.2%. At an
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intuitive level, as the coefficient of variation increases, there is more value discovery
involved, which pushes the seller to react more aggressively, and in turn amplifies the
fundamental inefficiency associated with campaign coordination in the value chain.
3.5 Impact on the Buyers’s Side: Competition
Among Intermediaries
In the previous section, we analyzed the case of one intermediary representing two
advertisers to highlight the main intuition and the main phenomena at play. In
practice, there would be multiple intermediaries and each will be representing a po-
tentially large number of buyers. The goal of this section is to analyze the impact of
coordinated campaigns on the buyers’s side U∗co − U∗in in such a general setting.
3.5.1 Large Market Approximation
We will analyze the impact of coordinated campaigns in a regime where both the
number of buyers and the number of intermediaries grow large while the probability
of any advertiser matching shrinks to zero such that the average number of advertisers
who have a positive value for the item auctioned off is constant, equal to some c > 0,
i.e., αJK = c. More precisely, we will assume that α and Kα are small, J and K are
large, while the average number of buyers having positive value for the item αJK = c
is constant.
In other words, in the regime we analyze, the competition in any given auction is
always ex-ante identical and fixed, independently of the scale of the network. This
ensures that the auctions do not degenerate and that the level of competition in the
auctions does not change with the number of intermediaries and advertisers.
From the seller’s perspective, if one fixes the reserve price for a moment, coor-
dinated campaigns leads to inefficiencies as soon as the same intermediary has both
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the highest value v
[1]
1:J and the second highest value v
[2]
1:J among all advertisers. Given
the structure of the network, the probability that such an event occurs is given by
K − 1
KJ − 1 .
As a result, in a large market, we expect coordinated campaigns to have an impact
of order O(1/J) on the various players in the value chain.
The next result shows, through upper and lower bounds that, indeed, the reserve
price rco approaches rin in the large market regime at rate (1/J).
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where C1 is a constant depending only on the distribution F .
Next, we analyze the impact on buyers: U∗co −U∗in =MBC +SRI by deriving
upper bounds on the myopic benefit of collusion MBC and on the seller’s reaction
impact SRI .
Proposition 3.3 (Myopic benefit of collusion). The myopic benefit of collusion















(y − x)F (y)f(x)f(y)c3e−cF (x)dydx
]
+O(ln(JK)/J2).
This result shows that theMBC is indeed of order O(1/J) when ln(JK) = o(J).
The main idea behind the proof of the result is to condition on the number of matches
5The dependence of the reserve prices on the relevant parameters will be dropped to lighten
notation.
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and study the myopic benefit of collusion as a function of how the values of the
matches are distributed among intermediaries. While the proof deals with the general
case, the main ideas can be highlighted in the limiting regime, when K and J increase
to infinity. In that case, the distribution of the number of matches converges to a
Poisson distribution with mean c. Now, the myopic benefit of collusion is only strictly
positive if there are at least two matches for the winning intermediary and the latter
has the two highest values among all buyers.
If exactly two matches occur, which happens with probability c2e−c/2 under the
Poisson distribution, then these are at the same intermediary with probability (K −
1)/(KJ−1). In that case, at the first order, one can show that the market is reduced
to the exact setting studied in Section 3.4: one seller with a reserve price rin and
one intermediary representing two advertisers having a distribution F , so the myopic
benefit of collusion is E[(v[2] − rin)+] =
∫∞
0
(y − rin)+2F (y)f(y)dy. This is the driver
of the first term in the brackets in the bound in Proposition 3.3.
If there are strictly more than two matches, the myopic benefit of collusion is
diminished because of competition since a winning intermediary would be charged
eventually more than the reserve price rin. One can show that at the first order, if
an intermediary has the two highest values of buyers, then it is unlikely that he has
the third highest value among buyers. It means that the winning intermediary will
be, with high probability, charged the maximum of the third highest price and the
reserve price rin. It is this effect that drives the second term in the brackets in the
bound in Proposition 3.3.
Next, we derive an upper bound on the seller’s reaction impact SRI .
Proposition 3.4 (seller reaction impact). Suppose that α ≤ 1/2, J ≥ 3 and JK ≥
16 max{1, (ce)4}, then SRI is upper bounded as follows





αKα + α + (Kα)2),
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where M > 0 a constant that depends only on the distribution F and the average
number of matches c.
As mentioned earlier, the seller’s reaction is always non-positive. In the large
market regime, the challenge in evaluating SRI = Uco(rco) − Uco(rin) stems from
two main effects. First, the reserve price rco depends on parameters of the regime, in
particular, α and K, which govern the number of buyers that an intermediary might
represent in the marketplace. Second, the utility function Uco(·) at any value r > 0
is varying as a function of the parameters of the market, J , K, and α and needs
to be approximated in the large market regime. The proof leverages the limiting
distribution of matches to bound Uco(·) from a suitable approximation, which in
conjunction with the characterization of rco − rin derived in Lemma 3.2 leads to the
bound in the result.
Combining Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 leads to a general upper bound on U∗co − U∗in.
Theorem 3.2 (Upper bound on impact of coordinated campaigns on buyers’s side).
Suppose that α ≤ 1/2, J ≥ 3, JK ≥ 16 max{1, (ce)4} and that ln(K) = o(J). Then
the impact of coordinated campaigns on buyers is upper bounded as follows.






















The bound above highlights the tension between the two effects taking place:
MBC and SRI . The sign of the bound is governed by which effect dominates.
The bound can be evaluated for any particular distribution and market parameters.
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In the next section, we will specialize the bound to the case of Generalized Pareto
distributions and then explore numerically the bound for other distributions.
3.5.2 Generalized Pareto distributions
In this section, we focus on the Generalized Pareto Distributions introduced in Section
3.4 and analyze the sign of the asymptotic upper bound on U∗co − U∗in, through ∆U∗,
as derived in Theorem 3.2. The next result shows that the main insight obtained in
the case of one intermediary and two advertisers carries over to this general model.
Theorem 3.3. (impact of coordinated campaigns on buyers’s side) Suppose that the
distribution of values is given by a generalized Pareto distribution with parameters
(σ, ξ). Then there exists c¯ > 0 such that for an average number of matches c < c¯,
there exists ρc in [0, 1) such that if the coefficient of variation of values CV (ξ) ≥ ρc,
then ∆U∗ ≤ 0.
Theorem 3.3 highlights that the coefficient of variation of values plays again a key
role in the general model with competition among intermediaries (as it did in the case
of one intermediary and two advertisers) to determine which effect dominates SRI
or MBC . In particular, when the coefficient of variation is sufficiently large, the
result implies that in the limiting “large market” regime, U∗co − U∗in ≤ 0, and hence,
the buyers’s side is negatively affected by coordinated campaigns. Since sellers are
always negatively affected by this coordination, independent campaign management
leads to a Pareto improvement in the value chain.
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Figure 3.3(a) depicts the value of ∆U∗ derived in Theorem 3.2, corresponding to
an asymptotic upper bound on U∗co − U∗in when J grows large. Figure 3.3(b) depicts
the limit of (rco − rin)/(αK) when J grows large, which we denote by ∆r.

















(a) Impact on buyers’ surplus









Coefficient of Variation CV (ξ)
∆
r
(b) impact on reserve price.
Figure 3.3: Impact of coordinated campaigns on the buyers’ side surplus and reserve
price as a function of the coefficient of variation and values of c ∈ {1, · · · , 7} for
generalized Pareto distributions with parameters (σ = 1−ξ, ξ) in the limiting regime.
Figure 3.3(a) provides a picture-proof of Theorem 3.3 but also enriches the result
with numerical values for the thresholds. As seen in the one intermediary and two
buyers case in Section 3.4, the negative impact on buyers is mainly due to the fact
that the seller reaction dominates the myopic benefit. This is mitigated under the
general model due to the competition among intermediaries. However the seller’s
impact can still be high compared to the myopic benefit of collusion. This reaction
of the seller is pictured in Figure 3.3(b). It shows that the seller increases his reserve
price with the coefficient of variation and with the average number of matched buyers.
Furthermore, if we focus only on markets where the competition is moderate, meaning
the average number of interested advertisers is less than four (c ≤ 4), then for almost
any coefficient of variation, coordinated campaigns in the market is always detrimental
to buyers’ side. This emphasizes the robustness of the insight obtained in the case
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of one intermediary and two advertisers. In the next section, we will see that this
finding is also robust across different distributions of values for buyers.
3.6 Robustness Analysis
In Sections 3.4 and 3.5, we have shown formally that a Pareto improvement in the
value chain is possible under the class of Generalized Pareto distributions as long
as the coefficient of variation of values is not too small. In this section, we explore
numerically the same question across classes of distributions. In particular, we analyze
the Gamma and Beta distributions.
Each of these distributions are parametrized by two positive parameters. The
Gamma distribution, parameterized by a > 0, b > 0, has support in [0,∞[ and its







where Γ(·) is the gamma function. The Beta distribution, parametrized by a > 0 and





In general, both classes of function belong to the IFR class if their parameters
(a, b) are both greater than one. For each of these classes, we sample 1,000 pair of
parameters from [1, 10]2. We then compute the corresponding coefficient of variation
for that pair and the impact of coordinated campaigns on buyers U∗co − U∗in (or the
asymptotic upper bound ∆U∗). At the end of the procedure, we plot the 1,000 pairs
(CV,U∗co − U∗in) obtained in the process.
In Figure 3.4, we plot U∗co−U∗in for the case of one intermediary and two advertisers
for both the Beta and Gamma distributions.
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Figure 3.4: Impact of coordinated campaigns on the buyers’ side surplus as a function
of the coefficient of variation for Beta and Gamma distributions, with one interme-
diary and two buyers.
We observe that a similar result to Theorem 3.1 appears to hold for the Beta and
Gamma distributions. When the coefficient of variation is greater than a threshold (in
this case 0.4), then coordinated campaign management is detrimental for the buyers.
111
































Figure 3.5: Impact of coordinated campaigns on the buyers’ side surplus, under the
general model, as a function of the coefficient of variation and values of c ∈ {1, 3, 5}
for Beta and Gamma distributions.
In Figure 3.5, we plot the asymptotic upper bound ∆U∗ derived for the general
model analyzed in Section 3.5 for both the Beta and Gamma distributions. Figure 3.5
further emphasizes the robustness of the insights obtained in the previous sections
across a broad set of distributions. Indeed, we observe the coefficient of variation
is a key driver of the sign of U∗co − U∗in and that for moderate levels competition (as
measured by c), there exists a threshold such that the buyers’ side is always negatively
affected by the practice of coordinated campaign management when the coefficient
of variation exceeds this threshold.
3.7 Conclusion
The present chapter has analyzed the implications of the coordination of campaigns
implemented by intermediaries in the bidding process when these represent multiple
buyers. In particular, we have characterized the impact on the different parties in
the value chain. The seller’s revenues and the social welfare are always negatively
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affected. Notably, the buyers’s side is also negatively affected in a broad set of market
scenarios, which we characterize to be those with moderate competition and medium
to high values of the coefficient of variation of values.
In the online display advertising market, we emphasize here that we do not chal-
lenge the value of DSPs in the market. DSPs provide value to advertisers in different
ways. What we challenge in this chapter is the tactical role they play when coordi-
nating bids in the auctions, that leads to collusion among subsets of advertisers. This
chapter provides a framework to better understand and quantify the implications of
this coordination and anchor the debate about multi-bidding.
Many possible extensions can be considered, from the consideration of more gen-
eral models of values for buyers to include, e.g., common values, to the potential
analysis of markets with asymmetric players. Additionally, in the presence of inter-
mediaries, the seller faces a multi-dimensional mechanism design problem and the
question of understanding the performance of second price auctions compared to an
optimal mechanism is still open. More broadly, this chapter raises the important
question of whether it is possible to resolve the inefficiency identified in the online
display advertising value chain. The present chapter shows that advertisers them-
selves might have an incentive to advocate for independent campaign management as
an industry norm, to ensure that advertisers’ campaigns are always managed inde-
pendently of other advertisers represented by the same DSP. From that perspective,
a possible approach to this inefficiency is to tackle it at the interface between adver-
tisers and DSPs. Another possible avenue, which is also interesting from a research
perspective, is to investigate if this inefficiency can be mitigated at the interface be-
tween the seller and the DSPs through an adjustment of the selling mechanism to,
e.g., dynamic mechanisms across multiple items.
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs for Section 1.3
Proof of Theorem 3.2. The goal of this proof is to show that we can focus on the
scale-free mechanisms without loss of optimality. More precisely, we will establish
that for any mechanism in m ∈M there exists a mechanism mˇ ∈Msf such that
inf
F∈F
R(mˇ, F ) ≥ inf
F∈F
R(m,F ).
Consider a mechanism (x, t) inM. Consider F˜ ∈ F , with corresponding density
f˜ , and let θ > 0. By the scale invariance assumption on F , the distribution Fθ−1 also
belongs to F . This implies that for any θ > 0, by definition of the infinimum, we
have
R(m, F˜θ−1) ≥ inf
F∈F
R(m,F ). (A.1-1)
We first analyze R(m, F˜θ−1). By Lemma A.1-2, stated and proved after this result,
we have that the denominator of R(m, F˜θ) is given by
opt(F˜θ−1) = θ opt(F˜ ). (A.1-2)
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We show in Lemma A.1-1 (stated and proved after this proof) that for any x in
M, there exists xˇi(·, ·), such that for any v1, v2 ≥ 0,
xˇi(v1, v2) := lim
θ↓0
xi(θv1, θv2)
Note that xi(θs, θv−i) ≤ 1 and hence by an application of the dominated conver-





xˇi(s, v2)ds as θ ↓ 0.
Now note that
0 ≤ vi xi(θvi, θv−i)−
∫ vi
0
xi(θs, θv−i)ds ≤ vi,
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and EF˜ [vi] < ∞, since F˜ belongs to G. By another application of the dominated
convergence theorem, we have
lim
θ↓0





















Note that xˇi(v1, v2) and the payments tˇ(v1, v2) = vi xˇi(vi, v−i) −
∫ vi
0
xˇi(s, v−i)ds is a
feasible mechanism. Indeed,
vi xˇi(v1, v2)− tˇi(v1, v2) =
∫ vi
0
xˇi(s, v−i)ds ≥ 0,
and hence (IR) is satisfied.














i, θv−i)− ti(θv′i, θv−i)]
= v′ixˇi(v
′
i, v−i)− tˇi(v′i, v−i),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the initial mechanism m = (x, t)
is incentive compatible. Hence, we deduce that (IC) is satisfied for the the new
mechanism mˇ = (x˜, t˜). The probability constraints (AC) is clearly satisfied by x˜.
Hence, we have established that
lim
θ↓0
R(m, F˜θ−1) = R(mˇ, F˜ ).
Taking the limit on the left-hand-side of (A.1-1) as θ ↓ 0, we obtain
R(mˇ, F˜ ) = lim
θ↓0
R(m, F˜θ−1) ≥ inf
F∈F
R(m,F ).
Taking the infinimum over all F˜ in F , we obtain
inf
F∈F




Note that mˇ belongs to Msf . Indeed,
xˇi(λv1, λv2) = lim
θ↓0
xi(θλv1, θλv2) = lim
γ↓0
xi(γv1, γv2) = xˇi(v1, v2).
Taking successively the supremum over all mechanisms mˇ in Msf , and then over all
mechanisms m in M in (A.1-3), we obtain
R(Msf ,F ) ≥ R(M,F ). (A.1-4)
Since the other inequality is trivial, we conclude that
R(Msf ,F ) = R(M,F ).
This finalizes the proof.
Lemma A.1-1. For any mechanism m = (x, t) in M, for any v1, v2 ≥ 0, and
i = 1, 2, xi(λvi, λv−i) admits a limit as λ ↓ 0.
Proof of Lemma A.1-1. Fix m = (x, t) in M, there exists ε > 0 such that
maxi=1,2{TV (xi, [0, ε]2)} <∞.
Let us fix (vi, v−i). To show the result, we will first analyze the “variation” of the
function J(λ) := xi(λvi, λv−i) as a function of λ on [0, /max(vi, v−i)]. For that let
us fix an integer N ≥ 1 and a sequence of non-negative integer (λj)1≤j≤N such that
λj ≤ λj+1 ≤ /max(vi, v−i) for all j in 1, · · · , N − 1.







|xi(uj+1)− xi(uj)| ≤ TV (xi, [0, ε]2]) <∞,
Hence the function J(·) has a bounded total variation on [0, /max(vi, v−i)]. By
Jordan’s decomposition, see (Cohn, 2013, Proposition 4.4.2.), one can write J as
the difference between two monotone functions. In turn, the fact that a monotone
function admits a right limit at each point implies that xi(λvi, λv−i) admits a limit
as λ ↓ 0. This concludes the proof.
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Lemma A.1-2. For any distribution F in G, and θ > 0, we have opt(Fθ) =
θ−1 opt(F ).
Proof of Lemma A.1-2. The goal of this proof is to show that the optimal revenue
scales as we we scale the distribution.
Fix θ > 0 and F ∈ G. Let m = (x, t) denote a mechanism inM that is ε away from







≥ opt(F )− ε.
Denote by mθ the mechanism characterized by the allocations and payments given
by
xθ(v1, v2) = x(θv1, θv2),
tθ(v1, v2) = θ
−1t(θv1, θv2).
Note that for any i = 1, 2, v1, v2, vˆ1, vˆ2, we have
vi x
θ
i (v1, v2)− tθi (v1, v2) = θ−1 [θvi xi(θv1, θv2)− ti(v1, v2)] ≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that m satisfies (IR). Hence mθ also
satisfies (IR). In addition, we have
vi x
θ
i (vi, v−i)− tθi (vi, v−i) = θ−1 [θvi xi(θvi, θv−i)− ti(θvi, θv−i)]
≥ θ−1 [θvi xi(θvˆi, θv−i)− ti(θvˆi, θv−i)]
= vi x
θ
i (vˆi, v−i)− tθi (vˆi, v−i),
where the inequality is consequence of the fact that m satisfies (IR). Hence, (IC) is
also satisfied. Finally, (AC) follows directly from the feasibility of the mechanism m.
We deduce that mθ is feasible for problem (2.1). Furthermore, its performance




































≥ θ−1 [opt(F )− ε] .
We deduce that
opt(Fθ) ≥ θ−1 opt(F ).
Through a symmetric argument, we have that
opt(F ) ≥ θ opt(Fθ).
The result of the lemma follows and the proof is complete.
Proof of Lemma 1.2. We will exhibit a distribution, FB, for which the perfor-
mance of any scale-free mechanism can be arbitrarily close to zero. We will consider
a Bernoulli distribution, FB that put mass q > 0 at v = 1 and the remaining 1− q at
0, i.e.
P (v = 1) = 1− P (v = 0) = q.
Let us analyze the ratio for this distribution. Let us start by the denominator, i.e.
the optimal revenue of FB.
It is clear that given the structure of the distribution, it is suboptimal to charge
the winner a price different from 0 or 1. Hence the optimal mechanism is a posted
price equal to 1, hence the optimal revenue is given by




= q (2− q) .
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Now let us analyze the performance of a prior independent mechanism m = (x, t)
in Msf . We have
E [ti(vi, v−i)] = q2ti(1, 1) + q (1− q) (ti(1, 0) + ti(0, 1)) + (1− q)2 ti(0, 0).
From the incentive rational constraints, we have that an optimal mechanism nec-
essary verifies ti(0, 0) = ti(0, 1) = 0. From Lemma A.1-3, stated and proved after this
proof, we have that ti(1, 0) = 0. Hence we get that
2∑
i=1
E [ti(vi, v−i)] = q2 (t1(1, 1) + t2(1, 1)) .
Using the coupling and incentive rational constraints, we have that t1(1, 1)+t2(1, 1) ≤
1. Hence, we conclude that
2∑
i=1
E [ti(vi, v−i)] ≤ q2.
So from the previous analysis, we conclude that the performance of any mechanism






Hence, by taking the limit as q goes to 0, we conclude
R(M,G) = R(Msf ,G) = 0.
Lemma A.1-3. Consider any mechanism m = (x, t) in Msf . Then it must satisfy
that
ti(vi, 0) = 0 for any vi ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma A.1-3. Let m = (x, t) a mechanism inMsf . Let vi ≥ 0, then we
have that ti(vi, 0) = vi ti(1, 0). So it is sufficient to show that ti(1, 0) = 0 to conclude
the result.
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Using the DSIC, we have that for any a > 0,
xi(1, 0)− ti(1, 0) ≥ xi(a, 0)− ti(a, 0).
Since m = (x, t) is a mechanism in Msf , then xi(1, 0) = xi(a, 0) and ti(a, 0) =
ati(1, 0), so we conclude that for any a > 0 that
(a− 1) ti(1, 0) ≥ 0,
so necessary, we conclude that ti(1, 0) = 0, hence ti(vi, 0) = vi ti(1, 0) = 0.
A.2 Proofs for Section 1.4
Proof of Proposition 1.1. Let us fix subclass F of the set of regular distributions
Freg. It is clear that since M′sf ⊂Msf , then
R(M′sf ,F ) ≤ R(Msf ,F ).
Let us show the reverse inequality. For that, we will proceed in two steps. We start
from an initial mechanism inMsf and approximate the allocations by a combination
of step functions (with corresponding payments). In second step, we will compare
the performance of the approximation to that of the original mechanism to conclude.
Step 1: Let us pick a symmetric mechanism (x, t) in Msf .
Let us fix an in integer N ≥ 2. Define
αn := inf
{
r ≥ 0 : x1(r, 1) ≥ n
N
}
, for n ∈ {1, · · · , N}.
Note that by symmetry, we have that αn = inf{r ≥ 0 : x2(1, r) ≥ nN }. Note also
that by the monotonicity of x1(·, 1), the sequence {αn}1≤n≤N is non-decreasing. We
define α0 := 0 and αN+1 :=∞.







1{vi > αn v−i}, if vi 6= v−i,
x˜i(1
−, 1), if vi = v−i,
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where x˜i(1







The allocation x˜ clearly has the scale-free property. Moreover by construction, we
have that for any vi ≥ 0,






xi(vi, v−i) ≤ 1 and x˜i(·, v−i) is non-decreasing.
and if we introduce the payment function t˜ corresponding to the allocation x˜, defined
by Lemma 1.1, then the mechanism (x˜, t˜) belongs to Msf . Moreover note that, by
construction and monotonicity of xi(·, 1), we have
x˜i(1






1{r > αn} ≤ xi(1−, 1) ≤ xi(1, 1).
Since (x, t) is in Msf then by constraint (AC), we have that xi(1, 1) ≤ 1/2. Hence,
by construction, we have that (x˜, t˜) belongs to M′sf .
Furthermore, note that for any 0 ≤ n ≤ N , we have for any l in (αn v−i, αn+1 v−i)
such that l 6= v−i,
x˜i(l, v−i) ≤ xi(l, v−i) ≤ 1
N
+ x˜i(l, v−i). (A.2-5)







≤ xi(l, v−i) ≤ n+ 1
N
,
where the inequalities follows from the definition of the sequence αn.
Step 2: Next, we compute the revenue of the original mechanism and that of the
new mechanism (x˜, t˜).
For any F ∈ F ⊂ Freg, we have that




EF [xi(vi, v−i) φ(vi) 1{αnv−i < vi < αn+1v−i} 1{v−i 6= vi}] .
The first equality is a classical result in the literature, see Myerson (1981). In the
second equality, we have used that the set
BN = {(vi, v−i) in R+×R+ : v−i = vi}∪
(∪1≤n≤N{(vi, v−i) in R+ × R+ : αnv−i = vi})
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is such that P(BN) = 0 given that F admits a density. Hence we we get that (recalling





EF [xi(vi, v−i)φ(vi)1{vi < rF}1{αnv−i < vi < αn+1v−i}1{v−i 6= vi}]





















EF [φ(vi)1{vi ≥ rF}1{αnv−i < vi < αn+1v−i}1{v−i 6= vi}] .
In (a) we have used that φ(vi) is non-negative for vi ≥ rF , non-positive for vi < rF
and the inequalities in (A.2-5).
Now using again the fact that P(BN) = 0, we have that
EF [ti(vi, v−i)] ≤ EF [x˜i(vi, v−i)φ(vi)] + 1
N
EF [φ(vi)1{vi ≥ rF}]














in the last inequality, we have used the regularity of the distribution F and we recall














By taking the infimum over all distribution F in F , we get that for all N ≥ 2,
inf
F∈F
R(m,F ) ≤ inf
F∈F
R(m˜, F ) +
2
N
Taking the supremum over mechanisms in M′sf and then Msf , and letting N ↑ ∞
leads to the result.
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Proof of Lemma 1.3. Fix α ≥ 0. We will mainly use the Portmanteau Theorem
to show the limits.
Suppose first that α 6= 1. Let M = max{supn≥1 v¯Fn , vF + 1}. Consider the
function h(v1, v2) = v2 1{v1 > αv2} 1{v1 ≤ M} 1{v2 ≤ M}. The function h is
bounded and continuous F × F -almost surely, where F × F is the product measure.
Indeed, h is discontinuous on the lines v1 = αv2, v1 = M and v2 = M , which have
F × F measure zero since α 6= 1 and M > vF . Hence by Corollary 1 and Theorem
25.12 in Billingsley (2008), we conclude that
lim
n↑∞
EFn [v21{v1 > v2}] = EFa [v21{v1 > αv2}] .
Suppose now that α = 1.
Since Fn admits a density, we have that
EFn [v21{v1 > v2}] =
1
2
(EFn [v21{v1 > v2}] + EFn [v11{v1 ≤ v2}]) =
1
2
EFn [min(v1, v2)] .
Note that the minimum of two independent values with cdf Fn admits a cdf given by
Fn(2−Fn). the fact that Fn converges weakly to F implies that Fn(2−Fn) converges
weakly to F (2 − F ), which is the cdf of the minimum of two independent values
with cdf F . By Corollary 1 and Theorem 25.12 in Billingsley (2008) applied to the
function 1
2








EFn [v21{v1 > αv2}] =
1
2
EF [min(v1, v2)] .
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.2. Let us fix a mechanism in m = (x, t) in M′sf . Then,






1{vi > γk v−i}1{vi 6= v−i}+ c 1{vi = v−i},
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for some N ≥ 1, γ ∈ RN and c ∈ [0, 1
2
].
We will establish that the worst-case performance of this mechanism against F is
upper bounded by the performance of an alternate mechanism m˜ ∈M′sf againstW ′.
Fix an element F ∈W ′. By assumption, there exists a sequence Fn from elements in
F such that Fn weakly converges to F .
Step 1. We first establish that
lim inf
n↑∞
opt(Fn) ≥ opt(F ).





max{v[2], y}1{v[2] ≥ y}
]
.












































By taking the lim inf we get that for any y < a,
lim inf
n↑∞
opt(Fn) ≥ x F (y)
(
2− F (y)) .
by taking the limit as y ↑ a
lim inf
n↑∞
opt(Fn) ≥ a F (a−)
(
2− F (a−)) = opt(F ).
where the last equality follows from Lemma A.2-4 (stated and proved after this proof).
Step 2. Next, we derive an asymptotic upper bound on the ratio R(m,Fn). Let
us define
I := {k ∈ [1, N ] : γk = 1}, I− := {k ∈ [1, N ] : γk < 1},
I+ := {k ∈ [1, N ] : γk > 1}.
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EFn [γk v−i 1{vi > γk v−i}]
opt(Fn)
.



























































where |S| represents the cardinality of a finite set S.
For any vi, v−i ≥ 0, we have that




























Step 3: We now show that the upper bound above cane be expressed as the














and t˜ its corresponding payment using Lemma A.2-5, and let m˜ = (x˜, t˜). We may











Since infF∈F R(m,F ) ≤ R(m,Fn) for any n, we deduce that
inf
F∈F
R(m,F ) ≤ inf
F∈W ′
R(m˜, F ). (A.2-6)
To conclude, we need to show that m˜ = (x˜, t˜) belongs to M′sf . Let us first
start by showing that it belongs to Msf . Note that for any vi 6= v−i, we have
x˜i(vi, v−i) = xi(vi, v−i) and that the allocation x˜i(·, v−i) is non decreasing on [0, v−i]
and on [v−i,∞) for fixed v−i ≥ 0. Furthermore,
lim
vi↑v−i

































We conclude that xi(·, v−i) is non decreasing, for fixed v−i ≥ 0 and that x˜i(vi, vi) ≤ 1.
Let us show that x˜(vi, vi) ≤ 1/2. For that, let us introduce the following indices












By construction, we have that γ > 1, γ < γk, for all k ∈ I+, γ γj < 1, for all j ∈ I−.
This implies that











(|I |+ 2|I−|) .












Hence, we have etablished that for all vi, v−i ≥ 0,
0 ≤ x˜i(vi, v−i) ≤ 1,
2∑
i=1










We conclude that m˜ belongs toM′sf . Returning to (A.2-6), and taking the supremeum
over mechanisms m and m˜, we obtain
R(M′sf ,F ) ≤ R(M′sf ,W ′).
This concludes the proof.
Lemma A.2-4. Fix a distribution F in W . Then,
 For any mechanism m = (x, t) ∈M, the revenues generated by m are given by
2∑
i=1











xi(vi, v−i)φF (vi)f(vi)dvidF (v−i),
where a = vF , i.e. the upper support of F .
 The optimal revenue that the seller could achieve is given by
opt(F ) = a F (a−) (2− F (a−)).
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Proof of Lemma A.2-4. We show the first point then we leverage it to show the
second point.
Recall that by the envelope theorem, Lemma 1.1, we have that
2∑
i=1
EF [ti(vi, v−i)] =
2∑
i=1






























































































xi(vi, v−i)F (vi)dvidF (v−i).











xi(vi, v−i)F (vi)dvidF (v−i).
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Hence we conclude the first point, i.e.
2∑
i=1












xi(vi, v−i)φF (vi)f(vi)dvidF (v−i). (A.2-7)
Now let us try to characterize the optimal revenue leveraging the previous expres-
sion.
Since F is in W , then for all vi < a, φFa(vi) ≤ 0. In turn, setting xi(vi, v−i) = 0 for
all vi < a and for all v−i < a, xi(a, v−i) = 1 and xi(a, a) = 1/2 maximizes point-wise
the expressions in the integrals in (A.2-7). This mechanism is clearly feasible (corre-
sponding to a posted price of a to both buyers and when both buyers are willing to
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= a F (a−)
(
2− F (a−)) .
Hence, we get the second result.
Proof of Proposition 1.3. Fix a mechanism m = (x, t) in M′sf ⊂ Msf . Let
m˜ = (x˜, t˜) with x˜i(vi, v−i) = xi(vi, v−i)1{vi ≥ v−i}, for i = 1, 2 and vi, v−i ≥ 0 (and
t˜ its corresponding payment using Lemma 1.1). The proof is organized as follows.
In step 1, we establish that m˜ belongs to Mmaxsf . In step 2, we establish that m˜
dominates m against any distribution in W and deduce the result.
Step 1. We first establish that m˜ ∈Mmaxsf . We have that


















1{vi > max(γk, 1) v−i}1{vi 6= v−i}+ c 1{vi = v−i}.
It follows that m˜ ∈Mmaxsf by setting αn := max(γn, 1).
Step 2. We next establish that for any F ∈W ,
R(m,F ) ≤ R(m˜, F ). (A.2-8)
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By Lemma A.2-4, stated and proved right before this proof, the total revenue of
the mechanism m when nature picks the distribution Fa is given by
2∑
i=1











xi(vi, v−i)φF (vi)f(vi)dvidF (v−i).























xi(a, v−i)dF (v−i) = aF (a−)
∫ a
0









x˜i(vi, v−i)φF (vi)f(vi)dvidF (v−i),
where the first equality follows from that the fact that by construction for any vi ≥
v−i, we have that xi(vi, v−i) = x˜i(vi, v−i); the second inequality follows from the fact
that x˜i(·, ·) ≤ xi(·, ·) and that for any vi < a, we have φF (vi) ≤ 0 since F belongs to
W ′. In turn, we conclude that (A.2-8) holds. This implies that
R(M′sf ,W ′) ≤ R(Mmaxsf ,W ′).
Since Mmaxsf ⊂M′sf , the proof is complete.
Lemma A.2-5. If m = (x, t) in M′sf , then there exist N ≥ 1, γ ∈ [0,∞)N and
c ∈ [0, 1/2] such that for all vi, v−i ≥ 0, we have






1{vi > γk v−i}1{vi 6= v−i}+ c 1{vi = v−i}
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v−i 1{vi = v−i},
where I − = {k : γk < 1} and |I −| represents the cardinality of I −.
Note that if m = (x, t) is in Mmaxsf then |I −| = 0
Proof of Lemma A.2-5. We will show the result forM′sf , the proof forMmaxsf is
very similar.
Fix m = (x, t) in M′sf , then by definition, there exist N ≥ 1, γ ∈ [0,∞)N and






1{vi > γk v−i}1{vi 6= v−i}+ c 1{vi = v−i}.
By Lemma 1.1, we have that for all vi 6= v−i,









vi 1{vi > γk v−i} −
∫ vi
0












γk v−i1{vi > γk v−i},






γk v−i1{vi > γk v−i},
Moreover for vi = v−i, we have by Lemma 1.1
ti(vi, v−i) = vi xi(vi, v−i)−
∫ vi
0






1{l > γk vi}dl
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Hence we get that

















This concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. The result is consequence of earlier results. Indeed, we
have
R(M,F ) (a)= R(Msf ,F ) (b)= R(M′sf ,F )
(c)
≤ R(M′sf ,W ′) (d)= R(Mmaxsf ,W ′),
where (a) follows from Theorem 3.2, (b) from Proposition 1.1, (c) from Proposition 1.2
in conjunction with the assumption that any element in W ′ admits a sequence in F
that weakly converges to it; and (d) from Proposition 1.3.
A.3 Proofs of Section 1.5
Proof of Theorem 1.3. In this proof, we will use the family of distributionsWreg ⊂
W defined as follows:






, if v < a,
1 , if v ≥ a,
In Lemma B.6-2, stated and proved following this proof, we establish that any element
in Wreg can be “approached” by a sequence in Freg, i.e., a sequence of elements in
Freg converges weakly to the element. In turn, using Theorem 1.2 in conjunction
with Lemma B.6-2, we have that
R(M,Freg) ≤ R(Mmaxsf ,Wreg).
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We next bound R(Mmaxsf ,Wreg). Let us fix a > 0 and a mechanism m = (x, t) in
Mmaxsf . We will bound R(m,Fa). For some N ≥ 1, γ ∈ [1,∞)N and c ∈ [0, 1/2], by






γkv−i1{vi > γk v−i}1{vi 6= v−i}+ cv−i1{vi = v−i},
for i = 1, 2 and vi, v−i ≥ 0.
Note that since γk ≥ 1, we have 1{vi > γk v−i}1{vi 6= v−i} = 1{vi > γk v−i}.
We first derive a close form expression for
∑2
i=1 EFa [ti(vi, v−i)]. We have
2∑
i=1







EFa [γk v−i1{vi > γk v−i}] + 2caq2a,
where qa = 1/(1 + a).
Note that














q + γk(1− q)dq,
where the last equality follows from a change of variable q = F a(v−i) = 1/(1 + v−i).
Suppose γk = 1. Note that F (a
−) = 1/(1 + a) = qa. Then we have that
EFa [γv−i1{vi > γv−i}] =
∫ 1
qa
(1− q) dq = 1
2
(1− qa)2.
Suppose γk > 1. Let q¯ = F (a/γk). We have that
































γk − 1 −
1
(γk − 1)2




Let us now compute q¯. We have








1− qa + γk qa ,
where we have used the fact aqa = a/(a + 1) = 1 − qa. So we conclude from the
previous computation that when γk > 1,




γk − 1 −
1
(γk − 1)2













1− qa + γkqa
)]
.
Recall that by Lemma A.2-4, opt(Fa) = a qa (2− qa) = (1− qa)(2− qa), hence





















2−qa , if γ = 1.




i=1 EFa [ti(vi, v−i)]
opt(Fa)
=
































































Noting that c ≤ 1/2, we have
R(m,Fa)































The bound in the theorem follows and the proof is complete.
Lemma A.3-1. For each a > 0, there is a sequence {Fn : n ≥ 1} in Freg that
convergences weakly to Fa defined in (1.7), such that there exists Ma > a such that
for all n, Fn(Ma) = 1.
Proof of Lemma B.6-2. Fix a > 0. The proof will be constructive in that we will
explicitly exhibit a sequence Fn that satisfies the properties in the result.
Step 1. We first construct the sequence and characterize its weak limit.
a) Let n ≥ 2, and define for x ≥ 0,





Note that there exists a unique xn ≥ 0 such that gn(xn) = 0. Indeed, gn is differen-
tiable with derivative given by g′n(x) = 1− n xn−1/an, hence gn is strictly increasing
on [0, (an/n)1/(n−1)) and strictly decreasing on ((an/n)1/(n−1) ,+∞[. Since gn(0) = 1
and lim
x↑∞
gn(x) = −∞ there exists a unique xn s.t. gn(xn) = 0. Furthermore, noting
that gn(a) = a > 0, we have that
xn > a, n ≥ 2.











, if x < xn,
1 , if x ≥ xn.
(A.3-1)
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Step 2. We next establish that Fn belongs to Freg and that the sequence converges
weakly to Fa.
We first show that the sequence xn is decreasing and is lower bounded by a. The
fact that xn > a implies that
gn+1(xn) = 1 + xn − (xn/a)n+1 < 1 + xn − (xn/a)n = gn(xn) = 0.
In turn, by definition of xn+1, we get that
xn < xn+1.
Hence for all n ≥ 2, xn < x2. Setting Ma = x2, we have Ma > a and Fn(Ma) = 1 for
all n ≥ 2.
Since xn is decreasing and lower bounded by a, it necessarily converges to some
limit l ≥ a. If l > a then for n sufficiently large, we would have xn ≥ (1/2) (l + a)
implying that gn((1/2) (l + a)) ≥ 0. However limn↑∞ gn((1/2) (l + a)) = −∞, which
is a contradiction. We conclude that necessarily lim
n↑∞
xn = a.
Note also that for x ≥ 0, gn is a polynomial with root xn, and no root in [0, xn].
Since g′n(xn) 6= 0, then necessarily the multiplicity of xn is one, so we can find a
polynomial function Qn such that gn(x) = (xn − x)Q(x) and for all x ∈ [0, xn]
we have Qn(x) > 0. In turn, by the Weierstrass extreme value theorem, we have
An := infx∈[0,xn] Qn(x) ∈ (0,∞) and Bn := supx∈[0,xn] Qn(x) ∈ (0,∞). and and we
can find Bn, An > 0 such that for all x ∈ [0, xn], we have An ≤ Qn(x) ≤ Bn.



































We deduce that Fn defined in (B.6-7) has no atoms. Furthermore, its virtual value






which is clearly non-decreasing on [0, xn). Hence, Fn belongs to Freg.
Step 3. Let us establish that Fn converges weakly to Fa. The points of continuity
of Fa are R+ \ {a}. Fix x < a. we have lim
n↑∞
(x/a)n = 0. Hence for all x < a, using
the Dominated Convergence Theorem, we have lim
n↑∞
Fn(x) = Fa(x). Fix x > a. Since
xn converges to a, there exists N such that for all n ≥ N, we have x > xn, hence for
all n ≥ N , Fn(x) = Fa(x) = 1. We conclude that Fn weakly converges to Fa.
Proof of Proposition 1.4. Let F be a distribution in Freg and m = (x, t) be a
mechanism Mmaxsf . By Lemma A.2-5, the revenue of the mechanism m when nature













γk v−i 1{vi > γk v−i}1{vi 6= v−i}+ c v−i 1{vi = v−i}
]
=














where Rev(v) := vF¯ (v), the last equality follows from symmetry and the fact that
the set {(vi, v−i) : vi = v−i} has measure zero with respect to the F−measure, since
F has a density.




















where (a) follows by integration by parts; (b) follows from the fact thatRev(γk 0)F (0) =
0 (since Rev(0) = 0) and lim
v→∞




F (v) = 0; (c) follows from a change of variable. In turn, by decomposing





















where the last equality follows from the change of variable q = F (v) and noting
that that Rev′(v) = f(v) (−Rev′(q)), where here we abuse notation and denote
Rev(q) = qF−1(1− q).
For v ≥ rF , we have Rev′(v) ≤ 0 and F (v/γk) ≤ F (rF/γk). Hence, we have∫ ∞
rF
Rev′(v)F (v/γ)dv ≥ −F (rF/γ)Rev(qF ) ≥ − γk qF





where for the last inequality, we have used Lemma A.3-2, stated and proved after
this proof.
For q ≥ qF , we have Rev′(q) ≤ 0 since F belongs to Freg and by (Fu et al., 2015,












1 + (γk − 1) qdq













Since F is regular, Rev(q) is concave, so Rev′(q) is decreasing. Noting that
(1− 1/(1 + (γk − 1) q))



























1− qF − 1
γk − 1 ln
[
γk












1− qF − 1
γk − 1 ln
[
γk













1− qF − 1
γk − 1 ln
[
γk










where for the last inequality, we used that Rev(qF ) ≥ opt(F )/2. and the fact that










































1− qF − 1
γk − 1 ln
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1− qF − 1
γk − 1 ln
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1− qF − 1
γk − 1 ln
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1− qF − 1
γk − 1 ln
[
γk




− 2 γk qF





Rearranging terms, one obtains the bound in the result and this concludes the proof.
Lemma A.3-2. For any distribution F in Freg, we have













for any α ≥ 1. (A.3-4)
Proof of Lemma A.3-2. We will show each claim separately. Let us fix F in Freg.








where the last equality follows from the the change of variable q = F (v), i.e. v =
F−1(1− q) and noting that f(v)dv = −dq.










now using the concavity of Rev(q), since F is in Freg, the area below the curve of
Rev(q) when q ∈ [qF , 1] is greater than the area of the quadrilateral defined by the
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following points {(1, 0), (q¯, Rev(q¯)), (qF , Rev(qF )), (qF , 0)},∫ 1
qF
Rev(q)dq
≥ (q¯ − qF )Rev(q¯) + 1
2
(1− q¯)Rev(q¯) + 1
2
(q¯ − qF ) (Rev(qF )−Rev(q¯))



















































So we conclude that∫ 1
qF




























q¯Rev(qF ) ≤ α qF





















Moreover, using the concavity of Rev(q), the area of the triangle of vertices
{(0, 0), (qF , Rev(qF )), (qF , 0)} is less the area than of the curve Rev(q) between [0, qF ].






















The proof is complete.
A.4 Proofs for Section 1.6
Proof of Theorem 1.4. The proof follows initially the same structure of the proof
of Theorem 1.3. However, there are two main differences. We will be considering a
different limiting worst case family, Wmhr. Furthermore, we will be able to upper
bound the performance by establishing that the best achievable performance against
Wmhr is that of a second price auction.
Let us introduce, Wmhr ⊂W defined as follows,




1− exp (− v
a
)
, if v < b,
1 , if v ≥ b,
In Lemma A.4-1, stated and proved following this proof, we establish that any element
in Wmhr can be “approached” by a sequence in Fmhr, i.e., a sequence of elements in
Fmhr converges weakly to the element. In turn, using Theorem 1.2 in conjunction
with Lemma A.4-1, we have
R(M,Fmhr) ≤ R(Mmaxsf ,Wmhr).
We next bound R(Mmaxsf ,Wmhr). Let us fix a ≥ b > 0 and a mechanism in
m = (x, t) in Mmaxsf . We will bound R(m,Fa,b). For some N ≥ 1, γ ∈ [1,∞)N and






γk v−i 1{vi > γk v−i}1{vi 6= v−i}+ c v−i 1{vi = v−i},
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for i = 1, 2, and vi, v−i ≥ 0.Note that since γk ≥ 1, we have 1{vi > γkv−i}1{vi 6= v−i} =
1{vi > γk v−i}.
We first derive a close form expression for
∑2
i=1 EFa,b [ti(vi, v−i)]. We have
2∑
i=1







EFa,b [γk v−i 1{vi > γk v−i}] + 2 c b q2a,b,
where qa,b = e











































exp(− (γk + 1) v/a)dv,
By integration by parts, we get




































































qa,b(2− qa,b) ln(1/qa,b)Ψ(γk, qa,b) +
qa,b
2− qa,b , (A.4-1)
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Next we further simplify the bound. To that end, we will establish that for any q
in [e−1, 1] Ψ(α, q) is non-increasing in α on [1,∞). Note first that Ψ(α, 1) = 0, which





























where in the previous to last inequality, we used that q ≥ e−1 and in the last inequality,
we used that α ≥ 1. By the Schwarz’s theorem, we conclude that ∂Ψ
∂α
(α, ·) is non-
decreasing, anf hence for any q in [e−1, 1], we have that
∂Ψ
∂α
(α, q) ≤ ∂Ψ
∂α
(α, 1) = 0.
In turn, we obtain that Ψ is non-increasing in α on [1,∞).
Returning to Eq. (A.4-1) and leveraging the above, we have that
Ψ(γk, qa,b) ≤ Ψ(1, qa,b),





















qa,b(2− qa,b) ln(1/qa,b) −
q2a,b ln(1/qa,b)







qa,b(2− qa,b) ln(1/qa,b) .
Recalling that qa,b spans [e
−1, 1], this concludes the proof.
Lemma A.4-1. For each distribution F in Wmhr, there exists a sequence Fn in
Fmhr that convergences weakly to F , such that there exists M > 0 such that for all
n, Fn(M) = 1.
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) if v < b,
1 if v ≥ b.
The proof will be constructive in that we will explicitly exhibit a sequence Fn that
satisfies the properties in the result.
Step 1. We first construct the sequence and analyze it. Let n ≥ 1, and define







, for 0 ≤ v ≤ b.











, if v < b,
1 , if v ≥ b.
(A.4-3)
Note that Fn(a) = 1, for all n ≥ 1, so we can set M := a.
Step 2. We next establish that Fn belongs to Fmhr and that the sequence con-
verges weakly to F . For that let us show that Fn has no mass at v = b.















where the last inequality follows from the fact that 0 ≤ u ≤ b. Hence, we conclude

























by taking the limit, we conclude that lim
v↑b
Fn(v) = 1, hence Fn does not have any







, for v < b.
which is clearly non-decreasing on the support of Fn. Hence, Fn belongs to Fmhr.
Let us check that Fn converges weakly to F . The points of continuity of F are
R+\{b}. For all v < b, we have lim
n↑∞
(v/b)n = 0. Hence, by the dominated convergence
theorem, for all v < b, we have lim
n↑∞
Fn(v) = F (v). For v > b, we have that for all
n ≥ 1, Fn(v) = F (v) = 1. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 1.5. The goal of this proof is to lower bound the perfor-
mance of the second price auction. For that, we will bound the difference between
the optimal revenue and the expected value of the second highest value leveraging
the MHR property. Fix any F in Fmhr. We have
opt(F )− E[v[2]]
= E[v[2]1{v[2] ≥ rF}] + 2rF qF (1− qF )−
[
E[v[2]1{v[2] ≥ rF}] + E[v[2]1{v[2] < rF}]
]
= 2rF qF (1− qF )− E[v[2]1{v[2] < rF}]








where the last equality follows from a change of variable q = F (v). We next lower
bound Rev(q) = qF−1(1−q) on [qF , 1]. For that, we use a classical result in reliability
theory: (Barlow and Proschan, 1975, Chapter 4, Theorem 2.18). Namely, for any dis-
tribution with increasing hazard rate, we have that for each λ > 0, F (v)− exp{−λv}
has at most one change of sign and if one change of sign occurs, it occurs from + to
−. In particular, letting λ = − ln(qF )/rF , we have that F (rF ) = exp(−λrF ), i.e., the
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crossing occurs at rF and hence
F (v) ≥ exp{−λv}, for all v ≤ rF .
In turn, moving to the quantile space, with q = F (v), we have
q ≥ exp{(ln(qF )/rF )F−1(1− q)} for all q ≥ qF .




≤ qF−1(1− q) = Rev(q) for all q ≥ qF .


















































= rF qF (2− qF ) + 1
2












Using the argument in the proof of (Fu et al., 2015, Corollary 1), we have that
opt(F ) ≥ Rev(qF )(2− qF ) = rF qF (2− qF ). Note that the latter is the revenue of the







qF (2− qF ) ln(qF ) .
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Proof of Theorem 1.5. This is a direct consequence of Theorem 1.4 and Proposi-














2 q (2− q) ln(1/q) ,
where (a) follows from Proposition 1.5 and (b) follows from Theorem 1.4. Hence, we
conclude the result. For the numerical evaluation of the infinimum, we took a grid of
the interval [e−1, 1] with step size 10−6.
A.5 Proofs for Section 1.7.1
Proof of Proposition 1.6. In this proof, we analyze the upper bound then we
analyze the lower bound.
Upper bound We will first show the upper bounds, for that note the following that
we can decompose the worst case performance as either two buyer case, i.e. K = 2
or at least three buyers, i.e. K ≥ 3, formally













Hence, we conclude that
R˜(M˜,F ) ≤ R(M,F ). (A.5-2)
We conclude that all the upper bounds developed in the previous sections can still
be applied, hence we get the upper bounds.
Lower bound For the lower bound, note that from (A.5-1) that we can control the
case of two buyers using our previous results whereas now we need some lower bound
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performance on a mechanisms when the number of players is greater than 2. For that
we use we will use the implication of a result shown in (Fu et al., 2015, Corollary 1).
Lemma A.5-1. For any number of buyers K ≥ 2 and a distribution F in Freg then
the performance of second price auction without a reserve price is bounded as follows,
RK(mspa, F ) ≥ max
(
1− (1− qF )K−1





where qF = F¯ (rF ) is the oracle optimal quantile.
Now we will treat the case of regular and mhr class of distributions separately.
Let us start by the latter.
One can show that the function 1−(1−qF )
K−1
1−(1−qF )K is non-decreasing in K and qF . By
Hartline et al. (2008), we know that for any distribution F in Fmhr, we have that
qF ≥ e−1. Hence we conclude that for any F in Fmhr and K ≥ 3 we have
RK(mspa, F ) ≥ 1− (1− e
−1)2
1− (1− e−1)3 ≥ 80%,
By Theorem 1.5, we have that
inf
F∈Fmhr
R2(mspa, F ) ≈ 71.53%,
Hence by (A.5-1), we get that
R˜(M˜,F ) ≥ inf
F∈Fmhr
R2(mspa, F ).
and the analysis of the upper bound in particular, (A.5-2), we get that
R˜(M˜,F ) = inf
F∈Fmhr
R2(mspa, F ) ≈ 71.53%.
Now let us now analyse the performance against the regular class of distributions.
For that let us consider the following mechanism if there are two buyers, i.e. K = 2,
then the seller uses the mechanism, we proposed in Section 1.5.3 and if K ≥ 3 the
seller uses a second price auction. For such mechanism the seller would make at least
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51.9% when there are two buyers and get 2/3 when there are at least three buyers
based on Lemma A.5-1. Using (A.5-1), we conclude the result.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 The Interplay of Inflation and Deflation
A simple heuristic. A natural heuristic analyzed in the literature (see Huang
et al. (2015) and Fu et al. (2015)) is simply to “post your sample”, namely not use
any deflation or inflation and just use γ = 1 with probability one. It is well known
that for regular and MHR distributions, the competitive ratio of such a heuristic is
50%. The key idea is that the sample is equally likely to be above or below the
willingness to pay of a new customer and for a random variable with support [s, s],
with s = s + o(s), i.e., with a very small variability, the optimal revenue is at least
s. For such a family, post your sample collects half of s + o(s) and the ratio of
performances is of order 1/2 + o(1). Hence relying only on post your sample may not
lead to optimal performance, and the need for inflation and deflation arises.
The necessity of deflation. Against the family of distributions described above
(with support [s, s], with s = s+o(s)), as a matter of fact any mechanism that puts all
mass on multiplicative factors γ > 1 would actually perform arbitrarily poorly. This
failure could be mitigated by putting some weight on deflation for some γ < 1. Indeed,
in such a case, if γs ≤ s and γ > 1/2, then the deflation mechanism guarantees a
fraction γ > 1/2 of the optimal revenues. In particular, the argument above implies
that any mechanism that does not have some weight on deflation will be suboptimal
against Fα (as any such family contains distributions with the properties outlined).
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The selective need for inflation. While we have seen above that some positive
weight on deflation is necessary (for all values of α), the role of inflation is more
subtle. Let M≤1 := {Ψ ∈M : Ψ(s|s) = 1} denote mechanisms in M that do not
put any mass on inflation.
Proposition B.1-1 (the role of inflation). i.) Against regular distributions (α =
0), any mechanism that does not put any mass on inflation is suboptimal, i.e.,
R(M≤1,F0) < R(P ,F0).
ii.) Let F˜1 denote the set of MHR distributions (α = 1) with bounded support and
continuous density f on the support S . Against such distributions, it is suffi-
cient to focus on mechanisms that do not put any mass on inflation, i.e.,
R(M≤1, F˜1) = R(P , F˜1).
Part i.) follows from Fu et al. (2015) in conjunction with formalizing that a mecha-
nism with no mass on inflation cannot do better than 50%. In particular, this implies
that while inflation will lead to arbitrarily poor performance against distributions
that have little variation (such as those exhibited in the post your sample discussion
above), any mechanism that does not put some mass on inflation will be suboptimal
against regular distributions.
Part ii.) establishes that against a large subclass of MHR distributions, inflation is
actually not necessary and one may focus on the classM≤1 without loss of optimality.
This highlights the subtle and different role of inflation across different values of α.
In contrast to deflation, inflation is not needed “across the board”. The proof of part
ii.) of Proposition B.1-1 is based on establishing that the strategy that posts the
sample s always dominates any strategy that inflates by any amount. In particular,
this implies that we can always exclude inflation and restrict to deflation or post your
sample without loss of optimality. We conjecture that this is also true for the entire
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MHR class F1; the assumptions of continuity of the density and boundedness of the
support are made for technical reasons to allow for an exchange of the integral and
derivative operators in the proof.
Intuitively, MHR distributions have little variation, since their coefficient of vari-
ation is always less than one (Barlow and Proschan, 1975), and their optimal oracle
price is sufficiently far from the upper support. Indeed, for any distribution F in the
MHR class F1, it has been established that F (rF ) ≥ e−1 (Hartline et al., 2008). This
means that there is significant mass above the optimal oracle posted price, which sug-
gests that the benefits of any mass on inflation may be limited. Proposition B.1-1ii.)
establishes that there is actually no benefit for a large subclass of MHR distributions.
B.2 Proofs for Section 2.3
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Let us fix α in [0, 1]. Clearly, R(M,Fα) ≤ R(P ,Fα)
since M ⊂ P . We next establish that R(M,Fα) ≥ R(P ,Fα). Fix ε > 0. We will
establish that R(M,Fα) ≥ R(P ,Fα) − ε. By definition of the supremeum, there
exists Ψ ∈ P such that
inf
G∈Fα
R(Ψ, G) ≥ R(P ,Fα)− ε.
Fix an arbitrary F ∈ Fα and for any integer n, let Fn(·) = F (n·) denote the scaled
version of F . Note that Fn belongs to Fα since φFn(v)−αv = (1/n) (φF (nv)−αnv),
for all v ≥ 0. By definition of the infinimum, we have that,
R(Ψ, Fn) ≥ inf
G∈Fα
R(Ψ, G) ≥ R(P ,Fα)− ε. for all n ≥ 1. (B.2-1)
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The second equality follows from a change of variable u = ns, the third follows from
the fact that opt(Fn) = n
−1opt(F ); and the fourth equality follows from another
change of variable ζ = np.
















dF (u) ≥ R(P ,Fα)− ε.























































is in [0, 1] and the fact that




F (v)dv−E [v1{v ≤ a}]. On the one hand, by the dominated convergence
theorem lim
a↑∞
E [v1{v ≤ a}] = E [v] and on the other hand, we have that ∫∞
0
F (v)dv =
E [v] (see Ross (1996)), since E [v] is finite because F is in G. We conclude that
lim
a↑∞
aF (a) = 0.
By the well-behaved assumption around zero, c.f. Definition 2.1, we have that











Furthermore, note that∫ ∞
0











dq = 2 opt(F ).



















Ψ∞ (ζ | u) dζ (c)=
∫ ∞
0
ζF (ζ) dΨ∞ (ζ | u) ,
where for (c), we used the same integration by parts as in the two previous equalities
(a) and (a′).









































ζF (ζ) dΨ∞ (ζ | u) dF (u)
= R(Ψ∞, F ).
In turn, we have for all F ∈ Fα,
R(Ψ∞, F ) ≥ R(P ,Fα)− ε.
Fix s, p > 0 and θ > 0. It is clear that Ψ∞(·|s) is non-decreasing and in [0, 1], for



















Now let us further reduce the expression of the performance of Ψ∞. For F in Fα,
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we have














































where in (a) we have used a change of variable p = γs; in (b), we have used Eq.
(B.2-2); in (c), we have used Tonelli’s Theorem; in (d) we have used the fact that
Ψ∞(·|1) is in [0, 1].
By taking the infinimum over all distributions then we conclude that for all ε > 0
inf
F∈Fα
R(Ψ˜∞, F ) ≥ R(P ,Fα)− ε,




dΨ∞(γ|1). Since Ψ˜∞ ∈ M and ε was arbitrary, we
obtain that R(M,Fα) ≥ R(P ,Fα). The proof is complete.
B.3 Proofs for Section 2.4
Proof of Lemma 2.1. We will show each point separately.
i). Noting that H˜−1l is non-increasing, the fact that H˜l lower bounds F on [w,w
′]






Furthermore note that by the assumption that H˜l(w) = F (w) and H˜l(w
′) = F (w′),
hence the composition of functions H˜−1l
(
F (·)) maps [w,w′] into [w,w′]. So the left-
hand side above always belongs to [w,w′] when v ∈ [w,w,′ ].
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Now, by assumption, the revenue uF (u) curve is non-decreasing for u in [γw, γw′]
and hence γvF (γv) is non-decreasing for v in [w,w′]. Leveraging the latter point and
the inequality (B.3-1), we deduce that











Using now the fact that H˜−1l
(
F (·)) belongs to [w,w′] and that Hl lower bounds F










)) ≥ γ H˜−1l (F (v)) Hl (γH˜−1l (F (v))) .
























where the last equality follows from change of variable q = F (v). This completes the
proof of the first point.
ii). Let us now show the second point. By assumption, we have
F (v) ≥ Hl(v) if γw ≤ v ≤ γw′, (B.3-2)
F (v) ≤ Hu(v) if w ≤ v ≤ w′. (B.3-3)






In addition, Eq.(B.3-3) implies that
v ≤ min (w′, H−1u (F (v))), w ≤ v ≤ w′. (B.3-4)




maps [w,+∞) to [w,+∞) and by assumption ii.),
vHl(v) is non-increasing on [γw,+∞) and hence
γvH(γv) ≥ γmin (w′, H−1u (F (v)))Hl (γmin (w′, H−1u (F (v)))) .
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where in the last equality, we performed the change of variable q = F (v). This
completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.2 . Fix α ∈ [0, 1], and F in Fα.
Let us define introduce the inverse function of Γα, denoted by Γ
−1
α (·), is well




q−(1−α) − 1) (1− α)−1 if α ∈ (0, 1]
− ln(q) if α = 1.
Step 1. Fix ξ > 0, We first establish the following holds.
 If the set S := {v : F (v) = Γα(ξv)} is empty then for all v ≥ 0, we have
F (v) ≥ Γα(ξv).
 If the set S is non-empty then for all u in S and v ≥ 0, we have
F (v) ≥ Γα(ξv), if v ≤ u,
F (v) ≤ Γα(ξv), if v ≥ u.
In other words, the difference F (v) − Γα(ξv) has at most one change of sign and if
one change of sign occurs, it occurs from + to −. If α = 1, the result follows from
(Barlow and Proschan, 1975, Chapter 4, Theorem 2.18), since the MHR class is a
subclass of the increasing failure rate in average (IFRA) class of distributions.
We next generalize the line of arguments used for α = 1. Note that Γα(·) is a
bijection, hence its inverse is well defined Γ−1α (·) and moreover by (Schweizer and
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Szech, 2016, Proposition 1 and Lemma 1), we have that f(u)/F
1+(1−α)
(u) is non
decreasing in u and that








Hence Γ−1α (F (·)) is convex. Since Γ−1α (F (0)) = 0, then by convexity we get that
Γ−1α (F (v))
v










v : F (v) = Γα(ξv)
}
.
Note that S is non-empty if and only if Eξ is also non-empty.
If the set Eξ is empty then since
Γ−1α (F (v))
v
is non-decreasing, then necessarily we
S is empty and we get the result.
If the set Eξ is non-empty, then, since
Γ−1α (F (v))
v




≤ ξ, if v ≤ u
Γ−1α (F (v))
v
≥ ξ, if v ≥ u.
based on the latter inequalities and the fact that Γα is decreasing we conclude the
first step.




, u ≥ 0.



































u ≥ w′ − w.
Conducting a change of variable v = u+ w, we obtain the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. i.) We first note that an application of Lemma 2.2
yields that










, v ∈ [w,w′], (B.3-5)










, v ∈ [γw, γw′]. (B.3-6)
Since w′ ≤ rF/γ, the revenue curve vF (v) is non-decreasing on [0, γw′]. Hence the
first condition of Lemma 2.1 is satisfied. On the other hand, the remaining conditions





































































since for any q ≤ qw and θ in [0, 1], we have

















































































ii.) Next we analyze the case when rF/γ ≤ w < w′. The proof follows a similar
structure, but now we apply Lemma 2.2 by exhibiting appropriates functions that
verify the required conditions. Using Lemma 2.2, we have for any w ∈ [0, w),










=: Hu(v), v ∈ [w,w],










=: Hl(v), v ∈ [γw, γw′].
By Lemma B.7-1, that is stated and proved is Appendix B.7, the function vHl(v) is



































































































Setting w = γ˜w, with γ˜ = w
w′ , and w



































































B.4 Proofs for Section 2.5
The proof of Proposition 2.3 follows from taking ε = 0 and applying Proposition B.6-
1 and Proposition B.6-2.
The proof of Proposition 2.4 follows from taking ε = 0 and applying Proposition B.6-
3 and Proposition B.6-4.
The proof of Theorem 2.1 follows from taking ε = 0 in Theorem 2.2 and letting
k ↑ ∞.
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B.5 Proofs for Section 2.6
Proof of Proposition 2.5. The proof is divided into three steps:
1. In the first step, we show that the maximin ratio is upper bounded as follows




F (·|q0, q1,∞) : (q0, q1) ∈ [0, 1]2 : q1 ≤ q0 ≤ 1






Note that we focuses only on the unbounded support distributions of the family
introduced in Section 2.6.
2. Second, we show that under the conditions stated in the proposition for any F
in FWα , we have the optimal reserve price is achieved at v = 1 and opt(F ) = q0.
3. Finally, we show that the main inequality.
Step 1. Let us start by showing the first point. Fix (q0, q1) in Qα and F (·|q0, q1)





, if v < 1,
(1− α)− 1
Γ−1α (q1/q0)
, if v > 1.




is clearly non-decreasing on R+ .
Hence, F belongs to Fα. So we conclude that FWα ⊂ Fα. In turn, we get
R(P ,Fα) = R(M,Fα) ≤ R(M,FWα ).
Step 2.
Let us now move to the second point. Fix (q0, q1) in Qα and F (·|q0, q1) in FW ,
v = 1 is the optimal reserve price of F , i.e. opt(F ) = F (1) = q0. The proof is a direct
implication of the following Lemma stated here and shown below.
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Lemma B.5-1. Fix two scalars β ≥ 0 and w ≥ 0. The revenue function vΓα (β (v − w))








Given this Lemma, then
1 ≤ 1
αΓ−1α (q0)
makes sure that v = 1 is below the reserve price of the first piece. This is equivalent
to
q0 ≥ α1/(1−α).
Whereas on the side, based on Lemma B.5-1, the condition
1 ≥ 1− (1− α)β1
β1α
.






. This is equivalent to the fact that
q1 ≤ q0Γα(1).
As a conclusion and by α-SR, we get that v = 1 is necessarily the reserve price.
Step 3. Let us now move to the third point. For that note that we can compute
















+ 1, if q ≤ q0,




+, q0, 0, q), if q > q0,
2 uα(0
+, q1/q0, 1/2, q/q0), if q ≤ q0,
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Let us fix γ > 0, let us denote q˜1 = F¯ (1/γ). We will analyze the case of deflation,
i.e. γ ≤ 1 then the case of inflation, i.e. γ > 1 separately.
Deflation. Let us assume that γ ≤ 1. We first decompose the bound into three
terms
R(δγ, F ) =
1
opt(F )




[C (γ, 0, 1;F ) + C (γ, 1, 1/γ;F ) + C (γ, 1/γ,∞;F )] ,
where δγ was defined in Eq.(2.4).
Let us analyze each term separately. Let us start by the first term, by analyzing
the quantity in the quantile space, we get,




+, q0, 0, q)Γα
(
Γ−1α (q0) γuα(0






+, q0, 0, 1, q0, γ, q0, 0, 1, 0, 0
)
Now let us move to the second term, we have







































, 1/2, 1, q0, 2γ,
q1
q0
, 1/2, 1, 0, 0
)
where in the second equality follows from change of variable.
Now let us move to the third and last term,























































, 1/2, q˜1/q0, 1/2γ, 1/2
)
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Inflation. Let us now analyze the case γ > 1. Using a similar decomposition of
the performance as in the deflation case, we have
R(δγ, F ) =
1
opt(F )




[C (γ, 0, 1/γ;F ) + C (γ, 1/γ, 1;F ) + C (γ, 1,∞;F )] .
As in the deflation case, let us analyze each term separately. Let us start by the first
term, by analyzing the quantity in the quantile space, we get,




+, q0, 0, q)Γα
(
Γ−1α (q0) γuα(0






+, q0, 1, q0, γ, q0, 0, 1, 0, 0
)
Now let us move to the second term, we have













+, q0, 0, q)− 1
))
dq












+, q0, 0, q˜1q)− 1
))
dq
= γ q0 q˜1 Aα
(
q0/q˜1, 0
+, q0, 0, q˜1, q1/q0, γ/2, q0, 0, q˜1, 1/γ, 1/2
)
where the first equality follows from a change of variable.
Now let us move to the third and last term,























































, 1/2, 1, 1/2γ, 1/2
)
where the third equality follows from a change of variable.
Finally, we get the result by combining all the terms and making the following
change of variable ρ = q1/q0.
179
Proof of Lemma B.5-1. First, note that the distribution Γα (β (v − w)) for v ≥ w
is α-SR. Its virtual value function is given by
ψ(v) = v − Γα (β (v − w))−Γ′α (β (v − w))
= v − 1 + (1− α)β (v − w)
β
= αv − 1− (1− α)βw
β
.
Since the virtual value function achieves its maximum at v = (1− (1− α)βw)/βα,
then we get the result since necessarily v ≥ w.
B.6 Proofs of Section 2.7
Throughout, we fix ε ≥ 0. We first remind the definition of a grid of quantile values
Gε =

[0, 1] if ε = 0,{
k ε : 1 ≤ k ≤ b1/εc} ⋃ {1} if ε > 0.
For any x in [0, 1], we define pi(x) to be the right-projection of x on the grid Gε, i.e.,
pi(x) := inf{y ∈ Gε : x ≤ y}.
B.6.1 General tractable lower bound
B.6.1.1 Tractable Lower bound for contributions from samples lower
than rF/γ
Proposition B.6-1. Fix ε ≥ 0, α ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈ R++ \ {1}. The functional
equation, T Lα,γ,εJ = J introduced in (2.10) admits a unique bounded solution Lα,γ,ε.
Furthermore, for any bounded function J in W(G 2ε ),
(T Lα,γ,ε)k J converges to Lα,γ,ε
as k grows to ∞.
Proof of Proposition B.6-1. We focus on the properties of recursion (2.10). Fix
an admissible policy µ : G 2ε → G 2ε such that (µ1(q, ρ+), µ2(q, ρ+)) ∈ BLα,γ,ε(q, ρ+)
for all (q, ρ+) ∈ G 2ε . Define the operator T L,µα,γ,ε : W(G 2ε ) → W(G 2ε ) as follows. For
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(q, q+) ∈ G 2ε ,
(T L,µα,γ,εJ)(q, q+)
= (q − ε) (µ1(q, ρ+)− ε)Aα (βˆLγ,ε (ρ+, µ2(q, ρ+)))+ γ˜J (µ1(q, ρ+), µ2(q, ρ+)) .






is bounded above by 1. Moreover, q, ρ+ and µ1(q, ρ
+) as well as µ2(q, ρ
+) belong to
[0, 1]. We deduce that for any bounded functions J inW(G 2ε ), T L,µα,γ,εJ is also bounded.
Furthermore we have for any J, J ′ and µ(·, ·),








‖T L,µα,γ,εJ − T L,µα,γ,εJ ′‖ ≤ γ˜‖J − J ′‖,
where the norm denotes the sup norm in the space of bounded functions. Since γ˜ < 1,
T Lα,γ,ε is a contraction operator. (Bertsekas, 2013, Proposition 2.1.1) implies that
T Lα,γ,εJ = J admits a unique solution Lα,γ,ε. Furthermore, Lα,γ,ε can be computed




This completes the proof.





, qj := F (rj) , and qˆj := pi(qj), j ∈ Z. (B.6-1)















where j ≤ 1 and α˜ = −1{γ ∈ [0, 1]}.
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, j ≤ 1,
where Lα,γ,ε is the unique fixed point of T Lα,γ,εJ = J .
Proof of Proposition B.6-2. i.) We first establish a property preserved by the
operator T Lα,γ,ε defined in (2.10). Suppose that a bounded function J satisfies Eq.






















































where (a) follows from an application of Proposition 2.2i.) with w = rj−1 and w′ = rj
and (b) follows from the monotonicity established in Lemma B.7-2.







































































































































longs to BLα,γ,ε (qˆj+α˜, pi (qj+1+α˜/qj+α˜)), a fact established in Lemma B.7-4. Since the
above was true for any j ≤ 1, we have established that Eq. (B.6-2) holds for T Lα,γ,εJ .
ii.) Now starting with J = 0, and applying repeatedly the argument above leads















, j ≤ 1.
Furthermore, by Proposition B.6-1,
(T Lα,γ,ε)k J converges to Lα,γ as k grows to ∞.















This concludes the proof.
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As mentioned in the main text, for α = 0, the discretized lower bound leads to the
trivial bound of zero. This is due to the fact the quantile at the the optimal price can
be arbitrarily small. Hence there is a need to develop a bound for this case that do
not use the a dynamic program and is still gives good performance. More formally,
we show the following,
Corollary B.1. Fix ε ∈ [0, 1) and a distribution F in Fα, we have
1
opt(F )
C (γ, 0, rF/γ;F ) ≥ L˜α,γ,ε(q∗, ρ),


























dq, if γ > 1.
Proof of Corollary B.1. Let us start by the deflation, i.e. the first case. For that,
let us fix γ < 1, we have
1
opt(F )
C (γ, 0, rF/γ;F ) =
1
opt(F )
[C (γ, 0, rF ;F ) + C (γ, rF , rF/γ;F )] ,
Let us lower bound each term. Let us start by the first term. by Proposition 2.2, we
have






F¯ (rF ), F¯ (γrF )
)
).
By Lemma B.7-4, we have
F¯ (γrF ) ≥ Γα
(
γ Γ−1α (F¯ (rF ))
)
and F¯ (rF )/F¯ (γrF ) ≥ γ. (B.6-3)
then we get that using the monotonicity of Γα(·) that
























since F in Fα, by Cole and Roughgarden (2014), we have that F¯ (rF ) ≥ α1/(1−α) and
also since the function qΓ−1α (q) is non-increasing on [α
1/(1−α), 1] then we conclude that





hence, we get that
C (γ, 0, rF ;F )
opt(F )
≥ γ 1


















For the second term, by Proposition 2.2, we have that
C (γ, rF , rF/γ;F )
opt(F )
≥ F¯ (γrF )Aα(βLγ
(
F¯ (rF/γ)/F¯ (rF ), F¯ (rF )/F¯ (γrF )
)
).
Now using Eq.(B.6-3) and Lemma B.7-3, we get




γ Γ−1α (F¯ (rF ))






Hence we conclude the first point.
For γ > 1, by Proposition 2.2, we have








F¯ (rF/γ), F¯ (rF )
))
.
By Lemma B.7-4, we have
F¯ (rF/γ) ≥ Γα
(
γ−1 Γ−1α (F¯ (rF ))
)
and F¯ (rF )/F¯ (γ
−1rF ) ≥ γ−1,


























Using the same arguments as in the deflation, we get that
C (γ, 0, rF/γ;F )
opt(F )
≥ (1− α)
(q∗ − ε)α − (q∗ − ε)
∫ 1
γF¯ (rF )












Moreover the function q → Γ−1α (q)
Γ−1α (γ q)
is non-decreasing and since Γα is non increasing
we conclude that
C (γ, 0, rF/γ;F )
opt(F )
≥ 1− α
(q∗ − ε)α − (q∗ − ε)
∫ 1
γq∗








This concludes the proof.
B.6.1.2 Tractable Lower bound for contributions from samples higher
than rF/γ
Proposition B.6-3. Fix ε ≥ 0, α ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈ (0, 1). The functional equation,
T Hα,γ,εJ = J admits a unique bounded solution Hα,γ,ε and
(T Hα,γ,ε)k J converges to
Hα,γ,ε as k grows to ∞ for any bounded J in W(Gε).
Proof of Proposition B.6-3. Fix an admissible policy µ : G 2ε → Gε such that
µ(ρ−) ∈ BHα,γ,ε(ρ−) for all ρ− ∈ Gε. We define the mapping T H,µα,γ,ε : W(Gε) → W(Gε)
such that for all ρ− ∈ Gε,















is bounded above by 1/γ by Lemma B.7-5 and that the
quantity (µ(ρ−)− ε) (ρ− − ε) is also bounded by γ2 since µ(ρ−) ∈ BHα,γ,ε(ρ−) . We
deduce that for all bounded functions J in W(Gε), both T H,µα,γ,εJ and T Hα,γ,εJ are also
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bounded. Furthermore we have for any J, J ′ bounded functions and µ(·),










≤ γ [J(µ(ρ−))− J ′(µ(ρ−))] ,
where we have used that µ(ρ−) belongs to BHα,γ,ε(ρ−). We deduce (where the norm
denotes the sup norm in the space of bounded functions)
‖T H,µα,γ,εJ − T H,µα,γ,εJ ′‖ ≤ γ‖J − J ′‖.
Since γ < 1, T H,µα,γ,ε is a contraction operator. Using (Bertsekas, 2013, Proposition
2.1.1), T Hα,γ,εJ = J admits a unique solution Hα,γ,ε. Furthermore, Hα,γ,ε can be
computed through value iteration. We have, starting with any bounded J ,
Hα,γ,ε = lim
k→∞
(T Rε )k J.
This completes the proof.
Proposition B.6-4. Fix ε ≥ 0, α ∈ [0, 1], γ ∈ (0, 1) and F ∈ Fα. Furthermore, let
rj := rF/γ
j and qj := F (rj) , j ∈ Z.















for j ≥ 1.














, j ≥ 1,
where Hα,γ,ε is the unique fixed point of T Hα,γ,εJ = J .
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Proof of Proposition B.6-4. This proof follows the same structure as that of
Proposition B.6-2.
i.) Suppose Eq. (B.6-4) is true for some bounded function J and fix j ≥ 1. We

























































where (a) follows from an application of Proposition 2.2ii.) with w = rj and w
′ = rj+1;
and (b) follows from the monotonicity properties established in Lemma B.7-2.





























































































































































































where for the second inequality, we used the definition of the projection operator













. Since the above was for any j ≥ 1, we have
hence established that T Hα,γ,εJ satisfies Eq. (B.6-4).
ii.) Now starting with J = 0, and applying repeatedly the argument above leads





γvF (γv)f(v)dv ≥ qjqj−1
q0 γj−1
((T Hα,γ,ε)k J)(pi( qjqj−1
))
Furthermore, by Proposition B.6-3, T Hα,γ,εJ = J admits a unique bounded solution
Hα,γ,ε and
(T Hα,γ,ε)k J converges to Hα,γ,ε as k grows to ∞. Hence, we conclude that















This concludes the proof.
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B.6.1.3 Main lower bound
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Fix γ > 0, such that γ 6= 1. We have for any distribution
in Fα,
R(δγ, F ) =
1
opt(F )
C (γ, 0, rF/γ;F ) +
1
opt(F )
C (γ, rF/γ,∞;F ).
We have by Proposition B.6-2, in particular the first point, Eq.(B.6-2), with j =
−1− 2α˜ and iterate k times,
1
opt(F )
















where α˜ = −1{γ ∈ [0, 1]}.
By Corollary B.1, we have
1
opt(F )







By combining the last two results, we get that
1
opt(F )




















Now let us analyze the remaining term, we have by Proposition B.6-4,
1
opt(F )

















Hence, we conclude that











































and by Cole and Roughgarden (2014), we have q0 ≥ α1/(1−α) then, we conclude the
result.
B.6.2 Evaluation of the upper bound
We fix ε ≥ 0 and M > 0. We define a grid of [0,M ]
GMε =

[0,M ] if ε = 0,{
k ε : 1 ≤ k ≤ bM/εc} ⋃ {M} if ε > 0.
For any x in [0,M ], we define pi(x) to be the right-projection of x on the grid Gε, i.e.,
piM(x) := inf{y ∈ GMε : x ≤ y}.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. . We show the result in two main steps:
1. First we show the following Lemma,
Lemma B.6-1. We have




F (·|q0, q1, v¯) s.t. v¯ > 1 and (q0, q1) ∈ [0, 1]2 with q1 ≤ q0 ≤ 1






In particular, for any F in F¯Wα and ψ in M, we have
inf
F˜∈Fα
R(ψ, F˜ ) ≤ R(ψ, F )
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2. Then we leverage and the projection to derive the upper bound.
The proof of Lemma B.6-1 is deferred at the end of this proof. Now, let us show
the second point for that. Fix a distribution F in{
F (·|q0, q1, v¯) s.t. v¯ > 1 and (q0, q1) ∈ [0, 1]2 with q1 ≤ q0 ≤ 1,




and q1/q0 ≤ Γα(1)
}
.
In this case, we can show as in step 2 of Proposition 2.5, the optimal price is rF = 1
and the optimal revenue is given by opt(F ) = q0.
Let us fix γ > 0. The goal here is to upper bound the performance of the pricing
strategy δγ, i.e. R(δγ, F ). To do so, there are two cases either γ ≤M or γ > M.
Case: γ ≤ M. Then the performance of the mechanism δγ can be rewritten as
follows,












piM(γ)− ε) v)] ,
where the last inequality is a direct implication of the fact that γ ≤ piM(γ).
Case: γ > M. In this case, we have,
















Let us now bound each term in the expression above. Let us start by the first





γvF (γv)f(v)dv ≤ (1− F (1/M)).
Now, let us bound the second term. For any v ≥ 1/M , we have M v ≥ 1 = rF










MvF (Mv)f(v)dv ≤ R(δM , F )
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Hence we conclude that for any γ > M , we have
R(δγ, F ) ≤ (1− F (1/M)) +R(δM , F ).
Based on the two cases, we get that
sup
γ>0









γv F ((γ − ε) v)]) , (1− F (1/M)) +R(δM , F )] .
Since F is in F¯Wα , by the first step of the proof in particular Lemma B.6-1 we get
that










hence, we get the result.
Proof of Lemma B.6-1. The proof is organized around multiple steps. In a first
step, we show through Lemma B.6-2 that we can approach the family F¯Wα by a
sequence in Fα. In second step, we show that we can rate the limit of the performance
as the performance of the limit. Then we conclude the result in the last step.
Step 1. We first establish that any element FWα can be approached by a sequence
of elements of Fα.
Lemma B.6-2. Fix 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and FWα in FWα . If





then there exists a sequence {Fn : n ≥ 1} in Fα that convergences weakly to FWα , such
that there exists M > v1 such that for all n, Fn(M) = 1.
Step 2. Fix γ > 0 We next establish that any mechanism δγ inM, the worst-case
performance of this mechanism against Fα is upper bounded by the performance of
an alternate mechanism m˜ ∈M against FWα .
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For any distribution F in F ⊂ Fα, we have
R(δγ, F ) =
EF [γs 1{v ≥ γs}]
opt(F )
.
Fix an element F ∈ FWα . By assumption, there exists a sequence Fn from elements
in Fα such that Fn weakly converges to F .
Step 2a). We first establish that
lim inf
n↑∞
opt(Fn) ≥ opt(F ).
Let a = vF < ∞. Note that opt(Fn) = maxv≥0 vF n(v). In particular, we have for
any y < a,
opt(Fn) ≥ y F n(y).
By taking the lim inf we get that for any y < a,
lim inf
n↑∞
opt(Fn) ≥ y F (y).
by taking the limit as y ↑ a, we conclude that that for any v ≤ a
lim inf
n↑∞
opt(Fn) ≥ v F (v),
hence, we conclude that
lim inf
n↑∞
opt(Fn) ≥ opt(F ) = max
v≥0
v F (v),
Step 2b). Next, we derive an asymptotic upper bound on the ratio R(δγ, Fn).
Note that (Allouah and Besbes, 2018, Lemma 2) implies that for any ζ ≥ 0,
lim
n↑∞
EFn [v21{v1 > ζv2}] ≤

EF [v21{v1 > ζv2}] , if ζ 6= 1,
EF [min(v1, v2)] if ζ = 1.
(B.6-6)








EFn [γs 1{v > γs}]
≤ 1
opt(F )
[1{γ = 1}EF [min{s, v}] + 1{γ 6= 1}EF [γs 1{v > γs}]] .
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Noting that
EF [min{s, v}] = EF
[


















EF [γs 1{v ≥ γs}]
= R(δγ, F ).
Hence, we get that for all γ > 0
lim sup
n↑∞
R(δγ, Fn) ≤ R(δγ, F ).
Using Reverse Fatou’s Lemma (since R(δγ, Fn) ≤ 1) in conjunction with Eq.(2.4),
we get that for all ψ in M that
lim sup
n↑∞
R(ψ, Fn) ≤ R(ψ, F ).
By taking the infinimun over distribution and supremeum over mechanisms, we
conclude the proof.
Proof of Lemma B.6-2. Let us fix q0, q1 and v¯ <∞ such that FWα = F (·|q0, q1, v¯)
is in F¯Wα . Let us denote β0 = Γ−1α (q0) and β1 = Γ−1α (q1/q0).
The proof will be constructive in that we will explicitly exhibit a sequence Fn that
satisfies the properties in the result.
Step 1. We first construct the sequence and characterize its weak limit.
a) Let n ≥ 2, and define for x ≥ 1,









Note that there exists a unique xn ≥ 0 such that gn(xn) = 0. Indeed, gn is dif-
ferentiable with derivative given by g′n(x) = 1 − α − n (x − 1)n−1/2β1(v¯ − 1)n,
hence gn is strictly increasing on [1, 1 + (2(1− α)β1(v¯ − 1)n/n)1/(n−1)) and strictly
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decreasing on (1 + (2(1− α)β1(v¯ − 1)n/n)1/(n−1) ,+∞). Since gn(1) = 1/β1 > 0 and
lim
x↑∞
gn(x) = −∞ there exists a unique xn in [1,∞) s.t. gn(xn) = 0. Furthermore,
noting that gn(v¯) ≥ 1/2β1 > 0, we have that
xn > v¯, n ≥ 2.
Define the sequence of cumulative distribution functions Fn
F n(x) =










, if 1 < x < xn,
0 , if x ≥ xn.
(B.6-7)




We first show that the sequence xn is decreasing and is lower bounded by v¯. The
fact that xn > v¯ implies that
















= gn(xn) = 0.
In turn, by definition of xn+1, we get that
xn < xn+1.
Hence for all n ≥ 2, xn < x2. Setting M = x2, we have M > v¯ and Fn(M) = 1 for
all n ≥ 2.
Since xn is decreasing and lower bounded by v¯, it necessarily converges to some
limit l ≥ v¯. If l > v¯ then for n sufficiently large, we would have xn ≥ (1/2) (l + v¯)
implying that gn((1/2) (l + v¯)) ≥ 0. However limn↑∞ gn((1/2) (l + v¯)) = −∞, which




Note also that for x ≥ 1, gn is a polynomial with root xn, and no root in [1, xn].
Since g′n(xn) 6= 0, then necessarily the multiplicity of xn is one, so we can find a
polynomial function Qn such that gn(x) = (xn − x)Q(x) and for all x ∈ [1, xn]
we have Qn(x) > 0. In turn, by the Weierstrass extreme value theorem, we have
An := infx∈[1,xn] Qn(x) ∈ (0,∞) and Bn := supx∈[1,xn] Qn(x) ∈ (0,∞). and and we
can find Bn, An > 0 such that for all x ∈ [0, xn], we have An ≤ Qn(x) ≤ Bn.


































We deduce that Fn defined in (B.6-7) has no atoms. Furthermore, its (1−α)−virtual
value function is given by
φ1−αn (x) =

−1/β0, if x < 1,
1− α− 1/β1 , if 1 < x < xn.
Since F
W
α is in F¯Wα then 1− α− 1/β1 ≥ −1/β0 is clearly non-decreasing on [0, xn) .
Hence, Fn belongs to Fα.
Step 3. Let us establish that F n converges weakly to F
W
α . The points of con-
tinuity of F
W








= 0. Hence for
all x < v¯, using the Dominated Convergence Theorem, we have lim
n↑∞
F n(x) = F
W
α (x).
Fix x > v¯. Since xn converges to v¯, there exists N such that for all n ≥ N, we have





B.7 Proofs of Auxiliary Results
Proof of Proposition B.1-1. We show each point separately.
i). First note that the results of Fu et al. (2015) imply that R(M,F0) > 1/2. We
next establish that R(M≤1,F0) ≤ 1/2.
Let us consider the following distribution
F (v) =

1/(1 + v), if 0 ≤ v ≤ 1,
1, if v > 1.
Note that opt(F ) = 1/2. Furthermore, remark that F (·) = F (·|q0, q1, v¯), belongs
to the family introduced in (2.9), with q0 = 1/2, q1 = 0 and v¯ = 1. In turn, by
applying Lemma B.6-1 for any ψ in M≤1, we have
inf
F˜∈F0
























where the last inequality follows from the monotonicity of v/(1 + v). Hence against
this specific distribution F , post the sample or the identity dominates weakly any
level of deflation. This concludes the proof of i.).
ii). Let us now move to the second point. For that, let F be a distribution in F˜1,
which is a subset of the MHR class of distribution F1, and S its support and we let
s = inf{S } and s = sup{S }.
Let us fix a pricing mechanism Ψ(p|s) inM. Then there exists ψ(·) in D, such that
Ψ(p|s) = ψ(p/s). According to (2.3), the revenue generated by such a mechanism is
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γs F¯ (γs)dF (s)
)
dψ(γ).





We will establish that g is differentiable and g′(γ) ≤ 0, for all γ ≥ 1. In other
words, any mechanism that puts positive mass on inflation levels γ > 1 is domi-
nated by an alternative mechanism that transfers this mass to γ = 1. We have by
assumption that s := sup{S } <∞. Defining






Note that, for γ ≥ 1, h(γ, v) is differentiable with respect to γ for all v ∈ [s, s/γ]






vF (γv)− γv2f(γv)) f(v).







h(γ, v)f(v)dv − 1
γ2
sF (s)f(s/γ).

























Note that the function f/F is monotone non-decreasing on (0,∞) by the assumption







































We next analyze F (v)/F (γv). For that let us introduce the following function, for
z, t ≥ 0,
φ(t, z) :=
F (z + t)
F (t)
.
It is clear that φ(t, ·) is differentiable almost everywhere and ∂φ
∂z
≤ 0. Furthermore,
since F ∈ F1, φ(·, z) is monotone non-increasing (see, e.g., Ross (1996)) and almost
everywhere we have ∂φ
∂t
≤ 0. Noting that
F (γv)/F (v) = φ(v, (γ − 1)v),










(v, (γ − 1)v) + (γ − 1)∂φ
∂z
(v, (γ − 1)v).
The latter is non-positive for all γ ≥ 1 given that the partial derivatives are non-
positive. So F (γv)/F (v) is non-increasing in v. Hence, F (v)/F (γv) is non-decreasing
in v.





















Using (B.7-1), we conclude that g′(γ) ≤ 0 for all γ ≥ 1. In turn, we conclude that



















s F¯ (s)dF (s)
)
dψ(γ).
In other words, that for all F in F˜1,
R(ψ, F ) ≤ R(ψ˜, F ),
where for all γ ≥ 0,
ψ˜(γ) =

ψ(γ), if γ < 1,
1, if γ ≥ 1,
Since Ψ˜(p|s) = ψ˜(p/s) is in M≤1, we conclude the result.
Lemma B.7-1. Fix a distribution F in Fα and w < w′. Suppose that w > rF . Then










is non-increasing on [w,∞).
Proof of Lemma B.7-1. Fix a distribution F in Fα, let us define the following
distribution through its ccdf, for all v ∈ [w,∞)
G(v) =












, if v ≥ w.
Note that G belongs to Fα, hence its revenue curve is unimodal. We also note
that
wF (w) = qwwG(w)
and moreover by Lemma 2.2, we have that for all v in [w,w′],
vF (v) ≥ qw v G(v).
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Using the fact that the revenue curve of F is non-increasing on [w,∞) since w ≥ rF ,
we have that for all v in [w,w′],
qwv G(v) ≤ v F (v) ≤ wF (w) = qw w G(w).
On the other side, since the revenue curve of G is unimodal, then necessarily its
revenue curve is non-increasing on [w,∞).
Lemma B.7-2. For η in [0, 1]12. The function Aα (η) defined in Eq. (2.7) has the
following monotonicity properties
 Aα (η) is non-increasing in η1, η5 and η8.
 Aα (η) is non-decreasing in η3, η6 and η10.
Proof of Lemma B.7-2. We verify each property separately. We analyze only our
case of interest which is η in [0, 1]12.
Since the integrand is non-negative, the function Aα (η) is non-increasing in η1.
Note now that the function Γα(·) is continuous and non-decreasing. A direct
implication is that Aα (η) is non-decreasing in η6.
Also given that the function Γα(·) is non-decreasing, the function uα (β0, β1, β2, β3q)
(defined in Eq. (2.7)) is non-decreasing in β1 and non-increasingin β3. Hence Aα (η)
is non decreasing in η3 and η10 and non-increasing in η5 and η8. This completes the
proof.
























































Proof of Lemma B.7-3. We first note that from the definition of the projector



































































































































where the last inequality follows from the monotonicity properties established in
Lemma B.7-2.
Lemma B.7-4. i.) If j ≤ 1 and γ < 1, then for any (qˆj−1, pi (qj/qj−1)) is in
BLα,γ,ε (qˆj, pi (qj+1/qj)) .













Proof of Lemma B.7-4. i.) First note that by the unimodality of the revenue
curve and the optimality of rF = r0, we have rj−1 qj−1 ≤ rj qj for j ≤ 0, since
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rj−1 ≤ rj ≤ rF . Hence, qj−1 ≤ qj/γ, hence qj/qj−1 ≥ γ. By definition pi(·), we get
pi(qj/qj−1) ≥ γ.
For the left side of the second point, by Lemma 2.2 and picking consecutively


































































(pi (qj+1/qj)− ε) (pi (qj/qj−1)− ε)
))
,
This concludes the first case when j ≤ 0.
Let us now move to the second case which is j ≥ 1. In this case using the
monotinincity of the revenue curve, we have rj+1 qj+1 ≤ rj qj ≤ rj−1 qj−1 since
rj+1 ≥ rj ≥ rj−1 ≥ rF , for j ≥ 1. So, we get that, qj+1/qj ≤ γ and qj+1/qj ≤ γ2,
hence we conclude that
pi (qj+1/qj) ≤ γ + ε and (pi (qj+1/qj)− ε) (pi (qj/qj−1)− ε) ≤ γ2,
hence we get the result.
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)) ≤ 1, and Aα (βˆRγ,ε (ρ+, ρ−)) ≤ 1γ .
Proof of Lemma B.7-5. We will show each point separately. By using the explicit






)) ≤ ∫ 1
ρ+
uα(0
+, ρ+ − ε, γ, t)dt.
Moreover since uα(0








By using the expression of A and βˆRγ,ε and the definition of the minimum also that















Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Proofs of Section 3.3
Proof of Lemma 3.1
The distribution of the value of the virtual buyer corresponding to an intermediary
is the distribution of the maximum of the values of the buyers that the intermediary
was representing initially, i.e., (Gα)
K . We first ensure that the distribution Gα has
an increasing failure rate (IFR) and that the distribution of the maximum has also
an increasing failure rate. Then we characterize the optimal reserve price rco.







Since F has an increasing failure rate, then F¯ (x+ t)/F¯ (t) is decreasing in t, fol-
lowing (Barlow and Proschan, 1975, Definition 1.1, Section 3). We conclude that
G¯α(x+ t)/G¯α(t) is also decreasing in t implying that Gα is IFR.
Lemma C.1-1 (Preservation of IFR property by maximum operator). Consider a set
of n i.i.d. random variables drawn from a distribution with increasing failure rate.
Then the distribution of the maximum of these n variables has also an increasing
failure rate.
The proof of the latter result is deferred to Appendix C.4. In turn, the virtual
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≥ 1− F (v)
f(v)
,
where the last inequality is strict if F (v) < 1. Recall that rco and rin are the unique









Using the fact the distribution F has an increasing failure rate, we deduce that rco is
always such that rco > rin. In particular, the strict inequality is a consequence of the
fact we always have F (rin) < 1. (Indeed, it is clear that rin > 0 and f(rin) > 0 and
hence F (rin) = 1− rinf(rin) < 1.) This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 3.1
We first establish that Π∗co < Π
∗
in.
Π∗co = E [max{rco,w2} 1{w1 ≥ rco}] = E
[
max{rco,w2} 1{v[1]1:J ≥ rco}
]
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since w1 = v
[1]
















max{rin,v[2]1:J} 1{v[1]1:J ≥ rin}
]
= Π∗in,
where (a) follows since v
[2]
1:J ≥ w2 and the strict equality follows from the fact that
v
[2]
1:J > w2 > rco occurs with positive probability. Finally, (b) follows from the fact
that rin is the optimal reserve price when the intermediaries are multi-bidding.
Next, we establish that S∗co < S
∗
in.
S∗co = E[w[1] 1{w[1] ≥ rco}] = E[v[1]1:J 1{v[1]1:J ≥ rco}] < E[v[1]1:J 1{v[1]1:J ≥ rin}],
where the second equality follows from w1 = v
[1]
1:J and the inequality follows from the
fact that rco > rin. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.1






in. Second, we derive explicitly the myopic benefit
of collusionMBC , then we characterize U∗co−U∗in, then we conclude with a derivation
for SRI .
The social welfare when the intermediary is coordinating campaigns is given by
S∗co = E[v
[1]



















Similarly, the social welfare when the intermediary is multi-bidding is given by
S∗in = E[v
[1]










1:J , rin)1{v[1]1:J ≥ rin}
]











Through integration by parts applied to the last term we obtain∫ ∞
rin
































JK(1− (Gα(x))JK−1)− (JK − 1)(1− (Gα(x))JK)
)
dx.
Let us define H(x) := (Gα(x))
K and h(x) = K αf(x) (Gα(x))
K−1. Let us com-




max(w[2], r)1{w[1] ≥ r}
]









Applying a similar reasoning as earlier through integration by parts for the last term











J(1− (H(x))J−1)− (J − 1)(1− (H(x))J)
)
dx,
So we conclude that
Πco(r)




J(1− (H(x))J−1)− (J − 1)(1− (H(x))J)
)
dx




J(1− (Gα(x))JK−K)− (J − 1)(1− (Gα(x))JK)
)
dx.
Thus the optimal seller’s revenue is given by




J(1− (Gα(x))JK−K)− (J −1)(1− (Gα(x))JK)
)
dx.
Given the above, we can derive the myopic benefit.
MBC = Uco(rin)− Uin(rin)
= E[(max(rin,v[2]1:J)−max(rin,w[2]))1{w[1] ≥ rin}]









J(1− (Gα(x))JK−K)− (J − 1)(1− (Gα(x))JK)
)
dx.
Using the fact that the impact on the buyers is given by U∗co − U∗in = S∗co − Π∗co −
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(S∗in − Π∗in), we obtain
U∗co − U∗in



























J(1− (Gα(x))JK−K)− (J − 1)(1− (Gα(x))JK)
]
dx.
This concludes the proof.
C.2 Proofs of Section 3.4
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Fix ξ < 0. For 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, the corresponding value z(q) corresponding to the quantile





Let us now characterize the optimal reserve prices and their corresponding quan-
tiles. As mentioned earlier rin verifies rin = (1−Fξ(rin))/fξ(rin) = σ(1 + ξσrin). Hence
rin =
σ
1−ξ and using (C.2-1), we get
qin = (1− ξ)
1
ξ .
On the other hand, rco verifies the following rco = (1− F 2(rco))/(2 f(rco) F (rco)).
Using (C.2-1), we get
σ
ξ













Using Proposition 3.1 with J = 1 and K = 2, we get that






















































This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Here we assume that ξ ∈ [−1, 0]. We will construct an upper bound on U∗co − U∗in,
which we will show is piecewise-concave and decreasing on the intervals [−1,−0.5]
and [−0.5, 0]. We then establish that this upper bound is negative on those intervals.
In the proof, we will sometimes drop the dependence of some quantities on ξ to lighten
the notation.
We have


























































In the last inequality, we have used for all ξ < 0, qin = exp{ξ−1 ln(1 − ξ)} ≤
exp{−2/(2 − ξ) + γ(ξ)}, with γ(ξ) := (2/5− ln(3/2))1{ξ≤−0.5}. (We note that
γ(ξ) ≤ 0.). The inequality follows from the fact that ln(1 + x) ≥ 2x/(2 + x)− γ(−x)
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2− ξ (2− x
2−ξ)− 2
1− ξ (1− x
1−ξ) for − 1 ≤ ξ ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
In turn, we have







The upper bound on U∗co − U∗in is driven by the function h and the ratio qco/qin. The
next two results present properties of h and the quantiles and their ratio.
Lemma C.2-2. For any x ∈ [0, 1], h(·, x) is concave on [−1,−0.5] and on (−0.5, 0];
for any ξ ∈ [−1, 0], h(ξ, ·) is increasing.
Lemma C.2-3. The following properties hold.
i.) The quantiles qin(ξ) and qco(ξ) are decreasing with ξ on (−∞, 0).




where for all non-positive ξ, y, α(ξ, y) = exp{− (((2/y)− 1) (1− ξ)− 1)−1}.
Moreover α(ξ, y) is decreasing with respect to ξ and decreasing with respect to y.
This lemma characterizes how the quantiles change with the respect to the coef-
ficient of variation (which admits a one-to-one relationship with ξ). Furthermore, it
characterizes the relation ratio of the quantiles and suggests through an upper bound
that as the coefficient of variation increases, the seller’s reaction becomes more pro-
nounced in the sense that (the bound on) qco/qin decreases.
Using the bound above in conjunction with (C.2-2), we obtain that on any interval
[ξ, ξ], we have for all ξ ∈ [ξ, ξ],
U∗co − U∗in ≤ σ q1−ξin h (ξ, α(ξ, qco(ξ))) ≤ h
(
ξ, α(ξ, qco(ξ))
) ≤ h (ξ, α(ξ, qco(ξ))) ,(C.2-3)
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where the second inequality follows from the fact that h is nondecreasing with respect
to its second argument and α is nonincreasing with respect to its first argument; in
the third inequality, we used the fact that α is nonincreasing with respect to its
second argument and qco(ξ) is nonincreasing in ξ. In the next result, we analyze
h (ξ, α(−1, qco(−0.5))) and h (ξ, α(−0.5, qco(0))).
Lemma C.2-4. We have that h (ξ, α(−1, qco(−0.5))) < 0 on all ξ ∈ [−1,−0.5] and
h (ξ, α(−0.5, qco(0))) < 0 on all ξ ∈ (−0.5, 1].
Using this result and the bound (C.2-3) for [ξ, ξ] = [−1,−0.5] and [ξ, ξ] = [−0.5, 0],
we obtain
U∗co − U∗in < 0 for all ξ in [−1, 0].
This completes the proof.
C.3 Proofs of Section 3.5
Proof of Proposition 3.3
The proof is organized into two main steps. We first bound theMBC by conditioning
on the number of matches and how they are distributed between intermediaries. This
leads to a bound composed of two terms, which we bound separately to obtain a final
bound on MBC .
Step 1. For i = 1, . . . , K, let
Ei = {ω : w[2] = v[i+1]1:J } (C.3-4)
denote the event that the intermediary with the highest value has all the ith highest
values but does not uniquely have the (i + 1)st value. Let M denote the number of
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matches. Note that conditional on M = m matches, {Ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ min{K,m}} is a

















(max{v[2]1:J , rin} −max{w[2], rin})1{v[1]1:J ≥ rin}
]
.









(max{v[2]1:J , rin} −max{w[2], rin})1{v[1]1:J ≥ rin}|Ei,M = m
]








(max{v[2]1:J , rin} −max{v[i+1]1:J , rin})1{v[1]1:J ≥ rin}|Ei,M = m
]








max{v[2]1:J , rin} −max{v[i+1]1:J , rin}|M = m
]
P(Ei|M = m)P(M = m),
where the last equality follows from the fact that if v
[2]
1:J ≥ rin, then v[1]1:J ≥ rin by
definition, and (max{v[2]1:J , rin} − max{v[i+1]1:J , rin})1{v[1]1:J ≥ rin} = max{v[2]1:J , rin} −










max{v[2]1:J , rin} −max{v[i+1]1:J , rin}|M = m
]






max{v[2]1:J , rin} −max{v[3]1:J , rin}|M = m
]








max{v[2]1:J , rin} −max{v[i+1]1:J , rin}|M = m
]
P(Ei|M = m)P(M = m),
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Step 2. In this step we analyze each term in the RHS of (C.3-7). Let us first ana-
lyze the probability of events E1 and E2. For m ≥ 2, the quantity 1− P(E1|M = m)
represents the probability that the buyers that have the two highest values are repre-
sented by the same intermediary. Given the ex-ante symmetry across intermediaries,
we have:
P(E1|M = m) = 1− K − 1
JK − 1 . (C.3-8)
For m ≥ 3, given that the buyers that have the two highest values are represented
by the same intermediary, the probability that the latter has also the third value is
given by K−2
JK−2 , then we can conclude that
P(E2|M = m) = K − 1
JK − 1
(




Since for M = 2 matches, {E1, E2} is a partition of the probability space. we
have P(E2|M = 2) = 1− P(E1|M = 2), so using (C.3-8), we get
P(E2|M = 2) = K − 1
JK − 1 . (C.3-10)
Step 2.1 We first analyze the second sum in the RHS of (C.3-7). We have
E
[












1:J |M = m
]
(a)











≤ EF [V ] (1 + ln (JK)) ,
where in (a) we used a result from Barlow (1965) for IFR random variables and in
(b) we used that
∑n
k=1 1/k ≤ (1 + ln(n)) for any n ≥ 1.
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max{v[2]1:J , rin} −max{v[i+1]1:J , rin}|M = m
]
P(Ei|M = m)P(M = m)





P(Ei|M = m)P(M = m)





P(Ei|M = m)P(M = m)





P(Ei|M = m)P(M = m)
= (ln(JK) + 1)EF [V ]
KJ∑
m=3
(1− P(E1|M = m)− P(E2|M = m))P(M = m).
Using (C.3-8) and (C.3-9), we have
1− P(E1|M = m)− P(E2|M = m) = K − 1
JK − 1
K − 2











max{v[2]1:J , rin} −max{v[i+1]1:J , rin}|M = m
]
P(Ei|M = m)P(M = m)
≤ 1
J2
(ln(JK) + 1)EF [V ].





max{v[2]1:J , rin} −max{v[3]1:J , rin}|M = m
]





max{v[2]1:J , rin} − rin|M = 2
]
P(M = 2) +
K − 1
JK − 1(






max{v[2]1:J , rin} −max{v[3]1:J , rin}|M = m
]
P(M = m),
where we have used (C.3-9) and (C.3-10).
Noting that M has a Binomial distribution with success probability α = c/(JK),
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we have

























Note that (JK −m) ln(1− c/JK) ≤ − c
JK





m ≤ K ≤ JK. Hence one may bound P(M = m) as follows





















(y −max{x, rin}) m!
(m− 3)!(F (x))














































(y − x)F (y)f(y)dy
)
dx.
On another hand, we have
E
[












(y − rin)F (y)f(y)dy.
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max{v[2]1:J , rin} −max{v[3]1:J , rin}|M = m
]
































(y − x) e−cF (x)f(x)F (y)f(y)dydx
]
+O(ln(JK)/J2).
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.3.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
We aim to lower bound
−SRI = Uco(rin)− Uco(rco(α,K)).
In the proof, we will sometimes use the shorthand notation rco for rco(α,K) to avoid
cluttering the exposition. The proof is organized around four steps. First, we show
that Uco(r) is differentiable and characterize its derivative. Second, we investigate
the derivative of the utility at rco. Third, we bound the difference in reserve prices
rco(α,K)−rin. In a last step, we conclude by combining the various bounds to obtain




co the distribution of the jth highest value among intermediaries and
by f
(j)
co the corresponding density on (0,+∞). Similarly, we denote by F (j)in and f (j)in
the corresponding functions for the jth highest value among all buyers.
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Step 1. We first establish that the buyers’ surplus Uco(·) is differentiable and char-
acterize its derivative.
Lemma C.3-5 (derivative of Uco). The buyers’ surplus Uco(·) is twice differentiable
on the interior of the support with derivative given by
U ′co(r) = −P{w[2] ≤ r ≤ v[1]1:J} for any r > 0.
Furthermore, if the probability of a match α ≤ 1 and the number of intermediaries
J ≥ 3 then
|U ′′co(r)| ≤ 3cf(r) for any r > 0.
Note that the derivations in the proof of Lemma C.3-5 also allow to conclude that
U ′co(rco) = S
′
co(rco)− Π′co(rco) = S ′co(rco) = −rcof (1)co (rco).
In turn, one may apply Taylor’s theorem to deduce that for any r ∈ S ∩ [rin,∞[,
there exist r˜ ∈ S ∩ [rin,∞[ such that




= −rcof (1)co (rco)(r − rco) +
U ′′co(r˜)
2
(r − rco)2. (C.3-12)
Step 2. We next analyze f
(1)
co (·). We first note that f (1)in (r) = f (1)co (r) for any r ∈
S \{0} since the maximum value among all buyers v[1]1:J coincides with the maximum




Lemma C.3-6. For any r ∈ S \ {0}, the density of v[1]1:J is bounded below as follows
f (1)co (r) = f
(1)








if we assume that 4
√
JK ≥ 2ce and 4√JK ≥ 2.
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So the derivative of the utility is bounded by








Step 3. Next, we analyze rco(α,K).
Proposition C.3-1 (reserve price - Lemma 3.2). For any α,K such that α ≤ 1/2





− (α + 3(Kα)2)C1 ≤ rco(α,K)− rin ≤ Kα rine 11−α ,
where C1 is a constant depending only on the distribution F .
Step 4. Combining (C.3-12), Lemma C.3-5, (C.3-13) and Proposition C.3-1, we
have
−SRI
= −rcof (1)co (rco)(rin − rco) +
1
2
U ′′co(r˜)(rin − rco)2


























































































We consider the following function rf(r) exp{−cF¯ (r)}, given that f has a continuous
derivative bounded around rin then the latter has a continuous derivative bounded at
rin using Taylor expansion, we get that there exist constants C2 and C3 such that
crcof(rco)e
−cF¯ (rco) ≥ crinf(rin)e−cF (rin) − C2(rco − rin)
(a)
≥ crinf(rin)e−cF (rin) − C2Kα rine 11−α
f(r˜) ≤ C3
where in (a), we have used the RHS inequality in Proposition C.3-1. So we conclude
that








































then if α ≤ 1/2 and 4√JK ≥ 2ce and 4√JK ≥ 2 and J ≥ 3, we get
|R2| ≤ C4
(√
αKα + α + (Kα)2
)
.
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.4.
Proof of Theorem 3.3
For this proof, we simplify first the expression of the bound in Theorem 3.2 and then
compute in closed each term of the simplified bound for the case of Generalized Pareto
distributions. In turn, we find explicitly the root of the simplified bound (i.e. where
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the bound is 0). Then we study the relation between this root and the coefficient of
variation to conclude the result.

























(y − rin)F (y)f(y)c2(e−cF (y) − e−cF (rin))dy.


































where in (a), we have used that (e−c + e−cF (y) − e−cF (rin)) ≤ 1 for all y ≥ rin and in
(b), we have used the Markov inequality, since for x ≥ rin∣∣∣∣12 ((x− rin)+)F (x)2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ((x− rin)+) (E[V ])2x2 ≤ (E[V ])2x →x→∞ 0.
Hence, we have














Let us analyze the main term of the previous bound as a function of ξ. As computed
in Section 3.4, we have qin = (1 − ξ)
1
ξ . Let us now compute explicitly each term in
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(1− ξ) = (1− ξ)
2−2ξ
ξ .





















Since ξ ≤ 0 then the sign of the RHS is the sign of the following quantity




The function γ(ξ, c) is increasing in c and the value at c = 0 is −1. This implies that
for an ξ ≤ 0, there exists a threshold cξ such that for all c ≤ cξ, U∗co − U∗in ≤ 0. Let
us look in details to the threshold cξ for which γ(ξ, c) = 0, i.e., exp{−cξ(1− ξ)1/ξ} =
(1− ξ)(2− ξ). We can solve for cξ to obtain








Since (1−ξ)−1ξ and − ln(1−ξ
2−ξ ) are increasing positive functions in ξ then cξ is increasing
with ξ. Hence, the maximum value c¯ of the threshold cξ is reached when ξ → 0−.
Fix any c < c¯, since the function that maps the ξ to the threshold cξ is strictly
increasing and continuous in ξ, there exists ξc such that cξc = c. In turn, we have for
all ξ ≥ ξc, we have γ(ξ, c) ≤ 0. Recall that ξ = (CV 2 − 1)/(2CV 2) is increasing in
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the coefficient of variation CV , so we conclude that there is corresponding threshold
(τc := 1/
√
1− ξc) on the coefficient of variation, such that for all CV ≥ τc, we have
U∗co − U∗in ≤ 0. This completes the proof.
C.4 Proofs of auxiliary results
Proof of Lemma C.1-1
Let n ≥ 2 and X1, X2, ..., Xn be i.i.d. random variables drawn from an IFR distribu-
tion F and define M = max(X1, X2, ..., Xn). The cumulative distribution function of
M is (F )n. If F (x) = 0, then the hazard rate is given by zero and if F (x) > 0, the
hazard rate is given by
λM(x) =
n f(x) (F (x))n−1
1− (F (x))n =
n f(x) (F (x))n−1










Note that f(x)/F (x) is non-decreasing since by assumption F is IFR. In addition
the fact that F is non-decreasing and non-negative implies that 1 + 1/F (x) + . . . +
1/(F (x))n−1 is non-increasing. In turn, (1 + 1/F (x) + . . . + 1/(F (x))n−1)−1 is seen
to be non-decreasing. We deduce that λM(·) is non-decreasing. This concludes the
proof.
Proof of Lemma C.2-2
Fix ξ in [−1, 0]. We first prove that h(ξ, ·) is increasing for x ∈ [0, 1]. Indeed,
∂h(ξ, x)
∂x
= −e− 22−ξ+γ(ξ)x1−ξ + 2x−ξ = x−ξ(2− e− 22−ξ+γ(ξ)x) ≥ 0,
where in the last inequality, we used the fact that ξ ≤ 0, x ∈ [0, 1] and γ(ξ) ≤
0. Next, we prove that h is concave with respect to the first component on the
intervals [−1. − 0.5] and (−0.5, 0). For that we will show that the second partial
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derivative w.r.t to ξ of h is increasing w.r.t x, and then show that its maximum value
at x = 1 is negative. It is clear that h is infinitely differentiable in the considered







































The right-hand-term above is non-positive for all ξ ∈ [−1, 0] so we conclude that
h(·, x) is concave on the intervals [−1. − 0.5] and (−0.5, 0). This completes the
proof.
Proof of Lemma C.2-3
i.) Let us show that the quantiles qin and qco are decreasing with ξ.

























Since for all x > 0 we have ln(x) ≤ x− 1 then we conclude that ∂qin/∂ξ ≤ 0.
Let us now show that qco is decreasing. We consider the following function for all
ξ ≤ 0 and 0 < q < 1.





We have G(qco, ξ) = 0 and G(·, ·) is differentiable so by the implicit function


































ln(q−ξco )− (q−ξco − 1)
)
,
where in (a), we used the fact that G(qco, ξ) = 0. It is clear that ∂G/∂q > 0. Since
ξ < 0 and since ln(x) ≤ x − 1 for all x > 0, we also observe that ∂G/∂ξ > 0. We
conclude that ∂qco/∂ξ < 0.
ii.) Recalling that qin = (1 − ξ)1/ξ and (1/ξ)(1 − qξco) = (2 − qco)/(2(1 − qco)), we
have
[qin(ξ)]
























≥ −qco(ξ) ≥ −qin(ξ)
≥ −qin(−1) > −1,



















where in the last inequality we used that ξ < 0 and that ln(1 +x) ≤ x for all x > −1.





























































































Since 0 ≤ qco ≤ 1 it is clear that α(ξ, y) is decreasing with respect to ξ. Let us now
show that α is nonincreasing with respect to y. The function
− ((2z − 1) (1− ξ)− 1)−1 for z ≥ 1,
is nondecreasing in z for all ξ. Since 1/y is non-increasing in y, we conclude that
α(ξ, y) is nonincreasing with respect to y. This concludes the proof.
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Proof of Lemma C.2-4
We first find approximations for qco(0) and qco(−0.5).
Consider ξ = 0. The virtual value function of the maximum of two exponential
random variables in terms of quantiles is given by
φ(q) = − ln(q)− 2− q
2(1− q) .
We recall that the latter is non increasing and the optimal quantile qco verifies φ(qco) =
0 and we have φ(0.29) > 0 which means that qco(0) > 0.29.
For ξ = −1
2







which can be re written as
−5q√q + 4q + 6√q − 4 = 0,
so
√
qco verifies a third degree equation. The latter can be solved exactly using
Cardano’s method. It has three roots, and only one belongs to the interval [0, 1].
The latter is bounded as follows
0.369 ≤ qco(−0.5) ≤ 0.37.

























(ξ − 2)3 .
Now we have all ingredients to evaluate the right partial derivatives at ξ =
−0.5, x = α(−0.5, 0.29) and ξ = −1, x = α(−1, 0.369), we find that both are negative.
Given that h(·, x) is concave on the intervals [−1,−0.5] and (−0.5,−1], we deduce
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that h (·, α(−0.5, 0.29)) is decreasing on [−0.5, 0] and h (·, α(−1, 0.369)) is decreasing
on [−0.5,−1].
Hence we get that for any ξ ∈ (−0.5, 0],
h(ξ, α(−0.5, qco(0))) ≤ h(ξ, α(−0.5, 0.29)) ≤ lim
ξ↓−0.5+
h(ξ, α(−0.5, 0.29)) < 0.
Similarly, for any ξ ∈ [−1,−0.5],
h(ξ, α(−1, qco(−0.5))) ≤ h(ξ, α(−1, 0.369)) ≤ h(−1, α(−1, 0.369)) < 0.
The proof is complete.
Proof of Lemma C.3-5
Recall the expression for Gα(·) given in (3.1). For any x ≥ 0, we denote the distribu-
tion function of the maximum of each intermediary by H(x), i.e., H(x) := (Gα(x))
K .



















− E [w[2]1{w[2] ≥ r}]− r E [1{w[2] < r}1{v[1]1:J ≥ r}]











w[2]1{w[2] ≥ r}] ,
h3(r) := r E
[
1{w[2] < r}1{v[1]1:J ≥ r}
]
.
We next compute the derivative of the functions hi(r), i = 1, 2, 3. Note that for




v dF (i)co (v),
230
and hence hi(r) is differentiable at any r > 0 and
h′i(r) = −r f (i)co (r).
Note that
F (1)co (r) = [H(r)]
J , f (1)co (r) = JH
′(r)[H(r)]J−1,
F (2)co (r) = [H(r)]
J + J [H(r)]J−1(1−H(r)),
f (2)co (r) = J(J − 1)H ′(r)(1−H(r))[H(r)]J−2.
We now turn to h3(r).
h3(r) = r E
[
1{w[2] < r}1{v[1]1:J ≥ r}
]
= r J H(r)J−1(1−H(r)).
h3(r) is differentiable since f is twice differentiable and furthermore,
h′3(r)
= J H(r)J−1(1−H(r)) + r J (J − 1)H ′(r)H(r)J−2 (1−H(r))− r J H ′(r)H(r)J−1
= J H(r)J−1(1−H(r)) + rf (2)co (r)− rf (1)co (r)
= J H(r)J−1(1−H(r))− h′2(r) + h′1(r).
By combining the result of the three previous terms, we obtain that Uco(r) is
differentiable for r > 0 with derivative given by
U ′co(r) = h
′
1(r)− h′2(r)− h′3(r) = −J H(r)J−1(1−H(r)) = −P
{
w[2] ≤ r ≤ v[1]1:J
}
.
Next, we compute U ′′co(r) then try to bound it. U
′
co is differentiable for r > 0 and
the second derivative is given by
U ′′co(r) = JH
′(r)[H(r)]J−1 − J(J − 1)H ′(r)(1−H(r))[H(r)]J−2
= JH ′(r)[H(r)]J−2 [H(r)− (J − 1)(1−H(r))]
= JH ′(r)[H(r)]J−2 [1− J(1−H(r))]
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Since H ′(r) = Kαf(r)(Gα(r))K−1, and αJK = c, we have
U ′′co(r) = cf(r)[Gα(r)]
KJ−K−1 [1− J(1−H(r))] .
We get that






Since (1− [Gα(r)]K) ≤ −K ln(1− α(1− F (r))) and −x ln(x) ≤ e−1 for all x ≥ 0




JK −K − 1
(
(1− α(1− F (r)))JK−K−1) (− ln((1− F (r)))JK−K−1))
≤ JK






So we conclude that if J ≥ 3























≤ cf(r) [1 + 3e−1]
≤ 3cf(r),
where in (a) we have used that c = JKα and in (b) we have used that J ≥ 3. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma C.3-6
Note that the distribution of the maximum v
[1]








in (r|M = m)P (M = m) = f(r)
JK∑
m=1
mFm−1(r)P (M = m) .
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The focus of this proof is to bound the probability of matching P (M = m) . Since M
has a Binomial distribution with success probability α = c/(JK), then






















On one hand, using the fact that c/JK = α < 1 and the fact that ln(1 + x) ≥









= eJK ln(1−c/(JK)) ≥ e−c/(1+c/JK) ≥ e−c.
Let us note d = 4
√
JK. For any m ≤ d we have


















Furthermore using the fact that ln(1+x) ≥ x/(1+x) for all x > −1 and ex ≥ 1+x
for all x, we have(






) ≥ e −d(d−1)JK−d+1 ≥ 1− d(d− 1)
JK − d+ 1 ≥ 1−
d2
d4 − d+ 1 .
So we conclude that the probability of matching is lower bounded as follows for
any m ≤ d:





d4 − d+ 1).



















































Let Z be a random variable with Poisson distribution with mean cF (r) and let
t = ln( d
cF (r)


































ecF (r) − (c e
d
)d)









ecF (r) − ( c e
d
)d)
d4 − d+ 1
]






d4 − d+ 1cf(r)e
−cF¯ (r)
]






d4 − d+ 1
]
.
















2d2 − 1 ,
d2















This completes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition C.3-1
The goal of this proof is to bound the difference rco − rin from both sides. In a first
step, we will bound the difference from above then in a second step, we will bound it
from below. In the whole proof, we assume that α < 1 and αK < 1.
Step 1. Upper bound rco − rin
Let














≥ 1− F (v)
f(v)
,



























≤ φα,K(v) ≤ φF (v).
Both the right-hand-side and the left-hand-side are monotonically increasing by the
IFR assumption on F . Let r˜in denote the unique solution to

















rin = φ˜(r˜in)− φ˜(rin)





− 1− F (rin)
f(rin)
)
≥ r˜in − rin,
and hence
0 ≤ rco − rin ≤
(
1
(1− α)K − 1
)
rin.
We have for all α < 1,
(1− α)−K = e−K ln(1−α)
(a)
≤ e Kα1−α ≤ e Kα1−α (b)= 1 + Kα
1− αe




where in (a), we have used the fact that for all x > −1 we have x
1+x
≤ ln(1 + x) and
α < 1. While in (b), we have used the fact by the Taylor expansion of ex around
0 at the point Kα
1−α , there exists 0 ≤ x˜ ≤ Kα1−α ≤ 11−α -(because αK < 1)- such that
e
Kα
1−α = 1 + Kα
1−αe
x˜.
We conclude that that for α < 1 and Kα < 1
0 ≤ rco − rin ≤ Kα
1− α rin e
1
1−α . (C.4-14)
This concludes the first step.
Step 2. The goal of this step is to find a lower bound of order Kα on the difference





Note that for any k ≥ 0, we have Gkα(v) = exp
{
k ln(1− αF¯ (v))} and hence, using




In turn, using the fact that for all x ≤ 0, exp(x) ≤ 1 + x+ x2/2, we have
Gkα(v) ≤ 1− kαF¯ (v) + (kα)2(F¯ (v))2/2.
We hence have for αK < 1,











1− (K − 1)αF¯ (rco) + ((K − 1)αF¯ (rco))2/2
]
(a)



























The inequality (a) falls from the fact that (K − 1)αF¯ (rco) < 1 and for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
we have x(1− x/2) ≤ 1/2 and for x ≤ 1
2
, we have 1
1−x ≥ 1 + x.
Using the fact that α ≤ αK < 1 and F¯ (rco) ≤ 1 and the distribution is IFR then
the remainder verifies |R1| ≤ 2 F¯ (rin)f(rin) (αK)2.

























































where in the last two inequalities, we have used the fact that F¯ (rco) ≤ 1 and the
monotonicity of the hazard rate and that rco ≥ rin.
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Noting that F¯ /f = v − φ(v), we have, using a Taylor expansion that there exists






+ (1− φ′(rin))(rco − rin)− (1/2)φ′′(r˜)(rco − rin)2
There exists C1 such that φ
′′ ≤ C1 because f is twice continuously differentiable,
and f(rin) > 0, so φ(·) is twice continuously differentiable so its second derivative is





+ (1− φ′(rin))(rco − rin)− (1/2)C1(rco − rin)2.








+ (rco − rin)H ′(r˜) ≥ (F¯ (rin))
2
f(rin)
− C2(rco − rin),
where H(r) = (F¯ (r))
2
f(r)
and |H ′(r˜)| ≤ C2, such C2 exists since, F is twice differentiable
and f(rin) > 0 so H
′(·) is twice differentiable and bounded around rin.
By combining the last two bounds, we get that rco verifies the following:



































Let us assume that α ≤ 1/2. If we denote M1 := rinφ′(rin) max(2, rin, 2C1e4, C2e2)
and using (C.4-14), we get that |R2| ≤ (α + 3(Kα)2)M1φ′(rin). So we conclude that
φ′(rin)rco ≥ φ′(rin)rin + αK (F¯ (rin))
2
2f(rin)
− (α + 3(Kα)2)M1φ′(rin).
So
rco ≥ rin + αK (F¯ (rin))
2
2f(rin)φ′(rin)
− (α + 3(Kα)2)M1,
The result follows.
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Figure C.5-1: High level overview of basic actors and communication links in the real
time bidding market.
C.6 Generalized Pareto distributions
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Figure C.6.1: The density function for generalized Pareto distributions for different
parameters of ξ when σ = 1− ξ.
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